In the United States, the 1970s were the decade of inflation. While it may come as a surprise to some that the average inflation rate for the decade was only 6.8%, this pace is roughly quadruple the rate of the previous two decades and double the long-run historical norm (see table 12.1).
In the 1970s, why was inflation so high?
- Rapid inflation occurs when the prices of goods and services in an economy grow rapidly, reducing savings’ buying power.
- In the 1970s, the United States had some of the highest rates of inflation in recent history, with interest rates increasing to nearly 20%.
- This decade of high inflation was fueled by central bank policy, the removal of the gold window, Keynesian economic policies, and market psychology.
Why was the economy in the 1970s so bad?
In actuality, the 1970s were a period of growing prices and unemployment; the periods of slow economic growth could all be attributed to high oil prices’ cost-push inflation.
What happened during the 1970s inflationary period?
What is the point of being understandable? “Since the 1970s, we haven’t seen an environment where supply shocks are the primary driver of inflation,” said Boivin, a former deputy governor of the Bank of Canada. But that’s about where the parallels end.
Oil embargoes in the 1970s exacerbated inflation by driving up energy prices, slowing the economy and fuelling inflation. The current supply shocks are largely the product of a demand surge connected to the global economy’s resumption following the COVID-19 stoppage. That’s a significant distinction.
In many ways, the 1970s and the current scenario are diametrically opposed, according to Boivin. Growth and activity outpaced the global economy’s productive potential, resulting in stagflation half a century ago. The economy is currently experiencing supply-chain bottlenecks, which is not the same as a recession. In fact, he claims, the economy is still working below its productive capability.
That means, unlike in the 1970s, supply will finally rise to meet demand, rather than demand falling to meet supply.
While both instances featured skyrocketing oil prices, the scenario in the 1970s involved oil supply disruptions by producers, which slowed the economy and degraded its operating capacity. Energy prices are rising now because the economy has recovered, and “there is no way to recover without energy,” according to Boivin. “Causality works in the opposite direction.”
In an Oct. 18 note, Neil Dutta, head of U.S. economics at Renaissance Macro Research, wrote, “To be in stagflation, the economy must by definition be stagnant, and the evidence for this is pretty thin.” “By all indications, the economy is still in full swing.”
Dutta used the Institute for Supply Management’s new orders and prices paid indexes to spot indicators of stagflation.
Is inflation bad for business?
Inflation isn’t always a negative thing. A small amount is actually beneficial to the economy.
Companies may be unwilling to invest in new plants and equipment if prices are falling, which is known as deflation, and unemployment may rise. Inflation can also make debt repayment easier for some people with increasing wages.
Inflation of 5% or more, on the other hand, hasn’t been observed in the United States since the early 1980s. Higher-than-normal inflation, according to economists like myself, is bad for the economy for a variety of reasons.
Higher prices on vital products such as food and gasoline may become expensive for individuals whose wages aren’t rising as quickly. Even if their salaries are rising, increased inflation makes it more difficult for customers to determine whether a given commodity is becoming more expensive relative to other goods or simply increasing in accordance with the overall price increase. This can make it more difficult for people to budget properly.
What applies to homes also applies to businesses. The cost of critical inputs, such as oil or microchips, is increasing for businesses. They may want to pass these expenses on to consumers, but their ability to do so may be constrained. As a result, they may have to reduce production, which will exacerbate supply chain issues.
What is the extent of inflation?
Year-on-year inflation rates have reached their greatest levels in over three decades as the global economy recovers from the COVID-19 epidemic. Is this higher inflation just a blip on the radar, or is it here to stay? Patricia Sanchez Juanino, Corrado Macchiarelli, and Barry Naisbitt explore US inflation possibilities for the next 18 months to answer these questions. They believe that inflation will peak at 5% in the coming months and then remain close to 4% in the near term: this may happen if, for example, inflation expectations continue to rise.
The 12-month CPI inflation rate in the United States reached its highest level since 1990 in October 2021, at 6.2 percent year-on-year. Pent-up demand and rising energy prices have been primary drivers of the increase, but supply chain constraints and spikes in other commodity prices have also played a role. A crucial policy question is whether the current rise in US inflation is only temporary, as it was in 2008, or if it signals the start of a longer era of inflation above the 2% objective, like it did in the 1970s and early 1980s.
