- The opposite of inflation, which occurs when the cost of goods and services rises, is deflation, which is a reduction in the general price level of goods and services.
- Deflation can be produced by a variety of economic variables, including a decline in product demand, an increase in product supply, surplus production capacity, an increase in money demand, or a decrease in money supply or credit availability.
- During the Great Depression, between 1930 and 1933, the United States saw the most extreme deflationary phase in its history.
During the Great Depression, what happened to inflation?
The figure below shows the annual change in the Consumer Price Index from 1913 to 1940. The graph has two distinct peaks and valleys. The first is the depression of 19201921, which some argue was caused by the reintegration of millions of war veterans into the economy, lowering labor costs and causing severe deflation. Between 1920 and 1921, the CPI fell by roughly 16 percent. According to the Department of Commerce, deflation was 18 percent over this time period.
The Great Depression, which lasted from 1929 to 1932, was the chart’s second trough. The over-indebtedness of the United States, according to economist Irving Fisher, was the primary cause of the Great Depression. When the bubble burst in 1929, it set off a deflationary cycle that no amount of fiscal or monetary intervention could stop. As far as he could tell, Irving Fisher identified nine basic causes. High debt levels, a contracting money supply, falling asset prices, rising bankruptcies, and a loss of confidence are just a few of the reasons.
Keep in mind that Irving Fisher named these reasons with the benefit of hindsight. Just days before the stock market fell in 1929, his “foresight” lead him to say, “stock prices had hit what appears to be a permanently high level.” If you swap out Irving Fisher with Dave Portnoy (and a slew of other Wall Street pundits), you’ve got all the ingredients for the same dish.
During the Great Depression, the CPI fell by a total of 24%. Despite deflation during the Great Depression, inflation returned to the United States in 1933. The Consumer Price Index, on the other hand, did not return to 1929 levels until 1943, 14 years later.
What was the rate of inflation during the Great Depression?
From 1913 through 1929, the All-Items CPI climbed at a 3.5 percent annual pace (see figure 1), although this was achieved through a tumultuous path that included both strong inflation and deflation. Inflation was low in 1914 and 1915, hovering around 1%, but it spiked in 1916 and remained historically high throughout World War I and the immediate postwar decades. Then, during the early 1920s’ severe recession, prices plummeted. The CPI showed minor price increases from 1923 to 1929, however the slight deflation in 1927 and 1928 is somewhat surprising considering the widespread impression of the middle and late 1920s as a period of economic expansion.
During a depression, does inflation rise?
Inflation and deflation are linked to recessions because corporations have surplus goods due to decreasing economic activity, which means fewer demand for goods and services. They’ll decrease prices to compensate for the surplus supply and encourage demand.
Was the Great Depression marked by high or low inflation?
With the exception of the world wars, the Great Depression, and a few brief periods, inflation in the United States during the twentieth century kept around 5% for the most part – except during the 1970s. Price fluctuations from year to year increased from 2% in 1965 to 14% in 1980.
Was the Great Depression marked by deflation or inflation?
Deflation occurred during the Great Depression as a result of a failing financial sector and bank bankruptcies. The deflation that occurred at the start of the Great Depression was the most severe the United States had ever seen. 1 Between the years of 1930 and 1933, prices fell by an average of about 7% per year.
What is the extent of inflation?
Year-on-year inflation rates have reached their greatest levels in over three decades as the global economy recovers from the COVID-19 epidemic. Is this higher inflation just a blip on the radar, or is it here to stay? Patricia Sanchez Juanino, Corrado Macchiarelli, and Barry Naisbitt explore US inflation possibilities for the next 18 months to answer these questions. They believe that inflation will peak at 5% in the coming months and then remain close to 4% in the near term: this may happen if, for example, inflation expectations continue to rise.
The 12-month CPI inflation rate in the United States reached its highest level since 1990 in October 2021, at 6.2 percent year-on-year. Pent-up demand and rising energy prices have been primary drivers of the increase, but supply chain constraints and spikes in other commodity prices have also played a role. A crucial policy question is whether the current rise in US inflation is only temporary, as it was in 2008, or if it signals the start of a longer era of inflation above the 2% objective, like it did in the 1970s and early 1980s.
