Since 1857, a recession has happened around every three-and-a-quarter years on average. Previously, the government believed that allowing recessions to run their course was the best answer for all parties involved.
Since WWII, the average time between recessions has been 58.4 months, or over five years. The last economic upswing, which began at the conclusion of the Great Recession and lasted 128 months, was the longest in history. When the Pandemic Recession struck, we were overdue for an economic slowdown by that metric.
Do economic downturns occur every ten years?
Financial analysts and many economists hold the view that recessions are an unavoidable part of the business cycle in a capitalist economy. On the surface, the empirical evidence appears to strongly support this theory. Recessions appear to occur every ten years or so in modern economies, and they appear to follow periods of rapid expansion on a regular basis. Is it inevitable that this pattern recurs with such regularity? To put it another way, do recessions always follow periods of robust economic growth? Is it possible to avoid recessions, or are they an inherent part of the modern capitalist economy?
How long do recessions last?
The length of a recession might range from two to three years. A recession, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, is a period of economic downturn that lasts a few months, while a depression is defined as a period of economic activity that lasts three or more years.
What is the average length of a recession?
A recession is a long-term economic downturn that affects a large number of people. A depression is a longer-term, more severe slump. Since 1854, there have been 33 recessions. 1 Recessions have lasted an average of 11 months since 1945.
Before 2008, when was the last recession?
During the late 2000s, the Great Recession was characterized by a dramatic drop in economic activity. It is often regarded as the worst downturn since the Great Depression. The term “Great Recession” refers to both the United States’ recession, which lasted from December 2007 to June 2009, and the worldwide recession that followed in 2009. When the housing market in the United States transitioned from boom to bust, large sums of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and derivatives lost significant value, the economic depression began.
What caused the recession of the 1980s?
The 1981-82 recession was the greatest economic slump in the United States since the Great Depression, prior to the 2007-09 recession. Indeed, the over 11% unemployment rate attained in late 1982 remains the postwar era’s pinnacle (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). During the 1981-82 recession, unemployment was widespread, but manufacturing, construction, and the auto industries were especially hard hit. Despite the fact that goods manufacturers accounted for only 30% of overall employment at the time, they lost 90% of their jobs in 1982. Manufacturing accounted for three-quarters of all job losses in the goods-producing sector, with unemployment rates of 22% and 24%, respectively, in the home building and auto manufacturing industries (Urquhart and Hewson 1983, 4-7).
The economy was already in poor health prior to the slump, with unemployment hovering at 7.5 percent following a recession in 1980. Tight monetary policy in an attempt to combat rising inflation sparked both the 1980 and 1981-82 recessions. During the 1960s and 1970s, economists and politicians thought that raising inflation would reduce unemployment, a tradeoff known as the Phillips Curve. In the 1970s, the Fed used a “stop-go” monetary strategy, in which it alternated between combating high unemployment and high inflation. The Fed cut interest rates during the “go” periods in order to loosen the money supply and reduce unemployment. When inflation rose during the “stop” periods, the Fed raised interest rates to lessen inflationary pressure. However, as inflation and unemployment rose concurrently in the mid-1970s, the Phillips Curve tradeoff proved unstable in the long run. While unemployment was on the decline towards the end of the decade, inflation remained high, hitting 11% in June 1979. (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
Because of his anti-inflation ideas, Paul Volcker was chosen chairman of the Federal Reserve in August 1979. He had previously served as president of the New York Fed, where he had expressed his displeasure with Fed actions that he believed contributed to rising inflation expectations. In terms of future economic stability, he believes that rising inflation should be the Fed’s top concern: “It is what is going to give us the most troubles and cause the biggest recession” (FOMC transcript 1979, 16). He also thought the Fed had a credibility problem when it comes to controlling inflation. The Fed had proved in the preceding decade that it did not place a high priority on maintaining low inflation, and the public’s belief that this conduct would continue would make it increasingly difficult for the Fed to drive inflation down. “Failure to continue the fight against inflation now would simply make any subsequent effort more difficult,” he said (Volcker 1981b).
