High inflation fears are rooted in memories of the Great Inflation, which are still vivid in many people’s minds. Inflationary pressures wreaked havoc on the US economy in the 1970s, and only the Federal Reserve, led by Chairman Paul Volcker, was able to put a stop to it.
How was inflation brought under control?
- Governments can fight inflation by imposing wage and price limits, but this can lead to a recession and job losses.
- Governments can also use a contractionary monetary policy to combat inflation by limiting the money supply in an economy by raising interest rates and lowering bond prices.
- Another measure used by governments to limit inflation is reserve requirements, which are the amounts of money banks are legally required to have on hand to cover withdrawals.
After the Great Inflation, what happened?
High inflation unquestionably destabilized the economy, resulting in four recessions of increasing severity (the 1969-70, 1973-75, 1980, and 1981-82); monthly unemployment peaked at 10.8% in late 1982. Due to reduced productivity growth, high inflation stifled the rise in living standards.
What was the Federal Reserve’s response to the Great Inflation?
Some countries have had such high inflation rates that their currency has lost its value. Imagine going to the store with boxes full of cash and being unable to purchase anything because prices have skyrocketed! The economy tends to break down with such high inflation rates.
The Federal Reserve was formed, like other central banks, to promote economic success and social welfare. The Federal Reserve was given the responsibility of maintaining price stability by Congress, which means keeping prices from rising or dropping too quickly. The Federal Reserve considers a rate of inflation of 2% per year to be the appropriate level of inflation, as measured by a specific price index called the price index for personal consumption expenditures.
The Federal Reserve tries to keep inflation under control by manipulating interest rates. When inflation becomes too high, the Federal Reserve hikes interest rates to slow the economy and reduce inflation. When inflation is too low, the Federal Reserve reduces interest rates in order to stimulate the economy and raise inflation.
How did inflation do throughout the Great Recession?
The Great Inflation was the defining macroeconomic event of the twentieth century’s second half. After the roughly two decades it lasted, the worldwide monetary system built during World War II was abandoned, four economic recessions occurred, two catastrophic energy shortages occurred, and wage and price restrictions were implemented for the first time in peacetime. It was “the worst failure of American macroeconomic policy in the postwar century,” according to one eminent economist (Siegel 1994).
However, that failure ushered in a paradigm shift in macroeconomic theory and, ultimately, the laws that now govern the Federal Reserve and other central banks across the world. If the Great Inflation was the result of a major blunder in American macroeconomic policy, its defeat should be celebrated.
Forensics of the Great Inflation
Inflation was a bit over 1% per year in 1964. It had been in the area for the last six years. Inflation began to rise in the mid-1960s, reaching a high of more than 14% in 1980. In the second half of the 1980s, it had dropped to an average of barely 3.5 percent.
While economists dispute the relative importance of the causes that have spurred and sustained inflation for more than a decade, there is little disagreement about where it comes from. The actions of the Federal Reserve, which allowed for an excessive expansion in the quantity of money, were at the root of the Great Inflation.
It would be helpful to describe the story in three distinct but related parts to comprehend this phase of particularly terrible policy, particularly monetary policy. This is a kind of forensic examination into the motive, means, and opportunity for the Great Inflation to happen.
The Motive: The Phillips Curve and the Pursuit of Full Employment
The first section of the story, the motivation behind the Great Inflation, takes place in the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression, a period in macroeconomic theory and policy that was similarly momentous. Following World War II, Congress focused on programs that it anticipated would foster better economic stability. The Employment Act of 1946 was the most prominent of the new legislation. The act, among other things, stated that the federal government’s role is to “advance maximum employment, production, and purchasing power” and called for more coordination between fiscal and monetary policy. 1 The Federal Reserve’s current twin mandate to “maintain long-run expansion of the monetary and credit aggregates…in order to achieve effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” is based on this legislation (Steelman 2011).
The orthodoxy that guided policy in the postwar era was Keynesian stabilization policy, which was driven in part by the painful memory of the unprecedented high unemployment in the United States and around the world during the 1930s. The fundamental focus of these policies was the regulation of aggregate expenditure (demand) through the fiscal authority’s spending and taxation policies, as well as the central bank’s monetary policies. The notion that monetary policy can and should be used to manage aggregate spending and stabilize economic activity remains a widely held belief that governs the Federal Reserve’s and other central banks’ operations today. However, one crucial and incorrect assumption in the implementation of stabilization policy in the 1960s and 1970s was that unemployment and inflation had a stable, exploitable relationship. In particular, it was widely assumed that permanently lower unemployment rates could be “purchased” with somewhat higher inflation rates.