The Federal Reserve has revised up its annual inflation predictions for both this year and next year as the year has progressed. The September median prediction for year-on-year PCE (household consumption) inflation in the fourth quarter increased to 4.2 percent this year and 2.2 percent next year. Both forecasts are higher than those issued in March: 2.4 percent in 2021 and 2% in 2022. Despite the fact that predictions have risen, Federal Reserve policymakers still expect inflation to decline considerably next year. The Federal Open Markets Committee (the group that decides on the right monetary policy stance) stated in November that it will cut its monthly purchases of Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities, a policy known as tapering. However, it continued to emphasize that the spike in inflation, as reflected in its inflation estimates, was primarily transitory.
While we anticipate a reduction in inflationary pressure, we are concerned that the reduction will be insufficient. Annual US PCE inflation would grow from 1.2 percent in the fourth quarter of last year to 5.1 percent this year, then decline to 2.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2022, according to the National Institute’s Autumn 2021 Global Economic Outlook. However, we believe that the risks are skewed to the upside, and that if they materialize, the Federal Reserve will be forced to tighten monetary policy sooner than it appears to be planning.
Inflation scenarios for 2022-23
To demonstrate the dangers, we employ Huw Dixon’s technique from Cardiff University, which allows us to make stylized assumptions about future monthly price fluctuations in order to generate various annual inflation routes over the next 18 months. Three scenarios are examined (rather than forecasts).
In the best-case scenario, monthly inflation reduces steadily until it reaches its average level for the five years prior to the pandemic in June of the following year, and then stays there. After that, the monthly price changes are converted into year-over-year inflation. On this measure, annual PCE inflation would decline to 2.1 percent in the fourth quarter of next year, roughly in line with the Federal Reserve’s consensus forecast.
We look at two other scenarios that are much less reassuring. We assume that the extent of monthly price increases decreases, but not as quickly or as far as before the pandemic, so that it reaches twice the pre-pandemic period average in June. In this instance, annual PCE inflation in the fourth quarter of next year would be 3.2 percent.
Finally, if monthly PCE inflation stays at its current level (0.3 percent) for the rest of the year, annual inflation in the fourth quarter of next year will be 3.9 percent. Figure 1 depicts the year-on-year inflation projected lines for several scenarios.
Figure 1: Year-over-year PCE inflation projections based on stylized monthly assumptions (percent)
The most intriguing aspect of these scenarios is that they all hint to annual inflation being near 5% in the next months. Figure 1 shows that, despite monthly inflation returning to the 2015-2019 average by next June, year-on-year inflation continues to rise over the following few months, reaching 5%, as lower monthly rises in 2020 are replaced by greater monthly increases this year. In the best-case scenario, annual inflation returns to 2% by the end of next year. If monthly inflation stays at 0.3 percent, year-over-year inflation will remain persistently close to 4%.
These are simply projections based on stylized assumptions, not forecasts or a deep examination of the underlying reasons influencing recent and future monthly price fluctuations. They are broadly consistent with the idea that annual inflation risks will remain strong through 2022, even if recent price hikes owing to supply chain disconnections fade away over time. If policies do not prevent inflation expectations from rising, the situation may worsen.
With its new mandate and a strong focus on maximum employment, the Federal Reserve expects a temporary (or, in today’s lingo, transitory) overshoot of inflation above its target, especially when it follows a long period of undershooting. If inflation expectations become skewed and wage-push inflation forces increase, a temporary overshoot could turn into a long-term one.
Higher inflation may be here to stay
According to our forecasts, the current rate of inflation could return to its target rate by the end of 2022. However, it appears that inflation will continue to exceed the objective for some years. If inflation reaches 5%, the Federal Reserve will need to significantly up its policy messaging, arguing that the spike is just temporary and convincing families, businesses, and financial markets that monthly inflation will soon revert to lower levels. If the current supply-chain disruption and global energy price increases end, its arguments will be strengthened.
The Federal Reserve has yet to clarify the timeframe of ending quantitative easing, reversing it, and subsequently raising policy interest rates. For example, an unexpected policy reversal to protect central bank credibility could cause a quick financial market slump and public sector balance sheet imbalances. How central banks respond to increasing inflation, through a mix of terminating quantitative easing and raising policy rates, will determine bond prices.
Inflation expectations are rising, and the Federal Reserve needs to create contingency plans for its actions if a 5% inflation rate appears to be embedded. If it lifts its inflation predictions again after its December meeting, as we expect, such contingency measures may be required sooner rather than later. Given the uncertainty about the duration of higher inflation, wages, and an employment rate that remains below pre-pandemic levels, we believe the Federal Reserve will be cautious in tightening policy, especially because it will have to choose between stabilizing below-target employment and stabilizing above-target inflation. Moving too far, too fast, risks squandering the best chance it has to avoid near-deflationary traps with interest rates at their lowest levels. They are likely to pay the price if it is a time of significantly above-target inflation.