Instead of focusing on interest rates, Volcker altered the Fed’s policy to aggressively target the money supply. He chose this strategy for two reasons. To begin with, rising inflation made it difficult to determine which interest rate targets were suitable. Due to the expectation of inflation, the nominal interest rates the Fed targeted could be relatively high, but the real interest rates (that is, the effective interest rates after adjusting for inflation) could still be quite low. Second, the new policy was intended to show the public that the Federal Reserve was serious about keeping inflation low. The anticipation of low inflation was significant, as present inflation is influenced in part by future inflation forecasts.
Volcker’s initial efforts to reduce inflation and inflationary expectations were ineffective. The Carter administration’s credit-control scheme, which began in March 1980, triggered a severe recession (Schreft 1990). As unemployment rose, the Fed relented, reverting to the “stop-go” practices that the public had grown accustomed to. The Fed tightened the money supply further in late 1980 and early 1981, causing the federal funds rate to approach 20%. Long-term interest rates, despite this, have continued to grow. The ten-year Treasury bond rate surged from around 11% in October 1980 to more than 15% a year later, probably due to market expectations that the Fed would soften its restrictive monetary policy if unemployment soared (Goodfriend and King 2005). Volcker, on the other hand, was insistent that the Fed not back down this time: “We have set our course to control money and credit growth.” We intend to stay the course” (Volcker 1981a).
High interest rates put pressure on sectors of the economy that rely on borrowing, such as manufacturing and construction, and the economy officially entered a recession in the third quarter of 1981. Unemployment increased from 7.4% at the beginning of the recession to nearly 10% a year later. Volcker faced repeated calls from Congress to loosen monetary policy as the recession worsened, but he insisted that failing to lower long-run inflation expectations now would result in “more catastrophic economic situations over a much longer period of time” (Monetary Policy Report 1982, 67).
This perseverance paid off in the end. Inflation had dropped to 5% by October 1982, and long-term interest rates had begun to fall. The Fed permitted the federal funds rate to drop to 9%, and unemployment fell fast from over 11% at the end of 1982 to 8% a year later (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Goodfriend and King 2005). Inflation was still a threat, and the Fed would have to deal with several “inflation scares” during the 1980s. However, Volcker’s and his successors’ dedication to actively pursue price stability helped ensure that the 1970s’ double-digit inflation did not reappear.
How long did it take to recover from the financial crisis of 2008?
When the decade-long expansion in US housing market activity peaked in 2006, the Great Moderation came to an end, and residential development began to decline. Losses on mortgage-related financial assets began to burden global financial markets in 2007, and the US economy entered a recession in December 2007. Several prominent financial firms were in financial difficulties that year, and several financial markets were undergoing substantial upheaval. The Federal Reserve responded by providing liquidity and support through a variety of measures aimed at improving the functioning of financial markets and institutions and, as a result, limiting the damage to the US economy. 1 Nonetheless, the economic downturn deteriorated in the fall of 2008, eventually becoming severe and long enough to be dubbed “the Great Recession.” While the US economy reached bottom in the middle of 2009, the recovery in the years that followed was exceptionally slow in certain ways. In response to the severity of the downturn and the slow pace of recovery that followed, the Federal Reserve provided unprecedented monetary accommodation. Furthermore, the financial crisis prompted a slew of important banking and financial regulation reforms, as well as congressional legislation that had a substantial impact on the Federal Reserve.
Rise and Fall of the Housing Market
Following a long period of expansion in US house building, home prices, and housing loans, the recession and crisis struck. This boom began in the 1990s and accelerated in the mid-2000s, continuing unabated through the 2001 recession. Between 1998 and 2006, average home prices in the United States more than doubled, the largest increase in US history, with even bigger advances in other locations. During this time, home ownership increased from 64 percent in 1994 to 69 percent in 2005, while residential investment increased from around 4.5 percent of US GDP to nearly 6.5 percent. Employment in housing-related sectors contributed for almost 40% of net private sector job creation between 2001 and 2005.
