The US economy will have a recession, but not until 2022. More business cycles will result as a result of Federal Reserve policy, which many enterprises are unprepared for. The decline isn’t expected until 2022, but it might happen as soon as 2023. If the Fed manages to prevent a recession in 2023, expect a worsening depression in 2024 or 2025.
In 2021, will the United States be in a recession?
Last year, the US economy increased at its quickest rate since Ronald Reagan’s administration, coming back with tenacity from the coronavirus recession of 2020.
Is the US economy currently experiencing a downturn?
Indeed, the year is starting with little signs of progress, as the late-year spread of omicron, along with the fading tailwind of fiscal stimulus, has experts across Wall Street lowering their GDP projections.
When you add in a Federal Reserve that has shifted from its most accommodative policy in history to hawkish inflation-fighters, the picture changes dramatically. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow indicator currently shows a 0.1 percent increase in first-quarter GDP.
“The economy is slowing and downshifting,” said Joseph LaVorgna, Natixis’ head economist for the Americas and former chief economist for President Donald Trump’s National Economic Council. “It isn’t a recession now, but it will be if the Fed becomes overly aggressive.”
GDP climbed by 6.9% in the fourth quarter of 2021, capping a year in which the total value of all goods and services produced in the United States increased by 5.7 percent on an annualized basis. That followed a 3.4 percent drop in 2020, the steepest but shortest recession in US history, caused by a pandemic.
Is America experiencing a downturn or depression?
The United States is officially in a downturn. With unemployment at levels not seen since the Great Depression the greatest economic slump in the history of the industrialized world some may be asking if the country will fall into a depression, and if so, what it will take to do so.
What is the state of the economy in 2022?
According to the Conference Board, real GDP growth in the United States would drop to 1.7 percent (quarter-over-quarter, annualized rate) in Q1 2022, down from 7.0 percent in Q4 2021. In 2022, annual growth is expected to be 3.0%. (year-over-year).
Is the economy back on track after Covid?
Economic growth has outperformed consensus predictions made at the start of the pandemic when the economy touched bottom in the second quarter of 2020. As a result, real GDP topped its pre-pandemic level in the second quarter of 2021. With the ongoing effects of the fiscal stimulus passed by Congress in 2020 and 2021, pent-up demand from consumers for face-to-face services, and labor market and asset price strength, real GDP appears on track to rise at a rapid pace of around 6% in 2021. To be sure, the Delta variation puts that projection in jeopardy. Consumer purchasing and general economic activity were impressively robust even in the early phases of the epidemic, when people had significantly less information and mitigating tools.
The CBO’s upward revisions to its predictions reflect the surprise strength of the economy and the improvement in expectations (shown in figure 1). The amount of GDP in the third quarter of 2020 was 4.8 percent higher than the CBO’s prediction at the start of the quarter. Furthermore, since July 2020, the CBO has revised up estimated GDP for 2023 by roughly 7%, resulting in a projected GDP level for the end of 2023 that is now 2% higher than the pre-pandemic forecast. Nonetheless, the cumulative deficit in real production compared to pre-pandemic projections is anticipated to be around $400 billion in 2012 dollars by 2023. (CBO 2020a, 2021c). It’s worth noting that the CBO’s predictions show a soft landing, with real GDP only growing modestly by late 2022. It’s possible that the slowdown may be more abrupt and unpleasant than those estimates suggest.
Fact 2: The sharp decline in employment in spring 2020, which was largely concentrated in the services sector, has only partially reversed.
Figure 2 depicts the percent change in overall employment from the peak month preceding recent economic downturns to the month when employment returned to its previous business cycle high. Across the job market, employment is still 5.3 million lower than it was in February 2020, and nearly 9 million lower than it was before the outbreak.