The Federal Reserve has revised up its annual inflation predictions for both this year and next year as the year has progressed. The September median prediction for year-on-year PCE (household consumption) inflation in the fourth quarter increased to 4.2 percent this year and 2.2 percent next year. Both forecasts are higher than those issued in March: 2.4 percent in 2021 and 2% in 2022. Despite the fact that predictions have risen, Federal Reserve policymakers still expect inflation to decline considerably next year. The Federal Open Markets Committee (the group that decides on the right monetary policy stance) stated in November that it will cut its monthly purchases of Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities, a policy known as tapering. However, it continued to emphasize that the spike in inflation, as reflected in its inflation estimates, was primarily transitory.
While we anticipate a reduction in inflationary pressure, we are concerned that the reduction will be insufficient. Annual US PCE inflation would grow from 1.2 percent in the fourth quarter of last year to 5.1 percent this year, then decline to 2.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2022, according to the National Institute’s Autumn 2021 Global Economic Outlook. However, we believe that the risks are skewed to the upside, and that if they materialize, the Federal Reserve will be forced to tighten monetary policy sooner than it appears to be planning.
Inflation scenarios for 2022-23
To demonstrate the dangers, we employ Huw Dixon’s technique from Cardiff University, which allows us to make stylized assumptions about future monthly price fluctuations in order to generate various annual inflation routes over the next 18 months. Three scenarios are examined (rather than forecasts).
In the best-case scenario, monthly inflation reduces steadily until it reaches its average level for the five years prior to the pandemic in June of the following year, and then stays there. After that, the monthly price changes are converted into year-over-year inflation. On this measure, annual PCE inflation would decline to 2.1 percent in the fourth quarter of next year, roughly in line with the Federal Reserve’s consensus forecast.
We look at two other scenarios that are much less reassuring. We assume that the extent of monthly price increases decreases, but not as quickly or as far as before the pandemic, so that it reaches twice the pre-pandemic period average in June. In this instance, annual PCE inflation in the fourth quarter of next year would be 3.2 percent.
Finally, if monthly PCE inflation stays at its current level (0.3 percent) for the rest of the year, annual inflation in the fourth quarter of next year will be 3.9 percent. Figure 1 depicts the year-on-year inflation projected lines for several scenarios.
Figure 1: Year-over-year PCE inflation projections based on stylized monthly assumptions (percent)
The most intriguing aspect of these scenarios is that they all hint to annual inflation being near 5% in the next months. Figure 1 shows that, despite monthly inflation returning to the 2015-2019 average by next June, year-on-year inflation continues to rise over the following few months, reaching 5%, as lower monthly rises in 2020 are replaced by greater monthly increases this year. In the best-case scenario, annual inflation returns to 2% by the end of next year. If monthly inflation stays at 0.3 percent, year-over-year inflation will remain persistently close to 4%.
These are simply projections based on stylized assumptions, not forecasts or a deep examination of the underlying reasons influencing recent and future monthly price fluctuations. They are broadly consistent with the idea that annual inflation risks will remain strong through 2022, even if recent price hikes owing to supply chain disconnections fade away over time. If policies do not prevent inflation expectations from rising, the situation may worsen.
With its new mandate and a strong focus on maximum employment, the Federal Reserve expects a temporary (or, in today’s lingo, transitory) overshoot of inflation above its target, especially when it follows a long period of undershooting. If inflation expectations become skewed and wage-push inflation forces increase, a temporary overshoot could turn into a long-term one.
Higher inflation may be here to stay
According to our forecasts, the current rate of inflation could return to its target rate by the end of 2022. However, it appears that inflation will continue to exceed the objective for some years. If inflation reaches 5%, the Federal Reserve will need to significantly up its policy messaging, arguing that the spike is just temporary and convincing families, businesses, and financial markets that monthly inflation will soon revert to lower levels. If the current supply-chain disruption and global energy price increases end, its arguments will be strengthened.