The idea that the “Phillips curve” indicated a longer-term trade-off between unemployment, which was very destructive to economic well-being, and inflation, which was sometimes seen as more of a nuisance, was an appealing assumption for policymakers who sought to enforce the Employment Act’s requirements.
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But the Phillips curve’s stability was a dangerous assumption, as economists Edmund Phelps (1967) and Milton Friedman (1968) cautioned. “If the statical’optimum’ is chosen,” Phelps says, “it is logical to assume that participants in product and labor markets will learn to expect inflation…and that, as a result of their rational, anticipatory behavior, the Phillips Curve will progressively shift upward…” Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967). In other words, the authorities’ desired trade-off between reduced unemployment and higher inflation would almost certainly be a false bargain, requiring ever higher inflation to maintain.
The Means: The Collapse of Bretton Woods
If the Federal Reserve’s policies were well-anchored, chasing the Phillips curve in search of lower unemployment would not have been possible. Through the Bretton Woods agreement in the 1960s, the US dollar was tied if shakily to gold. As a result, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the severance of the US dollar from its last link to gold play a part in the story of the Great Inflation.
During World War II, the world’s industrial nations agreed to a worldwide monetary system, which they thought would promote global trade and offer more economic stability and peace. The Bretton Woods system, hammered out by forty-four nations in New Hampshire in July 1944, established a fixed rate of exchange between the world’s currencies and the US dollar, with the latter linked to gold.3
The Bretton Woods system, on the other hand, had a number of faults in its implementation, the most serious of which was the attempt to maintain constant parity across world currencies, which was incompatible with their domestic economic goals. Many countries were pursuing monetary policies that claimed to move up the Phillips curve, resulting in a more favorable unemployment-inflation nexus.
The US dollar faced an additional challenge as the world’s reserve currency. The need for US dollar reserves expanded in tandem with global trade. For a period, an expanding balance of payments deficit met the demand for US dollars, and foreign central banks accumulated ever-increasing dollar reserves. The amount of dollar reserves held overseas eventually exceeded the US gold stock, meaning that the US could not sustain total convertibility at the current gold pricea fact that foreign governments and currency speculators were quick to note.
As inflation rose in the second half of the 1960s, more US dollars were changed to gold, and in the summer of 1971, President Richard Nixon put a stop to foreign central banks exchanging dollars for gold. The short-lived Smithsonian Agreement attempted to save the global monetary system during the next two years, but the new arrangement performed no better than Bretton Woods and quickly fell apart. The worldwide monetary system that had existed since World War II had come to an end.
Most of the world’s currencies, including the US dollar, were now entirely unanchored after the last link to gold was destroyed. Except during times of global crisis, this was the first time in history that the industrialized world’s currencies were based on an irredeemable paper money standard.
The Opportunity: Fiscal Imbalances, Energy Shortages, and Bad Data
The US economy was in a state of flux throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. At a time when the US fiscal situation was already strained by the Vietnam War, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society legislation ushered in major spending programs across a broad range of social initiatives. The monetary policy was complicated by the developing budgetary imbalances.
The Federal Reserve used a “even-keel” policy approach to avoid monetary policy actions that would conflict with the Treasury’s funding plans. In practice, this meant that the central bank would not change policy and would maintain interest rates at their current levels during the time between the announcement of a Treasury issuance and its market sale. Treasury issues were rare under normal circumstances, and the Fed’s even-keeled policies didn’t obstruct monetary policy implementation significantly. The Federal Reserve’s adherence to the even-keel principle, however, became increasingly constrained as debt issues became more prevalent (Meltzer 2005).
The repeated energy crises, which raised oil prices and stifled US growth, were a more disruptive force. The first crisis was a five-month-long Arab oil embargo that began in October 1973. Crude oil prices quadrupled at this time, reaching a plateau that lasted until 1979, when the Iranian revolution triggered a second energy crisis. The price of oil tripled during the second crisis.
In the 1970s, economists and policymakers began to classify increases in aggregate prices into various inflation kinds. Macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy, had a direct influence on “demand-pull” inflation. It was caused by policies that resulted in expenditure levels that were higher than what the economy could produce without pushing the economy beyond its normal productive capacity and requiring the use of more expensive resources. However, supply interruptions, particularly in the food and energy industries, might push inflation higher (Gordon 1975). 4 This “cost-push” inflation was also passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail prices.
