BEIJING (Xinhua) The coronavirus pandemic has brought China’s spectacular, nearly half-century-long streak of growth to a stop, highlighting the monumental task that world leaders face in reviving the global economy.
Chinese officials announced on Friday that the world’s second-largest economy shrank 6.8% in the first three months of this year compared to the same period last year, putting an end to a run of unbroken growth that lasted through the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the SARS epidemic, and even the global financial crisis. The figures reflect China’s aggressive attempts to eradicate the coronavirus, which included closing most industries and offices in January and February as the outbreak afflicted tens of thousands of people.
The harsh figures demonstrate how difficult it will be to get the global economy back on its feet. China has become possibly the world’s single most vital economic engine, lifting fortunes at prior times of distress, such as the financial crisis, since emerging from abysmal poverty and isolation more than 40 years ago.
Now, China is attempting to relaunch its $14 trillion economy, a move that might provide a much-needed boost to the rest of the world. The spread of the coronavirus to the United States and Europe, which paralyzed their economies, has prompted predictions that global output will contract considerably more this year than it did even during the financial crisis.
Was China affected by the financial crisis of 2008?
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, China implemented the world’s largest stimulus package in late 2008. China was also the world’s first major economy to recover from the crisis. Following a brief but severe downturn in 2008, the Chinese economy recovered and expanded by 8.7% in 2009 and 10.4% in 2010.
Is the Chinese economy doomed by 2021?
China’s economy grew at an annual rate of 8.1 percent in 2021, but Beijing is under pressure to boost activity following a sharp downturn in the second half. 5:53 a.m., January 17, 2022
China’s Economy Prior to Reforms
Prior to 1979, China had a centrally planned, or command, economy under Chairman Mao Zedong’s direction. The state directed and controlled a substantial portion of the country’s economic output, setting production objectives, controlling prices, and allocating resources across the sector. All of China’s individual household farms were collectivized into big communes in the 1950s. During the 1960s and 1970s, the central government made large-scale expenditures in physical and human capital to promote rapid industrialization. As a result, by 1978, over three-quarters of industrial output was produced by centrally controlled, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with output targets set centrally. Private businesses and foreign-owned businesses were typically prohibited. The Chinese government’s main goal was to make China’s economy largely self-sufficient. In general, foreign trade was confined to obtaining items that could not be manufactured or obtained in China. The economy was distorted as a result of such practices. There were few incentives for firms, workers, and farmers to become more productive or concerned about the quality of what they produced because most aspects of the economy were managed and run by the central government. As a result, there were no market mechanisms to efficiently allocate resources, and thus there were few incentives for firms, workers, and farmers to become more productive or concerned about the quality of what they produced (since they were mainly focused on production goals set by the government).
China’s real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 6.7 percent from 1953 to 1978, according to Chinese government statistics, though the accuracy of these figures has been questioned by many analysts, who contend that Chinese government officials (especially at the subnational levels) often exaggerated production levels for a variety of political reasons during this time. China’s actual average yearly real GDP growth during this period, according to economist Angus Maddison, was around 4.4 percent. 5 Furthermore, China’s economy experienced significant downturns under Chairman Mao Zedong’s leadership, including during the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1962 (which resulted in a massive famine and the deaths of up to 45 million people)6 and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 (which resulted in a massive famine and the deaths of up to 45 million people) (which caused widespread political chaos and greatly disrupted the economy). China’s per capita GDP doubled between 1950 and 1978 on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis,7 a typical indicator of a country’s living standards. However, Chinese living standards declined by 20.3 percent between 1958 and 1962, and by 9.6 percent between 1966 and 1968. (see Figure 1). Furthermore, as seen in Figure 2, the rise in Chinese living standards paled in contrast to those in the West, such as Japan.