The Federal Reserve has yet to clarify the timeframe of ending quantitative easing, reversing it, and subsequently raising policy interest rates. For example, an unexpected policy reversal to protect central bank credibility could cause a quick financial market slump and public sector balance sheet imbalances. How central banks respond to increasing inflation, through a mix of terminating quantitative easing and raising policy rates, will determine bond prices.
Inflation expectations are rising, and the Federal Reserve needs to create contingency plans for its actions if a 5% inflation rate appears to be embedded. If it lifts its inflation predictions again after its December meeting, as we expect, such contingency measures may be required sooner rather than later. Given the uncertainty about the duration of higher inflation, wages, and an employment rate that remains below pre-pandemic levels, we believe the Federal Reserve will be cautious in tightening policy, especially because it will have to choose between stabilizing below-target employment and stabilizing above-target inflation. Moving too far, too fast, risks squandering the best chance it has to avoid near-deflationary traps with interest rates at their lowest levels. They are likely to pay the price if it is a time of significantly above-target inflation.
- “US inflation peaking soon?” in National Institute of Economic and Social Research (Box A), Global Economic Outlook, Series B., No. 4, Autumn, pp. 24-30, is the basis for this article. ‘Global Economic Outlook’, Series B, No. 4, Autumn, NIESR (2021).
Why was inflation so high in the United Kingdom in the 1970s?
- The mortgage market was deregulated by the Bank of England, which meant that High Street Banks may now lend mortgages (not just local building societies). This contributed to an increase in home values and consumer wealth.
- 1972 was the year of the Barber Boom. With huge tax cuts against a backdrop of rapid economic growth, chancellor Anthony Barber made a beeline for growth in the 1972 budget.
- Credit expansion. The first widespread use of credit cards occurred in the 1970s (Access). This aided in the formation of a consumption bubble.
In 1974, why was inflation so high?
This is how the tale goes: The Vietnam War cost President Lyndon B. Johnson a lot of money. The economy was saturated with money as a result of wartime spending, and prices began to rise. The entire economy lost faith in the assumption that prices would remain stable as a result of LBJ’s extravagant spending and the Federal Reserve’s willingness to tolerate it. Once everyone expected inflation, it became a self-fulfilling prophecy: workers demanded higher salaries because they expected prices to rise; businesses raised their prices because they expected wages to rise; and so on, in an ever-escalating “wage-price spiral.”
The inflation rate was nearing double digits, or possibly higher, towards the end of the 1970s, depending on the measure.
The Federal Reserve’s new, bold strategy brought the experience to a close. Now, here’s a quick rundown of how the Federal Reserve influences the economy: The Federal Reserve, in general, is in charge of determining how much money is flowing in the economy at any particular time. Inflation can occur when there is too much money; too little money can result in low inflation, but it can also cause firms and families to have difficulty borrowing money, bringing the economy to a halt.
The Fed chose to grind the economy to a halt in 1979 in order to control inflation. When Jimmy Carter appointed Paul Volcker as Fed chair that year, he raised interest rates, effectively shutting off the Fed’s money supply and warning to markets that additional rate hikes would follow until the situation was resolved.
What resulted was a gradual drop in inflation but also two major recessions in the early ’80s that brought the jobless rate to its greatest level since the Great Depression. The method worked because the Fed demonstrated its willingness to “shed blood, lots of blood, other people’s blood” to bring inflation under control, according to Reagan aide Michael Mussa.
Today, that story lingers over the economy. Inflation-watchers see the high-spending Biden administration and its extremely cooperative economic policy partner, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, as a replay of the 1970s inflation story.
Biden signed a $1.9 trillion stimulus bill less than two months after taking office, with the majority of the money going toward $1,400 payments to most Americans. Powell is accommodating this strategy by keeping interest rates around zero and buying Treasury bonds, effectively supporting the stimulus with printed money; moreover, during the debate over Biden’s bill, he urged Congress to pursue stimulus, dismissing fears that this would generate inflation.
Worries of a 1970s flashback appear to be justified, with inflation reaching 3.4 percent in May, the highest level in 30 years. But there’s reason to believe that the threat of a rerun is exaggerated. New economic study reveals that the picture of the Great Inflation of the 1970s told by orthodox economics may not be totally accurate.