Employment reductions in the leisure and hospitality sector accounted for nearly 40% of the total 22 million jobs lost from February to April 2020. In contrast, since then, a partial rebound in that industry has supported employment growth. Monthly employment increased by more than 700,000 on average from February to July of this year. However, in August, the pace slowed substantially. The pandemic’s comeback certainly slowed the rebound in the leisure and hospitality industry, which had no net job gains in August. Employment in that sector is still down 1.7 million jobs since February 2020.
In comparison to past recessions, the COVID-19 recession has been particularly harsh for the services sector. Consider the average outcomes of the four recessions from 1981 to 2019, 18 months after they began: employment in the service sector was 1% lower than it had been before the recession, while employment in the goods sector was 10% lower. In comparison, employment in the service sector was still 4% lower in August 2021 than it was in February 2020, while employment in the products sector was 3% lower.
Fact 3: Millions of workers are no longer eligible for Unemployment Insurance.
In certain areas, enhanced UI will expire in the summer of 2021, whereas in others, it will end in the first week of September 2021. That set of regulations dramatically boosted eligibility for workers who were not eligible for regular UI (Pandemic Unemployment Assistance), increased the amount of weeks a worker may receive UI (Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation), and raised the generosity of benefits (Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation ). Only 30% of workers were eligible for unemployment compensation prior to the CARES Act, which established PUA, PEUC, and FPUC.
Weekly ongoing UI claims for standard UI benefits and Extended Benefits, which automatically extends weeks of eligibility based on a state’s economic situation, as well as claims for emergency programs: PUA and PEUC, are superimposed on the total number of unemployed workers in Figure 3.
It’s worth noting that the unemployment rate drastically underestimates the number of people who lost their jobs as a result of the outbreak. A person must be actively looking for employment to be classified as legally jobless; yet, millions of people have essentially exited the labor force since March 2020 and were eligible for the extended UI benefits. There was a gap of more than 5.5 million workers in the job market who were unemployed but not receiving UI after the emergency programs expired. We expect the difference to narrow just little by the end of the year.
Fact 4: The number of job openings and the number of workers quitting their jobs is higher now than in the past 20 years.
Despite the fact that job vacancies are at their greatest level since the end of 2000 (the most recent statistics available), many factors are limiting employment growth. One factor is that the number of people quitting their jobs each month has reached an all-time high. Because workers are more inclined to switch occupations in a strong labor market, the quit rate often changes with the job opening rate, as seen in Figure 4. Furthermore, the mix of labor demand is shifting in the current context, and workers may be taking time off from temporary positions taken during the pandemic. Record job openings, sluggish job matching, and low labor force participation have all combined to put downward wage pressure on workers, especially those in the service industry, younger workers, and those with less formal education.
Aside from the low rate of job matching, the lack of improvement in the labor force participation rate, which is the percentage of the population that works or is actively looking for employment, is also concerning. Between February and April of last year, when roughly 8 million people exited the workforce, this figure plummeted from 63 percent to 60 percent. By June 2020, the participation rate had regained almost halfway, but has remained stubbornly low since then.
Fact 5: Even with recent jumps in inflation, lower income workers are seeing increases in real wages.
Wage inflation has been excellent news, especially for low-wage workers and those in certain industries. Wages in the bottom quartile of the wage distribution are risen 7.0 percent from pre-pandemic levels, or 4.6 percent annually, as illustrated in figure 5. That rate of growth is comparable to what that group saw in 2019, when the job market was thought to be relatively tight. Wage growth has been particularly substantial in several industries. For example, average hourly earnings in the leisure and hospitality sector have increased nearly twice as fast as the total private industry average over the last 12 months. Retail commerce, transportation and warehousing, and financial operations are all enjoying considerable increases in hourly earnings.