Inflation driven by the growing price of oil was mainly beyond the control of monetary policy, according to the central bank. However, the increase in unemployment that occurred as a result of the increase in oil prices was not.
The Federal Reserve accommodated huge and rising budget imbalances and leaned against the headwinds created by energy costs, motivated by a duty to generate full employment with little or no anchor for reserve management. These policies hastened the money supply expansion and increased overall prices without reducing unemployment.
Policymakers were also hampered by faulty data (or, at the very least, a lack of understanding of the facts). Looking back at the data available to policymakers in the run-up to and during the Great Inflation, economist Athanasios Orphanides found that the real-time estimate of potential output was significantly overstated, while the estimate of the unemployment rate consistent with full employment was significantly understated. To put it another way, officials were probably underestimating the inflationary effects of their measures as well. In reality, they couldn’t continue on their current policy path without rising inflation (Orphanides 1997; Orphanides 2002).
To make matters worse, the Phillips curve began to fluctuate, indicating that the Federal Reserve’s policy actions were being influenced by its stability.
From High Inflation to Inflation TargetingThe Conquest of US Inflation
Friedman and Phelps were correct. The previously stable inflation-unemployment trade-off has become unstable. Policymakers’ power to regulate any “real” variable was fleeting. This included the unemployment rate, which fluctuated about its “natural” level. The trade-off that policymakers were hoping to take advantage of didn’t exist.
As businesses and families began to appreciate, if not anticipate, rising prices, any trade-off between inflation and unemployment became a less favorable trade-off until both inflation and unemployment reached unacceptably high levels. This became known as the “stagflationary age.” When this narrative began in 1964, inflation was at 1% and unemployment was at 5%. Inflation would be over 12% and unemployment would be over 7% ten years later. Inflation was near 14.5 percent in the summer of 1980, while unemployment was over 7.5 percent.
Officials at the Federal Reserve were not ignorant to the escalating inflation, and they were fully aware of the dual mandate, which required monetary policy to be calibrated to achieve full employment and price stability. Indeed, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, more generally known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act after the bill’s authors, re-codified the Employment Act of 1946 in 1978. Humphrey-Hawkins tasked the Federal Reserve with pursuing full employment and price stability, as well as requiring the central bank to set growth targets for several monetary aggregates and submit a semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress. 5 When full employment and inflation collided, however, the employment part of the mandate appeared to have the upper hand. Full employment was the foremost objective in the minds of the people and the government, if not also at the Federal Reserve, as Fed Chairman Arthur Burns would later declare (Meltzer 2005). However, there was a general consensus that confronting the inflation problem head-on would be too costly to the economy and jobs.
Attempts to reduce inflation without the costly side effect of increasing unemployment had been made in the past. Between 1971 and 1974, the Nixon government implemented wage and price controls in three stages. These measures only delayed the rise in prices for a short time while aggravating shortages, particularly in food and energy. The Ford administration did not fare any better. Following his declaration of inflation as “enemy number one,” President Gerald Ford initiated the Whip Inflation Now (WIN) initiative in 1974, which included voluntary steps to encourage increased thrift. It was a colossal flop.
By the late 1970s, the public had come to anticipate monetary policy to be inflationary. They were also becoming increasingly dissatisfied with inflation. In the latter half of the 1970s, survey after survey revealed a deterioration in popular confidence in the economy and government policy. Inflation was frequently singled out as a particular scourge. Since 1965, interest rates have appeared to be on the rise, and as the 1970s drew to a conclusion, they jumped even higher. Business investment stagnated, productivity fell, and the country’s trade balance with the rest of the globe worsened during this time. Inflation was largely seen as either a substantial contributing factor or the primary cause of the economic downturn.
However, once the country was in the midst of unacceptably high inflation and unemployment, officials were confronted with a difficult choice. Combating high unemployment would almost surely drive inflation even higher, while combating inflation would almost certainly cause unemployment to rise much more.
Paul Volcker, formerly of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was elected chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in 1979. Year-over-year inflation was above 11 percent when he assumed office in August, and national unemployment was slightly under 6 percent. By this time, it was widely understood that lowering inflation necessitated tighter control over the pace of increase of reserves in particular, as well as broad money in general. As mandated by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had already began setting targets for monetary aggregates. However, it was evident that with the new chairman, attitude was shifting and that greater measures to restrict the expansion of the money supply were needed. The FOMC announced in October 1979 that instead of using the fed funds rate as a policy tool, it would target reserve growth.