Other policies and conditions that may have contributed to the tragedy of the 1970s are examined in this new account, which had traditionally been overlooked in historical narratives. This narrative focuses on specific difficulties that drove inflation in the 1970s that are no longer relevant now, such as an energy crisis and upheaval in global food markets.
To put it another way, this time could be different. Understanding this should assist policymakers steer policymakers away from pouring “other people’s blood” unnecessarily.
The standard story of the Great Inflation of the 1960s and ’70s
We can observe that prices began to climb more rapidly year over year during the mid-1960s, using the Fed’s favored measure of inflation.
They varied a little after a brief recession in 1970, but then soared to new heights in 1974-75 and again at the close of the decade. Inflation rose after Volcker’s inauguration in 1979, but quickly fell. It has never again exceeded 4% on an annual basis.
According to popular belief, the Great Inflation was the outcome of a series of policy decisions beginning with President Lyndon B. Johnson’s fiscal policies, particularly the Vietnam War.
While Johnson raised taxes to pay for some of his domestic initiatives, such as Medicare, he and Congress were hesitant to boost taxes to pay for the war. That meant the conflict or more especially, the money spent on the war was boosting the economy at a time when it was already booming, with no taxes to slow things down. The government was just injecting more money into a private economy that didn’t have much spare capacity, implying that the money would only be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
The traditional narrative, on the other hand, focuses solely on Vietnam as the primary reason. The underlying cause has to do with a trade-off known as the “Phillips curve” by economists (named after economist A.W. Phillips).
The Phillips curve is a plot of the unemployment rate against the inflation rate in its most basic form, and it is usually downward sloping: the greater the inflation rate, the lower the unemployment rate. From the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, here’s an example of a Phillips curve graph:
In essence, policymakers in the 1960s believed they could simply move left on the Phillips curve, to a point with higher inflation and lower unemployment, without any suffering, as Brad DeLong argues in his outstanding history of the Great Inflation.
They were, however, mistaken. According to the report, lowering unemployment too low threatens not only higher inflation (as the Phillips curve predicts), but also accelerating inflation, or inflation that continues to rise without halting.
This occurs as a result of expectations: once it is evident that the Federal Reserve is unconcerned about inflation and will do little to curb it, firms and consumers begin to anticipate and plan for it. Workers may demand more pay since they know that $1,000 now will be worth much more in a year or even a month. For the same reasons, businesses will hike prices.
These dynamics produce inflation in the form of increasing salaries and prices, which strengthens people’s expectations of future inflation, resulting in a poisonous loop.
According to economists Richard Clarida (now the Fed’s vice chair), Jordi Gal, and Mark Gertler, inflation was considered at risk of spiraling out of control under Fed policy at the time “because individuals (correctly) anticipate that the Federal Reserve will accommodate a rise in expected inflation.”
With Volcker’s appointment, the tale took a new direction. Volcker slashed interest rates drastically, ostensibly to show that the Fed was serious about suffocating inflation. It would do whatever it takes to enforce the law, including boosting interest rates to levels that caused two recessions in 1980 and 1981-82.
According to Clarida, Gal, and Gertler, Volcker and his successor Alan Greenspan’s policies eliminated the prospect of self-fulfilling inflationary cycles. “The Federal Reserve adjusts interest rates sufficiently to moderate any changes in projected inflation,” the Volcker policy stated.
The (assumed) trade-off between unemployment and inflation
Economists today dispute Johnson’s and his aides’ belief that you can just raise inflation without fear of triggering a spiral and receive lower unemployment as a result.
The NAIRU, a concept that has come to dominate Fed theory in recent decades, lies at the heart of their thinking. That’s the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, or the level of unemployment below which experts predict inflation similar to that of the 1960s and 1970s.
What is the mechanism behind this? The NAIRU is currently estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to be 4.5 percent in the third quarter of 2021. The Fed should not let unemployment, which is currently at 5.9%, fall below 4.5 percent under NAIRU-driven policy, lest it tempt the inflation gods. And, like Volcker did, the way to achieve that is to raise interest rates.
One reason for concern among inflation watchers is that the Fed no longer has an NAIRU-driven policy references to NAIRU have been eliminated from the Fed’s statement of strategy under Powell.