Workers’ purchasing power is not increasing as quickly as nominal salaries due to recent increases in the rate of inflation. From March to June 2021, actual wages fell as a result of recent price hikes. These decreases somewhat offset increases in real wages for wage earners in the bottom quartile early in the epidemic, when inflation was low and nominal wages were rising. Real wages for that group accelerated considerably in July and August. Overall, real earnings for the poorest quartile increased by 2.4 percent, or 1.6 percent per year, from February 2020 to August 2021. This is significantly lower than the 2.4 percent annual rate of real pay growth seen in the bottom quartile in 2019. Furthermore, in contrast to a 0.8 percent increase in 2019, actual salaries for individuals in the top quartile are essentially unchanged.
Fact 6: Post-pandemic, income after government taxes and transfers, as well as household saving, have been above their recent trends.
In 2020 and thus far in 2021, disposable personal income (DPI, or total aftertax income) was larger than it would have been if DPI had merely grown at its five-year trend rate. Since the beginning of the epidemic, DPI has been higher than trend by a total of $1.4 trillion.
Household savings have risen as a result of huge increases in DPI and constrained services spending during the pandemic. From March 2020 through April this year, the rate of saving was larger than it had been in the previous four decades in every month; in some months, it was nearly double the record postWorld War II peak. In total, households had $2.5 trillion more in savings than they would have had DPI and spending risen at trend rates in the five years before to the pandemic. Furthermore, property and stock market prices have risen dramatically, resulting in significant gains in household wealth. Those funds will be used to fund the unmet demand for foregone spending. Households will eventually see increased savings and wealth as financial resources to sustain long-term, reasonably consistent consumer expenditure.
Fact 7: Fiscal support led to a reduction in poverty in 2020.
Poverty climbed from 10.5 percent to 11.4 percent between 2019 and 2020, according to the Official Poverty Measure (OPM). The percentage of the US population living in poverty, as assessed by the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), decreased from 12 percent to 9 percent in 2020 after accounting for the massive economic support offered to households (figure 7). While SPM-measured poverty is normally lower than OPM for children, SPM-measured poverty was lower than OPM for the first time in 2020.
The increase of unemployment compensation and checks to households were the two policies that had the most substantial effects in comparison to previous years since they were the most different from previous policy. SPM poverty would have grown to 12.7 percent instead of declining to 9.1 percent if Congress had not enacted relief for families.
Another factor contributing to the reduction in poverty was the relatively significant salary growth seen by those at the bottom of the income distribution who stayed working (see fact 5). Those salary increases followed robust wage growth in 2018 and 2019, when the tight labor market favored lower-paid workers.
In 2021, ongoing fiscal supportparticularly full refundability and increases in the child tax credit, as well as increases in the maximum benefit of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)along with continued labor market recovery should help to pull households out of poverty. Making permanent some of the actions undertaken to combat the COVID-19 recession will allow for sustained progress in lowering post-tax-and-transfer poverty as assessed by the SPM.
Fact 8: To date, 36 states have made progress in catching up on delinquent rent and mortgage payments.
In the spring of 2020, politicians put in place numerous relief programs to assist Americans struggling to make mortgage and rent payments in the midst of a significant contraction in labor income. These initiatives began with foreclosure and eviction moratoria and eventually expanded to include financial assistance.
Delinquent mortgage borrowers who had a federally backed mortgage, which includes mortgages backed by the Federal Housing Administration, Veterans Administration, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, and were experiencing economic hardships as a result of the pandemic, were automatically eligible for forbearance through September 30, 2021. Mortgage servicers, who are normally compelled to make payments to investors regardless of whether borrowers are late, have received assistance from the government. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, forbearance plans disproportionately benefited low-income borrowers, particularly those with FHA-insured loans and those who lived in low-income areas (Haughwout, Lee, Scally, and van der Klaauw 2021). In addition, the American Rescue Plan, enacted by Congress, offered over $10 billion to homeowners who were behind on their mortgage and utility payments.