Fighting inflation was now considered as important to meet both of the dual mandate’s goals, even if it temporarily disrupted economic activity and resulted in a greater rate of unemployment. “My core idea is that over time we have no choice but to deal with the inflationary situation since inflation and the unemployment rate go together,” Volcker declared in early 1980. Isn’t that what the 1970s taught us?” (Meltzer, 1034, 2009).
While not perfect, better control of reserve and money expansion over time resulted in a desired slowdown of inflation. The establishment of credit limits in early 1980, as well as the Monetary Control Act, aided this stricter reserve management. Interest rates surged, decreased for a short time, and then spiked again in 1980. Between January and July, lending activity decreased, unemployment increased, and the economy experienced a temporary recession. Even as the economy improved in the second half of 1980, inflation declined but remained high.
The Volcker Fed, on the other hand, kept up the pressure on rising inflation by raising interest rates and slowing reserve growth. In July 1981, the economy suffered another recession, this time more severe and long-lasting, lasting until November 1982. Unemployment peaked at over 11%, but inflation continued to fall, and by the conclusion of the recession, year-over-year inflation had dropped below 5%. As the Fed’s commitment to low inflation gained traction, unemployment fell and the economy entered a period of steady growth and stability. The Great Inflation had come to an end.
Macroeconomic theory had undergone a metamorphosis by this time, influenced in large part by the economic lessons of the day. In macroeconomic models, the importance of public expectations in the interaction between economic policy and economic performance has become standard. The need of time-consistent policy choicespolicies that do not sacrifice long-term prosperity for short-term gainsas well as policy credibility became widely recognized as essential for excellent macroeconomic outcomes.
Today’s central banks recognize that price stability is critical to sound monetary policy, and many, including the Federal Reserve, have set specific numerical inflation targets. These numerical inflation targets have reinstated an anchor to monetary policy to the extent that they are credible. As a result, they have improved the transparency of monetary policy decisions and reduced uncertainty, both of which are now recognized as critical preconditions for achieving long-term growth and maximum employment.
When was the last time inflation occurred?
SNELL: So, Scott, the last time inflation was this high, Ronald Reagan was in the White House, Olivia Newton-John was everywhere on the radio, and the cool new computer was the Commodore 64, which was named after its 64 kilobytes of capacity. Oh, and a new soft drink was set to hit the market.
(Singing) Introducing Diet Coke, UNIDENTIFIED PERSON. You’ll drink it only for the sake of tasting it.
SNELL: Before Diet Coke, there was a period. And, while it feels like a long time ago, Scott, how close are we to having to go through it all again?
HORSLEY: Kelsey, you have to keep in mind that inflation was really decreasing in 1982. It had been significantly higher, nearly twice as high as it was in 1980, when annual inflation reached 14.6 percent…
HORSLEY:…Nearly twice as much as it is now. And inflation had been high for the greater part of a decade at the time. High inflation plagued Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter. And by the time Reagan took office, Americans had grown accustomed to price increases that seemed to go on forever.
REAGAN, RONALD: Now we’ve had two years of double-digit inflation in a row: 13.3% in 1979 and 12.4 percent last year. This happened only once before, during World War I.
HORSLEY: So, in comparison to the inflation rates of the 1970s and early 1980s, today’s inflation rate doesn’t appear to be all that severe.
SO IT WAS COMING DOWN. SNELL: How did policymakers keep inflation under control back then?
HORSLEY: Well, the Federal Reserve provided some fairly unpleasant medication. Paul Volcker, then-Federal Reserve Chairman, was determined to break the back of inflation, and he was willing to raise interest rates to absurdly high levels to do it. To give you an example, mortgage rates reached 18 percent in 1981. As you may expect, that did not go down well. On the backs of wooden planks, enraged homebuilders wrote protest notes to Volcker. The Fed chairman, on the other hand, stuck to his guns. Volcker was interviewed on “The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour.”
PAUL VOLCKER: This dam is going to burst at some point, and the mentality is going to shift.
HORSLEY: Now, some people may believe we’re in for a rerun when they hear the Fed is prepared to hike interest rates once more to keep inflation in check.
HORSLEY: The rate rises we’re talking about now, though, are nothing like Volcker’s severe actions. Keep in mind that interest rates were near zero throughout the pandemic. Even if the Fed raised rates seven times this year, to 2% or something, as some experts currently predict, credit would still be extremely inexpensive by historical standards. The Fed isn’t talking about taking away the punchbowl, just substituting some of the extremely sugary punch with something closer to Diet Coke. The cheap money party has been going on for a long time, and the Fed isn’t talking about stopping it.