Worriers like Blanchard and Summers are also concerned that Biden is doing what Johnson did with economic stimulus and other domestic spending instead of the Vietnam War; that he is juicing the economy so much that unemployment will quickly fall below the NAIRU, triggering an inflationary spiral that can only be stopped by a painful economic contraction down the road.
The mainstream story comes with two key caveats. One is that you may believe its basic assumption while still believing that the actual NAIRU is very, very low, lower than the CBO estimate of 4.5 percent and even lower than the 3% rate that supposedly caused difficulties in the 1970s. That is, the economy may continue to grow rapidly for a long time while lowering unemployment to historic lows without causing inflation difficulties.
Jn Steinsson, a UC Berkeley professor who, together with his co-author Emi Nakamura, has contributed to making macroeconomics considerably more empirically grounded, believes this is the case. He informed me that he is still convinced that inflation expectations and the credibility of the Federal Reserve are important. However, his study leads him to conclude that NAIRU could be extremely low, and that we could aspire for extremely low unemployment rates without fear of inflationary forces.
“The unemployment rate, if you just track it, it just keeps lowering,” Steinsson told me over the phone, “whether you look at the 1980s expansion, the 1990s expansion, or the 2010s expansion.” It just keeps falling and falling and falling, with no end in sight. Maybe it will at some time, but one point of view is that we’ve never gotten to the point of actual full employment.” Indeed, the US had unemployment at or below 4% for two years prior to Covid-19, with no inflationary issues.
Another caveat to the common scenario is that some economists believe the increase in aggregate demand that led to the Great Inflation in the 1960s and 1970s was partly due to an obscure rule known as Regulation Q, which capped interest rates on checking and savings accounts, rather than Vietnam.
For the first time in 1965, Q’s cap (then 4%) went below the Federal Reserve’s interest rate. This meant that everyone having money in a checking or savings account was earning less than the market rate – they were losing money.
This, according to economists Itamar Drechsler, Alexi Savov, and Philipp Schnabl, resulted in a significant outflow of deposits from the banking sector. This increased aggregate demand by encouraging consumers to spend rather than conserve their money while also contracting the economy since banks had less money to lend out to firms as a result of fewer deposits. With the introduction of Money Market Certificates and Small Saver Certificates, which offered market-rate interest with no caps in 1978 and 1979, Regulation Q was effectively repealed, and the Great Inflation began to fade shortly after.
There are reasons to doubt this story (for example, the Great Inflation happened in a bunch of other countries that didn’t have Regulation Q), but it matches the timing of the rise and fall in inflation eerily well, suggesting that a repeat of that exact situation is unlikely Joe Biden isn’t proposing bringing Regulation Q back.
What if inflation is not about the price of everything, but the prices of a few specific things?
However, there is another big flaw in the popular tale of inflation in the 1970s: it ignores certain extremely significant geopolitical events at the time. When these factors are considered, current fears of a return to 1970s-style inflation begin to fade.
The 1973 oil embargo, which saw Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies stop oil deliveries to the United States and some of its allies in retribution for supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War, is a minor footnote in the inflation expectations saga. Some, like former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke in his previous academic work with Gertler and Mark Watson, contend that the embargo was largely irrelevant because of the Fed’s reaction, which was to hike interest rates considerably (though not as much as Volcker would later on).
However, that argument appears to be unrealistically dismissive of the consequences of a simple fact: petrol prices nearly doubled between October 1973 and January 1974.
While the oil shock was the most well-known of the period’s supply shocks, it was far from the only one. Prices for commodities of all kinds soared in the 1970s, from oil to minerals to agricultural products like grain. And, in many cases, these booms were obviously linked to supply-side difficulties, rather than price inflation induced by consumers with too much money. The price of grain, for example, soared in part as a result of a major drought in the Soviet Union in 1972, which drastically limited the country’s food production, prompted it to buy the United States’ entire wheat reserves, and pushed up global food prices.
Skanda Amarnath, executive director of the macroeconomic policy organization Employ America, explains that during the 1960s and 1970s, the baby boom in the United States and Europe, as well as the resulting higher population, increased demand for these commodities and goods, and supply struggled to keep up in the absence of more capacity expansion investment.