- “US inflation peaking soon?” in National Institute of Economic and Social Research (Box A), Global Economic Outlook, Series B., No. 4, Autumn, pp. 24-30, is the basis for this article. ‘Global Economic Outlook’, Series B, No. 4, Autumn, NIESR (2021).
How did inflation do throughout the Great Recession?
The Great Inflation was the defining macroeconomic event of the twentieth century’s second half. After the roughly two decades it lasted, the worldwide monetary system built during World War II was abandoned, four economic recessions occurred, two catastrophic energy shortages occurred, and wage and price restrictions were implemented for the first time in peacetime. It was “the worst failure of American macroeconomic policy in the postwar century,” according to one eminent economist (Siegel 1994).
However, that failure ushered in a paradigm shift in macroeconomic theory and, ultimately, the laws that now govern the Federal Reserve and other central banks across the world. If the Great Inflation was the result of a major blunder in American macroeconomic policy, its defeat should be celebrated.
Forensics of the Great Inflation
Inflation was a bit over 1% per year in 1964. It had been in the area for the previous six years. Inflation began to rise in the mid-1960s, reaching a high of more than 14% in 1980. In the second half of the 1980s, it had dropped to an average of barely 3.5 percent.
While economists dispute the relative importance of the causes that have spurred and sustained inflation for more than a decade, there is little disagreement about where it comes from. The actions of the Federal Reserve, which allowed for an excessive expansion in the quantity of money, were at the root of the Great Inflation.
It would be helpful to describe the story in three distinct but related parts to comprehend this phase of particularly terrible policy, particularly monetary policy. This is a kind of forensic examination into the motive, means, and opportunity for the Great Inflation to happen.
The Motive: The Phillips Curve and the Pursuit of Full Employment
The first section of the story, the motivation behind the Great Inflation, takes place in the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression, a period in macroeconomic theory and policy that was similarly momentous. Following World War II, Congress focused on programs that it anticipated would foster better economic stability. The Employment Act of 1946 was the most prominent of the new legislation. The act, among other things, stated that the federal government’s role is to “advance maximum employment, production, and purchasing power” and called for more coordination between fiscal and monetary policy. 1 The Federal Reserve’s current twin mandate to “maintain long-run expansion of the monetary and credit aggregates…in order to achieve effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” is based on this legislation (Steelman 2011).
The orthodoxy that guided policy in the postwar era was Keynesian stabilization policy, which was driven in part by the painful memory of the unprecedented high unemployment in the United States and around the world during the 1930s. The fundamental focus of these policies was the regulation of aggregate expenditure (demand) through the fiscal authority’s spending and taxation policies, as well as the central bank’s monetary policies. The notion that monetary policy can and should be used to manage aggregate spending and stabilize economic activity remains a widely held belief that governs the Federal Reserve’s and other central banks’ operations today. However, one crucial and incorrect assumption in the implementation of stabilization policy in the 1960s and 1970s was that unemployment and inflation had a stable, exploitable relationship. In particular, it was widely assumed that permanently lower unemployment rates could be “purchased” with somewhat higher inflation rates.
The idea that the “Phillips curve” indicated a longer-term trade-off between unemployment, which was very destructive to economic well-being, and inflation, which was sometimes seen as more of a nuisance, was an appealing assumption for policymakers who sought to enforce the Employment Act’s requirements.
2
But the Phillips curve’s stability was a dangerous assumption, as economists Edmund Phelps (1967) and Milton Friedman (1968) cautioned. “If the statical’optimum’ is chosen,” Phelps says, “it is logical to assume that participants in product and labor markets will learn to expect inflation…and that, as a result of their rational, anticipatory behavior, the Phillips Curve will progressively shift upward…” Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967). In other words, the authorities’ desired trade-off between reduced unemployment and higher inflation would almost certainly be a false bargain, requiring ever higher inflation to maintain.
The Means: The Collapse of Bretton Woods
If the Federal Reserve’s policies were well-anchored, chasing the Phillips curve in search of lower unemployment would not have been possible. Through the Bretton Woods agreement in the 1960s, the US dollar was tied if shakily to gold. As a result, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the severance of the US dollar from its last link to gold play a part in the story of the Great Inflation.