Although some states have extended such safeguards, the federal eviction moratorium expired in August 2021. The federal government has set aside $46.5 billion to assist renters in making back payments as well as landlords who are owed such amounts. Even with recent US Department of the Treasury (2021) recommendations to speed delivery, state and local grantees had only provided $5.1 billion of the first $25 billion allotted for emergency rental assistance through July 2021, according to news reports (Siegel 2021). More than 60% of households receiving aid in the first quarter of 2021 had household incomes that were less than 30% of normal incomes in their geographic area.
Nonetheless, stronger fiscal support and a partial labor market recovery have contributed to a reduction in the number of persons who are behind on their payments. From each state’s high to the most recent data spanning July and August, Figure 8 indicates how much progress has been made in catching up on rent or mortgage payments. Between December 2020 and March 2021, three-quarters of states experienced their greatest rate of missed rent or mortgage payments. Since peaking, the percentage of residents reporting missed rent or mortgage payments has decreased by statistically significant levels in 36 states.
Fact 9: The strength in durable goods spending and weakness in spending on consumer services stands in sharp contrast to previous recoveries.
Together, social alienation and strong government support for households resulted in a boom in durable goods spending while households cut back on services spendinga marked deviation from typical recession behavior. Overall real spending on goods fell 13% from February to April 2020, as shown in figure 9a, but quickly recovered and had surpassed its pre-pandemic level by June. Vehicles, household furniture, and leisure equipment were among the items purchased in 2021; after accounting for inflation, purchases of those durable goods had averaged 25% greater than pre-pandemic spending. During the pandemic, however, spending on servicesmany of which were face-to-face transactions like live entertainment and dining at restaurantsfell sharply. In the spring of 2020, real services spending fell by more than 20%, and it has yet to rebound to pre-pandemic levels.
These trends differ from those seen in previous recessions. During most previous recessions, spending on durable goods remained depressed for an extended period, as in the case of the Great Recession, when goods expenditures were 7% below their pre-recession peak 18 months after the recovery began. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 9b, spending on services temporarily plateaued in the first year of recovery in each of the previous three recessions before resuming growth. However, in none of these previous recessions did services fall below their pre-recession levels for an extended period of time, highlighting the COVID-19 recession’s uniqueness.
As individuals resume routine activities, demand has shifted back toward services in recent months. From March to July, goods purchases fell slightly, while service spending surged by 3%; in particular, expenditure on live entertainment, hotels, and public transportation increased by 35% in those four months.
Fact 10: Retail inventories are unsustainably low.
Much of the consumer demand for goods has been fulfilled by inventory drawdowns through August 2021. The retail inventory-to-sales ratio increased at the start of the epidemic, when spending plunged, as seen in figure 10. However, the ratio has dropped dramatically since then. This is especially true in the car industry, where chip shortages have hampered manufacturing. Production has been insufficient to meet demand even outside of that sector. Orders that haven’t been filled and delivery times that haven’t been met are on the rise across the manufacturing industry. Disruptions in global supply chains have been a persistent stumbling block, particularly backlogs at ports, which have driven up shipping costs to historic highs.
On the one hand, manufacturing capacity utilization has nearly restored to pre-pandemic levels. On the other hand, historical patterns and recent manufacturer surveys imply that once demand returns, manufacturers will expand utilization well beyond that level to replenish stockpiles.
In addition to inventory investments, survey data suggests that capacity and productivity investments are on the rise. Since the second quarter of 2020, private investment in equipment and structures has partially recovered, but has not yet restored to pre-pandemic levels. Investment in business equipment had recovered as a share of potential output as of the first quarter of 2021, although more investment is needed to make up for lost investment during the epidemic. Investment in residential structures has more than compensated for a resurgence in structure investment; in fact, residential structure investment as a percentage of output has returned to levels not seen since 2007. Nonresidential structural investment, on the other hand, continues to fall as a percentage of potential output.
Fact 11: There were more new business applications and fewer bankruptcies in 2020 and 2021 than in 2018 and 2019.