“A fast speed of investment in everything from houses to oil wells was the response to these demographic-induced shortages,” Amarnath told me. “It takes years of exploration and development in the oil industry to convert initial investment into increased production capability.” That investment would eventually pay off and aid in the alleviation of shortages, but while those shortages raged, the effect may be inflation.
The introduction and removal of President Richard Nixon’s wage and price regulations were another supply-side impact. Nixon terminated the dollar’s convertibility to gold in 1971, removing a crucial component of the system that had been stabilizing exchange rates between the United States and the rest of the world since World War II. Nixon established obligatory wage and price limitations from 1971 to 1974 in an attempt to reduce the aftershocks. Prices were momentarily restrained by the limits until they were lifted, contributing to the inflationary spiral that began in 1974.
Since at least 1979, economist Alan Blinder has argued for a supply-centered explanation, and he and colleague Jeremy Rudd characterized the “supply-side” position succinctly in a 2013 paper.
They point out that the Great Inflation was actually two: one between 1972 and 1974, which “can be attributed to three major supply shocksrising food prices, rising energy prices, and the end of the Nixon wage-price controls program,” and another between 1978 and 1980, which reflected food supply constraints, rising energy prices, and rising mortgage rates. Mortgage interest payments were included in the most widely used inflation measure until 1983, which meant that when the Fed responded to inflation by raising interest rates which in turn led mortgage rates to rise this policy change boosted measured inflation on its own.
The policy implications of a supply-side account for 1970s inflation are vastly different from the “Volcker shock” of high interest rates intended to shrink the economy. Instead of lowering demand and expenditure to meet the period’s lower supply, economists like then-American Economic Association president and future Nobel Laureate Lawrence Klein advocated in 1978 that the government should actively try to raise the supply of certain rare products. This could have taken the form of efforts to increase crop yields or support domestic oil production in the United States.
We’ll never know if it succeeded, but it’s a compelling and in my opinion persuasive alternative to the story we’ve been taught for decades.
What this revised story of the Great Inflation means for policy in 2021
This alternate tale suggests that Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell should not contemplate slowing the economy as a blunt tool to keep prices down in 2021. Instead, the federal government should intervene in specific regions to prevent certain sorts of fast growing costs from becoming even more so.
As my colleagues Emily Stewart and Rani Molla have pointed out, the most significant price rises affecting consumers are in the food and beverage sector “In recent months, new and used cars, as well as air travel, have contributed to “core” non-gas or food inflation. According to the Biden Council of Economic Advisers, vehicle prices alone accounted for at least 60% of inflation in June, with a large portion of the rest coming from services like air travel rising in price as everyone rushes back to travel following the pandemic.
A semiconductor shortage accounts for a large portion of the growth in automobile prices, meaning that improving semiconductor supply, particularly increasing production in the United States, might be a better method to combat inflation than raising interest rates. The kind of intervention anticipated by this approach is Biden’s recent efforts to get Taiwan to increase manufacturing for US automakers.
Powell recently testified to Congress that the Fed is thinking along these lines “Supply restrictions have slowed activity in some areas, most notably in the automotive industry, where a global scarcity of semiconductors has drastically reduced production this year.” The same has been said by Lael Brainard, a powerful member of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors.
“If you believe this supply-side story is credible, that changes the way you want to think about things,” Steinsson explained. “Someone is going to build a new semiconductor factory at some point, so there’s no reason to use the blunt tool of hiking loan rates across the board.”
Yes, inflation is growing, there is a lot of uncertainty, and the 1970s are looming large. Given how much economic misery was inflicted on millions of people in the struggle against inflation decades ago, it’s reassuring that today’s leaders are more inclined to consider the path that their forefathers did not.
What caused the rise in inflation?
Much of the increase is due to improving economic conditions. In the spring of 2020, when the epidemic crippled the economy and lockdowns were implemented, businesses shuttered or cut hours, and customers stayed at home as a health precaution, employers lost a staggering 22 million employment. In the April-June quarter of last year, economic output fell at a record-breaking 31 percent annual rate.
Everyone was expecting more suffering. Companies have reduced their investment. The restocking has been put off. The result was a severe economic downturn.
Instead of plunging into a sustained slump, the economy roared back, propelled by massive injections of government help and emergency Fed action, which included slashing interest rates, among other things. The introduction of vaccines in March of this year encouraged customers to return to restaurants, pubs, shops, and airports.