During World War II, the world’s industrial nations agreed to a worldwide monetary system, which they thought would promote global trade and offer more economic stability and peace. The Bretton Woods system, hammered out by forty-four nations in New Hampshire in July 1944, established a fixed rate of exchange between the world’s currencies and the US dollar, with the latter linked to gold.3
The Bretton Woods system, on the other hand, had a number of faults in its implementation, the most serious of which was the attempt to maintain constant parity across world currencies, which was incompatible with their domestic economic goals. Many countries were pursuing monetary policies that claimed to move up the Phillips curve, resulting in a more favorable unemployment-inflation nexus.
The US dollar faced an additional challenge as the world’s reserve currency. The need for US dollar reserves expanded in tandem with global trade. For a period, an expanding balance of payments deficit met the demand for US dollars, and foreign central banks accumulated ever-increasing dollar reserves. The amount of dollar reserves held overseas eventually exceeded the US gold stock, meaning that the US could not sustain total convertibility at the current gold pricea fact that foreign governments and currency speculators were quick to note.
As inflation rose in the second half of the 1960s, more US dollars were changed to gold, and in the summer of 1971, President Richard Nixon put a stop to foreign central banks exchanging dollars for gold. The short-lived Smithsonian Agreement attempted to save the global monetary system during the next two years, but the new arrangement performed no better than Bretton Woods and quickly fell apart. The worldwide monetary system that had existed since World War II had come to an end.
Most of the world’s currencies, including the US dollar, were now entirely unanchored after the last link to gold was destroyed. Except during times of global crisis, this was the first time in history that the industrialized world’s currencies were based on an irredeemable paper money standard.
The Opportunity: Fiscal Imbalances, Energy Shortages, and Bad Data
The US economy was in a state of flux throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. At a time when the US economic situation was already stressed by the Vietnam War, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society Act ushered in large spending programs across a broad range of social initiatives. The monetary policy was complicated by the developing budgetary imbalances.
The Federal Reserve used a “even-keel” policy approach to avoid monetary policy actions that would conflict with the Treasury’s funding plans. In practice, this meant that the central bank would not change policy and would maintain interest rates at their current levels during the time between the announcement of a Treasury issuance and its market sale. Treasury difficulties were rare under normal circumstances, and the Fed’s even-keeled policies didn’t obstruct monetary policy implementation considerably. The Federal Reserve’s adherence to the even-keel principle, however, became progressively limited as debt difficulties became more prominent (Meltzer 2005).
The periodic energy crises, which raised oil prices and stifled US GDP, were a more disruptive force. The first crisis was a five-month-long Arab oil embargo that began in October 1973. Crude oil prices quadrupled at this time, reaching a plateau that lasted until 1979, when the Iranian revolution triggered a second energy crisis. The price of oil tripled during the second crisis.
In the 1970s, economists and policymakers began to classify increases in aggregate prices into various inflation kinds. Macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy, had a direct influence on “demand-pull” inflation. It was caused by policies that resulted in expenditure levels that were higher than what the economy could produce without pushing the economy beyond its normal productive capacity and requiring the use of more expensive resources. However, supply interruptions, particularly in the food and energy industries, might push inflation higher (Gordon 1975). 4 This “cost-push” inflation was also passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail prices.
Inflation driven by the growing price of oil was mainly beyond the control of monetary policy, according to the central bank. However, the increase in unemployment that occurred as a result of the increase in oil prices was not.
The Federal Reserve accommodated huge and rising budget imbalances and leaned against the headwinds created by energy costs, motivated by a duty to generate full employment with little or no anchor for reserve management. These policies hastened the money supply expansion and increased overall prices without reducing unemployment.
Policymakers were also hampered by faulty data (or, at the very least, a lack of understanding of the facts). Looking back at the data available to policymakers in the run-up to and during the Great Inflation, economist Athanasios Orphanides found that the real-time estimate of potential output was significantly overstated, while the estimate of the unemployment rate consistent with full employment was significantly understated. To put it another way, officials were probably underestimating the inflationary effects of their measures as well. In reality, they couldn’t continue on their current policy path without rising inflation (Orphanides 1997; Orphanides 2002).
To make matters worse, the Phillips curve began to fluctuate, indicating that the Federal Reserve’s policy actions were being influenced by its stability.