The Chinese government decided to break with its Soviet-style economic policies in 1978 (shortly after Chairman Mao’s death in 1976) by gradually reforming the economy according to free market principles and opening up trade and investment with the West, in the hopes of significantly increasing economic growth and raising living standards. “Black cat, white cat, what does it matter what color the cat is as long as it catches mice?” said Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s economic reforms. 8
The Introduction of Economic Reforms
China started a series of economic reforms in 1979. Farmers were given price and ownership incentives by the central government, allowing them to sell a portion of their harvests on the open market. Furthermore, the government developed four special economic zones along the coast to attract international investment, increase exports, and import high-tech products into China. Additional reforms, implemented in stages, aimed to decentralize economic policymaking in a number of areas, including trade. Provincial and municipal governments were given economic control of diverse firms, and they were generally allowed to operate and compete on free market principles rather than under the direction and guidance of state planning. Citizens were also encouraged to create their own enterprises. More coastal cities and regions have been classified as open cities and development zones, allowing them to experiment with free-market reforms and give tax and trade advantages to attract international investment. Furthermore, state pricing controls on a variety of products were gradually phased off. China’s economic growth was also aided by trade liberalization. Trade obstacles were removed, allowing for more competitiveness and FDI inflows. China’s incremental economic reforms aimed to determine which policies had positive economic effects (and which did not) so that they might be replicated across the country, a process Deng Xiaoping famously referred to as “crossing the river by touching the stones.” 9
China’s Economic Growth and Reforms: 1979-the Present
China’s economy has developed significantly quicker since economic reforms were implemented, and the country has avoided serious economic upheavals for the most part. 10 China’s annual real GDP averaged 9.5 percent from 1979 to 2018. (see Figure 3). As a result, China’s economy has been able to double in size in real terms every eight years on average. The worldwide economic slowdown that began in 2008 had a major influence on China’s economy. Early in 2009, Chinese media stated that 20 million migrant workers had returned home after losing their jobs due to the financial crisis, and that real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 had slowed to 6.8% year-on-year. The Chinese government responded by enacting a $586 billion stimulus program geared primarily at supporting infrastructure and relaxing monetary policy to boost bank lending. 11 As a result of these efforts, China was able to mitigate the consequences of a dramatic drop in worldwide demand for Chinese goods. China’s real GDP growth averaged 9.7% from 2008 to 2010. However, throughout the next six years, the rate of GDP growth fell, falling from 10.6 percent in 2010 to 6.7 percent in 2016. In 2017, real GDP increased to 6.8%, but fell to 6.6 percent in 2018. (although it rose to 6.8 percent in 2017). China’s real GDP growth will decelerate each year over the following six years, according to the IMF’s April 2019 World Economic Outlook, falling to 5.5 percent in 2024. (Figure 4). 12 Many analysts warn that if the US and China continue to apply punitive economic measures against each other, such as tariff rises resulting from US Section 301 action and Chinese retaliation, China’s economic development may decelerate even further. Increased tariffs on all trade between the US and China, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), could cut China’s real GDP by 1.1 percent in 2021-2022, compared to the OECD’s baseline economic predictions. 13
Figure 4: China’s Real Annual GDP Growth from 2007 to 2018, with Forecasts through 2024
Causes of China’s Economic Growth
Much of China’s quick economic growth is attributed to two key factors: large-scale capital investment (funded by substantial domestic savings and foreign investment) and rapid productivity growth, according to economists. These two elements appear to have worked in concert. Economic changes strengthened the economy’s efficiency, resulting in more output and more resources for new investment.
China has a long history of having a high savings rate. Domestic savings as a percentage of GDP was at 32 percent when reforms began in 1979. During this time, however, the majority of Chinese savings were generated through SOE earnings, which were utilised by the central government for domestic investment. Economic reforms, which included decentralization of economic output, resulted in significant increases in both family and business savings in China. As a result, China has the largest gross savings as a proportion of GDP among major economies. China has been able to support a high level of investment due to its substantial domestic savings. In fact, China’s gross domestic savings greatly outnumber its domestic investment, making it a significant net worldwide lender.
Productivity gains (i.e., advances in efficiency) have been identified as another important element in China’s rapid economic growth by a number of experts. Productivity gains were mostly due to a reallocation of resources to more productive uses, particularly in industries like agriculture, trade, and services that were formerly tightly regulated by the government. Agricultural reforms, for example, increased output, allowing employees to pursue jobs in the more productive manufacturing sector. Non-state companies (such as private corporations) arose as a result of China’s economic decentralization, which tended to pursue more productive activities than centrally controlled SOEs and were more market-oriented and efficient. Furthermore, a larger portion of the economy (mostly the export sector) was subjected to competitive dynamics. Local and provincial governments were given unrestricted authority to form and operate businesses without intervention from the federal government. FDI also introduced new technology and procedures to China, which increased efficiency.