Businesses were forced to scurry to satisfy demand. They couldn’t fill job postings quickly enough a near-record 10.6 million in November or buy enough supplies to keep up with client demand. As business picked up, ports and freight yards couldn’t keep up with the demand. Global supply chains clogged up.
Costs increased. Companies discovered that they could pass on those greater expenses to consumers in the form of higher pricing, as many of whom had managed to save a significant amount of money during the pandemic.
However, opponents such as former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers accused President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion coronavirus relief program, which included $1,400 checks for most households, in part for overheating an economy that was already hot.
The Federal Reserve and the federal government had feared a painfully slow recovery, similar to that which occurred after the Great Recession of 2007-2009.
“It was more than needed in retrospect,” said Ellen Gaske, an economist at PGIM Fixed Income. “I’m pointing a finger squarely at the current state of fiscal policy. It wasn’t only the quantity of the (relief) packages that made a difference; those direct cash distributions to households immediately increased purchasing power. When you put that up against the supply delays caused by COVID, the pressure valve inflated further.”
As long as businesses struggle to keep up with consumer demand for products and services, high consumer price inflation is likely to persist. Many Americans may continue to indulge on anything from lawn furniture to electronics thanks to a rebounding job market (which added a record 6.4 million jobs last year).
Many economists believe inflation will remain considerably above the Fed’s target of 2% this year. However, relief from rising prices may be on the way. At least in some industries, clogged supply chains are beginning to show indications of improvement. The Fed’s abrupt shift away from easy-money policies and toward a more hawkish, anti-inflationary stance might cause the economy to stall and consumer demand to fall. There will be no COVID relief cheques from Washington this year, as there were last year.
Inflation is eroding household purchasing power, and some consumers may be forced to cut back on their expenditures.
“By the second half of this year, I expect it to have mostly worked itself out,” PGIM’s Gaske predicted. “I believe some of those stresses will be relieved once supply is restored.”
COVID’s highly transmissible omicron form might cloud the picture even more, either by producing outbreaks that compel factories and ports to close, further disrupting supply chains, or by keeping people at home, lowering demand for commodities.
Wages are rising as a result of a solid employment market, but not fast enough to compensate for higher prices. After accounting for increasing consumer prices, hourly earnings for all private-sector employees declined 1.7 percent in November from a year earlier, according to the Labor Department. However, there are certain exceptions: Hotel workers had a nearly 14 percent increase in after-inflation pay, while restaurant workers saw a 7% increase.
The way Americans perceive the threat of inflation is also influenced by partisan politics. According to a consumer poll conducted by the University of Michigan, Republicans were nearly three times as likely than Democrats (47 percent versus 16 percent) to indicate that inflation had a negative impact on their personal finances last month.
When was the last time there was this much inflation?
SNELL: So, Scott, the last time inflation was this high, Ronald Reagan was in the White House, Olivia Newton-John was everywhere on the radio, and the cool new computer was the Commodore 64, which was named after its 64 kilobytes of capacity. Oh, and a new soft drink was set to hit the market.
(Singing) Introducing Diet Coke, UNIDENTIFIED PERSON. You’ll drink it only for the sake of tasting it.
SNELL: Before Diet Coke, there was a period. And, while it feels like a long time ago, Scott, how close are we to having to go through it all again?
HORSLEY: Kelsey, you have to keep in mind that inflation was really decreasing in 1982. It had been significantly higher, nearly twice as high as it was in 1980, when annual inflation reached 14.6 percent…
HORSLEY:…Nearly twice as much as it is now. And inflation had been high for the greater part of a decade at the time. High inflation plagued Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter. And by the time Reagan took office, Americans had grown accustomed to price increases that seemed to go on forever.
REAGAN, RONALD: Now we’ve had two years of double-digit inflation in a row: 13.3% in 1979 and 12.4 percent last year. This happened only once before, during World War I.
HORSLEY: So, in comparison to the inflation rates of the 1970s and early 1980s, today’s inflation rate doesn’t appear to be all that severe.
SO IT WAS COMING DOWN. SNELL: How did policymakers keep inflation under control back then?