From High Inflation to Inflation TargetingThe Conquest of US Inflation
Friedman and Phelps were correct. The previously stable inflation-unemployment trade-off has become unstable. Policymakers’ power to regulate any “real” variable was fleeting. This included the unemployment rate, which fluctuated about its “natural” level. The trade-off that policymakers were hoping to take advantage of didn’t exist.
As businesses and families began to appreciate, if not anticipate, rising prices, any trade-off between inflation and unemployment became a less favorable trade-off until both inflation and unemployment reached unacceptably high levels. This became known as the “stagflationary age.” When this narrative began in 1964, inflation was at 1% and unemployment was at 5%. Inflation would be over 12% and unemployment would be over 7% ten years later. Inflation was near 14.5 percent in the summer of 1980, while unemployment was over 7.5 percent.
Officials at the Federal Reserve were not ignorant to the escalating inflation, and they were fully aware of the dual mandate, which required monetary policy to be calibrated to achieve full employment and price stability. Indeed, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, more generally known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act after the bill’s authors, re-codified the Employment Act of 1946 in 1978. Humphrey-Hawkins tasked the Federal Reserve with pursuing full employment and price stability, as well as requiring the central bank to set growth targets for several monetary aggregates and submit a semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress. 5 When full employment and inflation collided, however, the employment part of the mandate appeared to have the upper hand. Full employment was the foremost objective in the minds of the people and the government, if not also at the Federal Reserve, as Fed Chairman Arthur Burns would later declare (Meltzer 2005). However, there was a general consensus that confronting the inflation problem head-on would be too costly to the economy and jobs.
Attempts to reduce inflation without the costly side effect of increasing unemployment had been made in the past. Between 1971 and 1974, the Nixon government implemented wage and price controls in three stages. These measures only delayed the rise in prices for a short time while aggravating shortages, particularly in food and energy. The Ford administration did not fare any better. Following his declaration of inflation as “enemy number one,” President Gerald Ford initiated the Whip Inflation Now (WIN) initiative in 1974, which included voluntary steps to encourage increased thrift. It was a colossal flop.
By the late 1970s, the public had come to anticipate monetary policy to be inflationary. They were also becoming increasingly dissatisfied with inflation. In the latter half of the 1970s, survey after survey revealed a deterioration in popular confidence in the economy and government policy. Inflation was frequently singled out as a particular scourge. Since 1965, interest rates have appeared to be on the rise, and as the 1970s drew to a conclusion, they jumped even higher. Business investment stagnated, productivity fell, and the country’s trade balance with the rest of the globe worsened during this time. Inflation was largely seen as either a substantial contributing factor or the primary cause of the economic downturn.
However, once the country was in the midst of unacceptably high inflation and unemployment, officials were confronted with a difficult choice. Combating high unemployment would almost surely drive inflation even higher, while combating inflation would almost certainly cause unemployment to rise much more.
Paul Volcker, formerly of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was elected chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in 1979. Year-over-year inflation was above 11 percent when he assumed office in August, and national unemployment was slightly under 6 percent. By this time, it was widely understood that lowering inflation necessitated tighter control over the pace of increase of reserves in particular, as well as broad money in general. As mandated by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had already began setting targets for monetary aggregates. However, it was evident that with the new chairman, attitude was shifting and that greater measures to restrict the expansion of the money supply were needed. The FOMC announced in October 1979 that instead of using the fed funds rate as a policy tool, it would target reserve growth.
Fighting inflation was now considered as important to meet both of the dual mandate’s goals, even if it temporarily disrupted economic activity and resulted in a greater rate of unemployment. “My core idea is that over time we have no choice but to deal with the inflationary situation since inflation and the unemployment rate go together,” Volcker declared in early 1980. Isn’t that what the 1970s taught us?” (Meltzer, 1034, 2009).
While not perfect, better control of reserve and money expansion over time resulted in a desired slowdown of inflation. The establishment of credit limits in early 1980, as well as the Monetary Control Act, aided this stricter reserve management. Interest rates surged, decreased for a short time, and then spiked again in 1980. Between January and July, lending activity decreased, unemployment increased, and the economy experienced a temporary recession. Even as the economy improved in the second half of 1980, inflation declined but remained high.
The Volcker Fed, on the other hand, kept up the pressure on rising inflation by raising interest rates and slowing reserve growth. In July 1981, the economy suffered another recession, this time more severe and long-lasting, lasting until November 1982. Unemployment peaked at over 11%, but inflation continued to fall, and by the conclusion of the recession, year-over-year inflation had dropped below 5%. As the Fed’s commitment to low inflation gained traction, unemployment fell and the economy entered a period of steady growth and stability. The Great Inflation had come to an end.