The development of the housing market was accompanied by an increase in household mortgage borrowing in the United States. Household debt in the United States increased from 61 percent of GDP in 1998 to 97 percent in 2006. The rise in home mortgage debt appears to have been fueled by a number of causes. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) maintained a low federal funds rate after the 2001 recession, and some observers believe that by keeping interest rates low for a “long period” and only gradually increasing them after 2004, the Federal Reserve contributed to the expansion of housing market activity (Taylor 2007). Other researchers, on the other hand, believe that such variables can only explain for a small part of the rise in housing activity (Bernanke 2010). Furthermore, historically low interest rates may have been influenced by significant savings accumulations in some developing market economies, which acted to keep interest rates low globally (Bernanke 2005). Others attribute the surge in borrowing to the expansion of the mortgage-backed securities market. Borrowers who were deemed a bad credit risk in the past, maybe due to a poor credit history or an unwillingness to make a big down payment, found it difficult to get mortgages. However, during the early and mid-2000s, lenders offered high-risk, or “subprime,” mortgages, which were bundled into securities. As a result, there was a significant increase in access to housing financing, which helped to drive the ensuing surge in demand that drove up home prices across the country.
Effects on the Financial Sector
The extent to which home prices might eventually fall became a significant question for the pricing of mortgage-related securities after they peaked in early 2007, according to the Federal Housing Finance Agency House Price Index, because large declines in home prices were viewed as likely to lead to an increase in mortgage defaults and higher losses to holders of such securities. Large, nationwide drops in home prices were uncommon in US historical data, but the run-up in home prices was unique in terms of magnitude and extent. Between the first quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2011, property values declined by more than a fifth on average across the country. As financial market participants faced significant uncertainty regarding the frequency of losses on mortgage-related assets, this drop in home values contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-08. Money market investors became concerned of subprime mortgage exposures in August 2007, putting pressure on certain financial markets, particularly the market for asset-backed commercial paper (Covitz, Liang, and Suarez 2009). The investment bank Bear Stearns was bought by JPMorgan Chase with the help of the Federal Reserve in the spring of 2008. Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in September, and the Federal Reserve aided AIG, a significant insurance and financial services firm, the next day. The Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation were all approached by Citigroup and Bank of America for assistance.
The Federal Reserve’s assistance to specific financial firms was hardly the only instance of central bank credit expansion in reaction to the crisis. The Federal Reserve also launched a slew of new lending programs to help a variety of financial institutions and markets. A credit facility for “primary dealers,” the broker-dealers that act as counterparties to the Fed’s open market operations, as well as lending programs for money market mutual funds and the commercial paper market, were among them. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which was launched in collaboration with the US Department of Treasury, was aimed to relieve credit conditions for families and enterprises by offering credit to US holders of high-quality asset-backed securities.
To avoid an increase in bank reserves that would drive the federal funds rate below its objective as banks attempted to lend out their excess reserves, the Federal Reserve initially funded the expansion of Federal Reserve credit by selling Treasury securities. The Federal Reserve, on the other hand, got the right to pay banks interest on their excess reserves in October 2008. This encouraged banks to keep their reserves rather than lending them out, reducing the need for the Federal Reserve to offset its increased lending with asset reductions.2
Effects on the Broader Economy
The housing industry was at the forefront of not only the financial crisis, but also the broader economic downturn. Residential construction jobs peaked in 2006, as did residential investment. The total economy peaked in December 2007, the start of the recession, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. The drop in general economic activity was slow at first, but it accelerated in the fall of 2008 when financial market stress reached a peak. The US GDP plummeted by 4.3 percent from peak to trough, making this the greatest recession since World War II. It was also the most time-consuming, spanning eighteen months. From less than 5% to 10%, the jobless rate has more than doubled.
The FOMC cut its federal funds rate objective from 4.5 percent at the end of 2007 to 2 percent at the start of September 2008 in response to worsening economic conditions. The FOMC hastened its interest rate decreases as the financial crisis and economic contraction worsened in the fall of 2008, bringing the rate to its effective floor a target range of 0 to 25 basis points by the end of the year. The Federal Reserve also launched the first of several large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs in November 2008, purchasing mortgage-backed assets and longer-term Treasury securities. These purchases were made with the goal of lowering long-term interest rates and improving financial conditions in general, hence boosting economic activity (Bernanke 2012).