SNELL: (laughter) OK, so there are certainly some significant distinctions between today’s inflation and the inflation experienced by the United States in 1982. Is there, however, anything we can learn from that era?
HORSLEY: One thing to remember is that inflation is still a terrible experience. Rising prices have a significant impact on people’s perceptions of the economy, and politicians ignore this at their peril. The growing cost of rent, energy, and groceries – you know, the stuff that most of us can’t live without – were some of the major drivers of inflation last month. Abdul Ture, who works at a store outside of Washington, says his money doesn’t stretch as far as it used to, so he has to shop in smaller, more frequent increments.
ABDUL TURE: Oh no, the costs have increased. Everything has gone to hell on the inside. I now just buy a couple of items that I can utilize for two or three days. I used to be able to buy for a week. But no longer.
HORSLEY: This has an impact on people’s attitudes. Price gains are expected to ease throughout the course of the year, but inflation has already shown to be larger and more persistent than many analysts anticipated.
SNELL: However, a great deal has changed in the last 40 years. Take, for example, my cell phone. It has 100,000 times the memory of the Commodore computer we discussed earlier. Is this to say that inflation isn’t as dangerous as it once was?
HORSLEY: For the most part, it appeared as if the inflation dragon had been slain for the last few decades. Workers, for example, were assumed to have less negotiating leverage in a global economy, limiting their ability to demand greater compensation. Because the economy is no longer as reliant on oil as it was in the 1970s, oil shocks do not have the same impact. However, additional types of supply shocks occurred throughout the pandemic. And when you combine shortages of computer chips, truck drivers, and other personnel with extremely high demand, you’ve got a recipe for price increases.
SNELL: You should know that both Congress and the Federal Reserve injected trillions of dollars into the economy during the pandemic. It was an attempt to defuse the situation. So, how much of that contributed to the current level of inflation?
HORSLEY: That’s something economists will be debating for a long time. Those trillions of dollars did contribute to a fairly quick recovery. Unemployment has dropped from over 15% at the start of the pandemic to 4% presently. Could we have had a faster recovery without the huge inflationary consequences? Jason Furman, a former Obama administration economic adviser, believes that the $1.9 trillion stimulus package passed by Congress this spring went too far, even if it helped to speed up the recovery and put more people back to work.
FURMAN, JASON: I’d rather have high unemployment and low inflation than the other way around. I believe there were probably better options than either of those. I believe that if the stimulus package had been half as large, we would today have nearly the same amount of jobs and much lower inflation. Who knows, though.
HORSLEY: Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell was also questioned about whether the Fed went too far. He claims that historians will have to decide on the wisdom of the central bank’s policies in years to come. In retrospect, his cigar-chomping predecessor, Paul Volcker, looks a lot better. Look out if Powell shows up to his next press appearance with a cigar in his mouth.
OLIVIA NEWTON-JOHN: Let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’ I’d like to engage in some physical activity. Let’s get down to business. Allow me to hear your body language, body language.
Key Points
- Volcker is credited with bringing the United States’ high inflation levels of the 1970s and early 1980s to an end while serving as chairman of the Federal Reserve.
- Inflation was high when he became chairman in 1979, peaking at 13.5 percent in 1981. The inflation rate fell to 3.2 percent by 1983, thanks to Volcker and the rest of the board’s efforts.
- In June of 1981, Volcker increased the federal funds rate from 11.2 percent to 20%. During this time, the jobless rate surpassed 10% for the first time.
- During the economic upturn, Volcker elected to implement a policy of preemptive restraint, which raised real interest rates.
- Volcker’s Federal Reserve board garnered some of the biggest political criticisms and protests in the Federal Reserve’s history, despite his level of accomplishment. The demonstrations erupted as a result of the high interest rates’ harmful impact on the building and farming businesses.
Key Terms
- Stagflation is defined as inflation that is accompanied by slow growth, unemployment, or a recession.
- Inflation is defined as a rise in the overall level of prices or the cost of living.
What is creating 2021 inflation?
As fractured supply chains combined with increased consumer demand for secondhand vehicles and construction materials, 2021 saw the fastest annual price rise since the early 1980s.
What happened to inflation in the 1980s?
During a period of tremendous economic volatility in the 1970s, the Federal Reserve was very lenient. As a result, in 1980, the annual rate of inflation peaked at 14.8 percent, the second highest amount ever recorded.