Macroeconomic theory had undergone a metamorphosis by this time, influenced in large part by the economic lessons of the day. In macroeconomic models, the importance of public expectations in the interaction between economic policy and economic performance has become standard. The need of time-consistent policy choicespolicies that do not sacrifice long-term prosperity for short-term gainsas well as policy credibility became widely recognized as essential for excellent macroeconomic outcomes.
Today’s central banks recognize that price stability is critical to sound monetary policy, and several, like the Federal Reserve, have set specific numerical inflation targets. These numerical inflation targets have reinstated an anchor to monetary policy to the extent that they are credible. As a result, they have improved the transparency of monetary policy decisions and reduced uncertainty, both of which are now recognized as critical preconditions for achieving long-term growth and maximum employment.
What is creating 2021 inflation?
As fractured supply chains combined with increased consumer demand for secondhand vehicles and construction materials, 2021 saw the fastest annual price rise since the early 1980s.
Is inflation caused by a recession?
The Fed’s ultra-loose monetary policy approach is manifestly ineffective, with inflation considerably exceeding its target and unemployment near multi-decade lows. To its credit, the Fed has taken steps to rectify its error, while also indicating that there will be much more this year. There have been numerous cases of Fed tightening causing a recession in the past, prompting some analysts to fear a repeat. However, there have been previous instances of the Fed tightening that did not result in inflation. In 2022 and 2023, there’s a strong possibility we’ll avoid a recession.
The fundamental reason the Fed is unlikely to trigger a recession is that inflation is expected to fall sharply this year, regardless of Fed policy. The coming reduction in inflation is due to a number of causes. To begin with, Congress is not considering any more aid packages. Because any subsequent infrastructure and social packages will be substantially smaller than the recent relief packages, the fiscal deficit is rapidly shrinking. Second, returning consumer demand to a more typical balance of commodities and services will lower goods inflation far more than it will raise services inflation. Third, quick investment in semiconductor manufacturing, as well as other initiatives to alleviate bottlenecks, will lower prices in affected products, such as automobiles. Fourth, if the Omicron wave causes a return to normalcy, employees will be more eager and able to return to full-time employment, hence enhancing the economy’s productive potential. The strong demand for homes, which is expected to push up rental costs throughout the year, is a factor going in the opposite direction.
Perhaps the most telling symptoms of impending deflation are consumer and professional forecaster surveys of inflation expectations, as well as inflation compensation in bond yields. All of these indicators show increased inflation in 2022, followed by a dramatic decline to pre-pandemic levels in 2023 and beyond. In contrast to the 1970s, when the lack of a sound Fed policy framework allowed inflation expectations to float upward with each increase in prices, the consistent inflation rates of the last 30 years have anchored long-term inflation expectations.
Consumer spending will be supported by the substantial accumulation of household savings over the last two years, making a recession in 2022 extremely unlikely. As a result, the Fed should move quickly to at least a neutral policy position, which would need short-term interest rates around or slightly above 2% and a rapid runoff of the long-term assets it has purchased to stimulate economic activity over the previous two years. The Fed does not have to go all the way in one meeting; the important thing is to communicate that it intends to do so over the next year as long as inflation continues above 2% and unemployment remains low. My recommendation is to raise the federal funds rate target by 0.25 percentage point at each of the next eight meetings, as well as to announce soon that maturing bonds will be allowed to run off the Fed’s balance sheet beginning in April, with runoffs gradually increasing to a cap of $100 billion per month by the Fall. That would be twice as rapid as the pace of runoffs following the Fed’s last round of asset purchases, hastening a return to more neutral bond market conditions.
Tightening policy to near neutral in the coming year is unlikely to produce a recession in 2023 on its own. Furthermore, as new inflation and employment data are released, the Fed will have plenty of opportunities to fine-tune its policy approach. It’s possible that a new and unanticipated shock will affect the economy, either positively or negatively. The Fed will have to be agile and data-driven, ready to halt tightening if the economy slows or tighten much more if inflation does not fall sharply by 2022.
Is inflation beneficial to the economy or detrimental?
Important Points to Remember Inflation is beneficial when it counteracts the negative impacts of deflation, which are often more damaging to an economy. Consumers spend today because they expect prices to rise in the future, encouraging economic growth. Managing future inflation expectations is an important part of maintaining a stable inflation rate.