HORSLEY: Well, the Federal Reserve provided some fairly unpleasant medication. Paul Volcker, then-Federal Reserve Chairman, was determined to break the back of inflation, and he was willing to raise interest rates to absurdly high levels to do it. To give you an example, mortgage rates reached 18 percent in 1981. As you may expect, that did not go down well. On the backs of wooden planks, enraged homebuilders wrote protest notes to Volcker. The Fed chairman, on the other hand, stuck to his guns. Volcker was interviewed on “The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour.”
PAUL VOLCKER: This dam is going to burst at some point, and the mentality is going to shift.
HORSLEY: Now, some people may believe we’re in for a rerun when they hear the Fed is prepared to hike interest rates once more to keep inflation in check.
HORSLEY: The rate rises we’re talking about now, though, are nothing like Volcker’s severe actions. Keep in mind that interest rates were near zero throughout the pandemic. Even if the Fed raised rates seven times this year, to 2% or something, as some experts currently predict, credit would still be extremely inexpensive by historical standards. The Fed isn’t talking about taking away the punchbowl, just substituting some of the extremely sugary punch with something closer to Diet Coke. The cheap money party has been going on for a long time, and the Fed isn’t talking about stopping it.
SNELL: (laughter) OK, so there are certainly some significant distinctions between today’s inflation and the inflation experienced by the United States in 1982. Is there, however, anything we can learn from that era?
HORSLEY: One thing to remember is that inflation is still a terrible experience. Rising prices have a significant impact on people’s perceptions of the economy, and politicians ignore this at their peril. The growing cost of rent, energy, and groceries – you know, the stuff that most of us can’t live without – were some of the major drivers of inflation last month. Abdul Ture, who works at a store outside of Washington, says his money doesn’t stretch as far as it used to, so he has to shop in smaller, more frequent increments.
ABDUL TURE: Oh no, the costs have increased. Everything has gone to hell on the inside. I now just buy a couple of items that I can utilize for two or three days. I used to be able to buy for a week. But no longer.
HORSLEY: This has an impact on people’s attitudes. Price gains are expected to ease throughout the course of the year, but inflation has already shown to be larger and more persistent than many analysts anticipated.
SNELL: However, a great deal has changed in the last 40 years. Take, for example, my cell phone. It has 100,000 times the memory of the Commodore computer we discussed earlier. Is this to say that inflation isn’t as dangerous as it once was?
HORSLEY: For the most part, it appeared as if the inflation dragon had been slain for the last few decades. Workers, for example, were assumed to have less negotiating leverage in a global economy, limiting their ability to demand greater compensation. Because the economy is no longer as reliant on oil as it was in the 1970s, oil shocks do not have the same impact. However, additional types of supply shocks occurred throughout the pandemic. And when you combine shortages of computer chips, truck drivers, and other personnel with extremely high demand, you’ve got a recipe for price increases.
SNELL: You should know that both Congress and the Federal Reserve injected trillions of dollars into the economy during the pandemic. It was an attempt to defuse the situation. So, how much of that contributed to the current level of inflation?
HORSLEY: That’s something economists will be debating for a long time. Those trillions of dollars did contribute to a fairly quick recovery. Unemployment has dropped from over 15% at the start of the pandemic to 4% presently. Could we have had a faster recovery without the huge inflationary consequences? Jason Furman, a former Obama administration economic adviser, believes that the $1.9 trillion stimulus package passed by Congress this spring went too far, even if it helped to speed up the recovery and put more people back to work.
FURMAN, JASON: I’d rather have high unemployment and low inflation than the other way around. I believe there were probably better options than either of those. I believe that if the stimulus package had been half as large, we would today have nearly the same amount of jobs and much lower inflation. Who knows, though.
HORSLEY: Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell was also questioned about whether the Fed went too far. He claims that historians will have to decide on the wisdom of the central bank’s policies in years to come. In retrospect, his cigar-chomping predecessor, Paul Volcker, looks a lot better. Look out if Powell shows up to his next press appearance with a cigar in his mouth.
OLIVIA NEWTON-JOHN: Let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’ I’d like to engage in some physical activity. Let’s get down to business. Allow me to hear your body language, body language.