However, as China’s technological development converges with that of major developed countries (i.e., through the adoption of foreign technology), productivity gains and, as a result, real GDP growth may slow significantly, unless China becomes a major center for new technology and innovation and/or implements new comprehensive economic reforms. Several developing economies (most notably in Asia and Latin America) experienced rapid economic development and growth in the 1960s and 1970s by implementing some of the same policies that China has used to develop its economy to date, such as measures to boost exports and promote and protect specific industries. However, at some point throughout their development, some of these countries began to face protracted economic stagnation (or substantially slower growth than prior levels), a situation known as the “middle-income trap” by economists. 14 This means that while several developing (low-income) economies were able to transition to a middle-income economy, they were unable to transition to a high-income economy due to their inability to sustain high levels of productivity gains (in part due to their inability to address structural inefficiencies in the economy). 15 China may be at a comparable fork in the road right now. The World Bank uses a per capita gross national income (GNI) approach to classify economic development levels. 16 According to the World Bank, China transitioned from a low-income to a low-middle-income economy in 1997, and then to an upper-middle-income country in 2010. China’s per capita GNI in 2017 was $8,690, which was 38.7% below the amount required to become a high-income economy. According to the Chinese government, China will be able to cross the high-income level by 2025. It intends to accomplish this, in part, by making innovation a key source of future economic growth. Skeptics argue that China’s innovative development will be difficult to achieve, particularly if it is primarily state-driven and imposes new limitations on foreign companies.
Notes: The red bar represents the level at which China would need to achieve in order to become a high-income economy.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), China’s real GDP growth will drop significantly over the next several decades, eventually catching up to US growth rates by 2037. (U.S. and Chinese real GDP growth rates are both projected at 1.9 percent ). For a few years after that, the EIU expects US GDP growth to outpace China’s (Figure 6). 17
Figure 6: Annual Real GDP Growth Rates in the United States and China from 2010 to 2018 and Projections to 2050
The Chinese government has expressed a desire to shift away from its existing economic model of “rapid growth at any cost” to more “smart” growth, which aims to minimize reliance on energy-intensive and high-polluting industries in favor of high technology, renewable energy, and services. China has also stated that it wishes to achieve more balanced economic growth. (These topics are covered in greater depth later in the report.)
What is the state of China’s economy?
- According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics, GDP increased by 4% in the fourth quarter compared to the previous year. China’s fourth-quarter GDP growth was predicted to be 3.6 percent, according to analysts polled by Reuters.
- Retail sales, on the other hand, fell short of estimates in December, rising only 1.7 percent year over year. Reuters polled analysts, who projected a rise of 3.7 percent.
- According to financial data source Wind Information, China analysts predicted an average annual growth rate of 8.4 percent in 2021.
Has China been affected by the Great Recession?
This article presents a brief overview of China’s growing prominence in the global economy and explores the global financial crisis’ spillover implications on China’s financial markets and macroeconomy. Alternative methods of estimating these effects are presented and critiqued. China, contrary to common belief, was hit particularly hard by the global recession brought on by the financial crisis. It experienced a significant reduction in exports, which were only partially offset by China’s massive stimulus package. While growth was still substantially above international standards, it fell by the same amount as the United States. The report concludes with a brief assessment of some of China’s major obstacles in rebalancing its economy to maintain high growth.
Is China experiencing a financial meltdown?
China is going through a slow-motion economic crisis that might jeopardize the existing regime’s stability and have major ramifications for the global economy. Despite the numerous red flags, Western analysts and policymakers believe Xi Jinping is capable of handling the issue. This kind of hope is wrong.
The United States and its allies have a variety of weapons to affect China’s economy, and they must evaluate the risks of a severe crisis against the threat that China’s current track offers to the United States. Instead of presuming that the Chinese economy’s strong growth and stability will continue, policymakers should consider how effectively to use these tools.
What was China’s strategy for avoiding the Great Recession?
The Chinese economy soon recovered to pre-crisis levels thanks to sharp gains in collective investment following the money injection, successfully averting a probable Great Recession and economic collapse during China’s vital period of economic transformation and industrialisation.
What type of economy does China have?
China has the world’s second-biggest nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and the world’s largest purchasing power parity (PPP) economy (PPP). Officially known as the People’s Republic of China, the country had a nominal GDP of $13.457 trillion in 2018, with a PPP of around $25.313 trillion in the same year. Within a market economy, China works as a socialist market economy, with state-owned firms and public ownership. A market economy, by definition, is one in which supply and demand, the two main forces that determine pricing, dominate crucial economic choices. The economy, according to the Chinese government, is one of the stages on the way to full socialism. Some economists contend, however, that China’s current structure of state ownership is a form of state capitalism rather than a socialist market economy.
Are businesses leaving China?
Many globally recognized corporations are abandoning China as the US-China trade war rages on and relations between other liberal democracies and Beijing deteriorate due to everything from intellectual property (IP) theft to human rights violations in Xinjiang and the erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy. Indeed, according to research firm Gartner, a third of supply chain executives expect to relocate at least some of their manufacturing out of China by 2023. Sales slumps and supply chain disruptions caused by the Coronavirus, as well as rising production costs, has exacerbated the departure. Continue reading to find out which world-famous companies are leaving the People’s Republic in part or in full. All figures are in US dollars.