Although the recession ended in June 2009, the economy remained poor. Economic growth was relatively mild in the first four years of the recovery, averaging around 2%, and unemployment, particularly long-term unemployment, remained at historically high levels. In the face of this sustained weakness, the Federal Reserve kept the federal funds rate goal at an unusually low level and looked for new measures to provide extra monetary accommodation. Additional LSAP programs, often known as quantitative easing, or QE, were among them. In its public pronouncements, the FOMC began conveying its goals for future policy settings more fully, including the situations in which very low interest rates were likely to be appropriate. For example, the committee stated in December 2012 that exceptionally low interest rates would likely remain appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remained above a threshold of 6.5 percent and inflation remained no more than a half percentage point above the committee’s longer-run goal of 2 percent. This “forward guidance” technique was meant to persuade the public that interest rates would remain low at least until specific economic conditions were met, exerting downward pressure on longer-term rates.
Effects on Financial Regulation
When the financial market upheaval calmed, the focus naturally shifted to financial sector changes, including supervision and regulation, in order to avoid such events in the future. To lessen the risk of financial difficulty, a number of solutions have been proposed or implemented. The amount of needed capital for traditional banks has increased significantly, with bigger increases for so-called “systemically essential” institutions (Bank for International Settlements 2011a;2011b). For the first time, liquidity criteria will legally limit the amount of maturity transformation that banks can perform (Bank for International Settlements 2013). As conditions worsen, regular stress testing will help both banks and regulators recognize risks and will require banks to spend earnings to create capital rather than pay dividends (Board of Governors 2011).
New provisions for the treatment of large financial institutions were included in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. The Financial Stability Oversight Council, for example, has the authority to classify unconventional credit intermediaries as “Systemically Important Financial Institutions” (SIFIs), putting them under Federal Reserve supervision. The act also established the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), which authorizes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to wind down specific institutions if their failure would pose a significant risk to the financial system. Another section of the legislation mandates that large financial institutions develop “living wills,” which are detailed plans outlining how the institution could be resolved under US bankruptcy law without endangering the financial system or requiring government assistance.
The financial crisis of 2008 and the accompanying recession, like the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Inflation of the 1970s, are important areas of research for economists and policymakers. While it may be years before the causes and ramifications of these events are fully known, the attempt to unravel them provides a valuable opportunity for the Federal Reserve and other agencies to acquire lessons that can be used to shape future policy.
How many recessions has the United States experienced?
A recession is defined as a two-quarters or longer decline in economic growth as measured by the gross domestic product (GDP). Since World War II and up until the COVID-19 epidemic, the US economy has endured 12 different recessions, beginning with an eight-month depression in 1945 and ending with the longest run of economic expansion on record.
Recessions in the United States have lasted an average of 10 months, while expansions have averaged 57 months.
What are the early warning signals of a downturn?
Real gross domestic product (GDP), or goods produced minus inflationary impacts, is the economic measure that most clearly identifies a recession. Income, employment, manufacturing, and wholesale retail sales are some of the other major indicators. Each of these areas suffers a drop during a recession.
What is the state of the economy in 2021?
Indeed, the year is starting with little signs of progress, as the late-year spread of omicron, along with the fading tailwind of fiscal stimulus, has experts across Wall Street lowering their GDP projections.
When you add in a Federal Reserve that has shifted from its most accommodative policy in history to hawkish inflation-fighters, the picture changes dramatically. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow indicator currently shows a 0.1 percent increase in first-quarter GDP.
“The economy is slowing and downshifting,” said Joseph LaVorgna, Natixis’ head economist for the Americas and former chief economist for President Donald Trump’s National Economic Council. “It isn’t a recession now, but it will be if the Fed becomes overly aggressive.”
GDP climbed by 6.9% in the fourth quarter of 2021, capping a year in which the total value of all goods and services produced in the United States increased by 5.7 percent on an annualized basis. That followed a 3.4 percent drop in 2020, the steepest but shortest recession in US history, caused by a pandemic.