This time, the Fed reduced short-term interest rates to near zero and injected trillions of dollars into the economy via quantitative easing, a still-controversial strategy.
In the late 1960s, the United States increased spending, and this trend continued for the next two decades, as high inflation fueled even more government spending.
Meanwhile, to minimize the damage caused by the COVID pandemic, Washington pumped $5 trillion into the economy in the form of stimulus payments to people and companies during the last year and a half.
The influx of stimulus funds far outstripped the previous full year of government spending prior to the crisis. In fiscal year 2019, the US spent $4.4 trillion.
The Fed has been forced to accelerate plans to discontinue its enormous stimulus program due to rising prices. By the middle of the year, the central bank may have begun boosting interest rates.
Under public pressure, the Biden administration is also looking for ways to lower prices.
Furthermore, when the stimulus fades and the White House’s big-spending plans run into more barriers, government expenditure is likely to fall substantially.
According to polls, Republicans are expected to take control of half or all of Congress in the 2022 midterm elections, despite the president’s $2 trillion Build Back Better bill stalling in Washington.
Any significant spending bills would very probably be blocked by a Republican-led Congress, especially under a Democratic president.
Ted Cruz is questioned why the national debt is so important to Republicans only when a Democrat is in the White House in the Capitol Report (October 2020).
See also: Goldman Sachs slashes US growth projection after Senator Joe Manchin rejects Biden’s $2 trillion spending proposal
Companies in the private sector are gradually figuring out how to deal with supply constraints and increase production through automation or other means. The supply shocks should subside by 2022, but it’s unclear if the labor deficit will be resolved as soon.
Many analysts, however, doubt that inflation will revert to pre-crisis levels of less than 2%. They claim that the longer a period of high inflation lasts, the more likely it is that some of it will become embedded in the economy.
“If we go into next fall with inflation at 3%, the Fed’s 2% long-term inflation target is out the door,” said Joel Naroff of Naroff Economic Advisors.
Read on to learn how Biden’s anti-inflation plan could make matters worse, according to Larry Summers.
What was Paul Volcker’s strategy for combating inflation?
Bullard was, in fact, responding to this question. “Would it be a serious issue if inflation came in a little bit higher?” the interviewer wondered. I’ll quote Bullard’s response word for word (my emphasis):
Inflation forecasting models aren’t very good. The risk would be that inflation would be even higher in 2022, possibly much higher, and the committee would be forced to go into inflation-fighting mode. That’s what I’ve been worried about: we’re not prepared for that scenario in 2022, and if we had to raise rates quickly, it would be very disruptive for markets.
If inflation does not reduce and remains high, or perhaps rises, we will need to turn to a monetary policy that genuinely puts downward pressure on inflation. That would be a long way off from where we are currently. So I’ve been emphasizing that we’re not in a position to deal with that scenario.
Bullard is accurate in my opinion, but he doesn’t appear to comprehend how the Fed was able to achieve this goal the last time it had to actively put downward pressure on price inflation. Here’s how the Fed would potentially approach getting ahead of increased consumer costs, according to Bullard (emphasis mine):
We’d have to stop buying assets and raise the policy rate above whatever you think the neutral policy rate is. These are the steps that would have to be taken to begin putting downward pressure on inflation, and if we had to do so quickly, financial markets and global financial markets would be severely disrupted.
However, there is a problem. Volcker’s Fed did not genuinely target a policy rate during the period 1977-1981. When Volcker took over in August 1979, he immediately moved into full-fledged crisis mode, but he made it clear that he wasn’t pursuing any particular federal funds rate. He did it by directly attacking the money supply, also known as “the aggregates” at the time. Rather than treating the fed funds rate as a target in and of itself, Volcker’s plan was to triangulate money supply growth using the fed funds target range.
He did this because of supply and demand, which is simple economics 101. The supply and demand for dollars versus the supply and demand for other products and services is what sets dollar prices of goods and services. If you can keep the money supply under control, you can restore confidence in the dollar, which was experiencing a significant confidence crisis at the moment.
What brought stagflation to an end in the 1970s?
- According to John Maynard Keynes’ views, if the economy slows, the central bank can increase the money supply, leading prices to rise and unemployment to decline, without fear of inflation.
- Because a period of poor economic development was accompanied by greater inflation in the 1970s, Keynesian economists had to reassess their paradigm.
- Milton Friedman restored the Federal Reserve’s reputation by assisting in the end of the stagflationary period.