Newly formed firms appear to be a significant source of the goods and services that families require. Figure 11a depicts new business applications from enterprises classified by the Census Bureau as having a high proclivity to hire people. Since the agency began tracking the series in 2004, we have seen the highest amount of applications since the summer of 2020. In the aftermath of the pandemic, applications may have indicated new commercial prospects. The increase in total new applications is concentrated in online retail, which accounts for a third of all new applications, and service sector companies, which saw some of the worst job losses early last year (Haltiwanger 2021).
Due in part to financial support like the Paycheck Protection Program, which granted forgiven loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, fewer businesses have collapsed in the last year and a half than had been expected. In Figure 11b, the total number of commercial bankruptcies during the last four years is compared. In total, there were 17% fewer bankruptcies in 2020 than in 2019, and 2021 is on course to have the fewest commercial bankruptcy filings since at least 2012. (when the data became available). In particular, Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filings, which reflect asset liquidation and sole proprietorships, respectively, were 16 percent and 45 percent lower in 2020 than in 2019. In contrast, Chapter 11 filings, which have generally reflected large-firm reorganizations, increased by 29% in 2020. That increase is also likely due to laws passed in February 2020 and then expanded through the CARES Act, which let smaller businesses to restructure under Chapter 11 and thus stay in operation.
What is the state of the economy in 2021?
“While Omicron will slow growth in the first quarter, activity is projected to pick up nicely once the newest pandemic wave has passed and supply-chain issues have been resolved,” said Sal Guatieri, a senior economist at BMO Capital Markets in Toronto.
“As it navigates underlying economic strength, rising labor shortages, and stubbornly high inflation, the Fed will need to remain ‘humble and flexible.'”
The economy increased at its fastest rate since 1984 in 2021, with the government providing roughly $6 trillion in epidemic relief. In 2020, it shrank by 3.4 percent, the most in 74 years.
President Joe Biden swiftly claimed credit for the outstanding performance, calling it “no accident.”
After Congress failed to approve his key $1.75 trillion Build Back Better legislation, Biden’s popularity is declining amid a stalled domestic economic plan.
In a statement, Biden said, “We are finally building an American economy for the twenty-first century, and I urge Congress to keep this momentum going by passing legislation to make America more competitive, strengthen our supply chains, strengthen our manufacturing and innovation, invest in our families and clean energy, and lower kitchen table costs.”
According to the government’s advance GDP estimate, gross domestic product increased at a 6.9% annualized pace in the fourth quarter. This follows a third-quarter growth rate of 2.3 percent.
However, by December, the impetus had dissipated due to an assault of COVID-19 infections, spurred by the Omicron variety, which contributed to lower expenditure and disruption at factories and service organizations. However, there are hints that infections have peaked, which could mean a surge in service demand by spring.
Inventory investment surged by $173.5 billion, accounting for 4.90 percentage points of GDP growth, the highest level since the third quarter of 2020. Since the first quarter of 2021, businesses have started reducing inventories.
During the epidemic, people’s spending shifted from services to products, putting a strain on supply systems. GDP rose at a sluggish 1.9 percent rate, excluding inventories.
On Wall Street, stocks were trading higher. Against a basket of currencies, the dollar rose. Treasury yields in the United States have fallen.
The minor increase in so-called final sales was interpreted by some economists as a sign that the economy was about to decline severely, especially if not all of the inventory accumulation was planned. They were also concerned that rate hikes and diminished government aid, particularly the elimination of the childcare tax credit, would dampen demand.
“Fed policymakers will have to tread carefully when raising interest rates,” said Christopher Rupkey, chief economist at FWDBONDS in New York. “Every other Federal Reserve in history has raised interest rates too high and brought the economy crashing back down.”
Last quarter’s growth was also boosted by a surge in consumer spending in October, before falling sharply as Omicron raged. Consumer expenditure, which accounts for more than two-thirds of GDP, increased by 3.3 percent in the fourth quarter after increasing by 2.0 percent in the previous quarter.
Increases in spending on healthcare, membership clubs, sports centers, parks, theaters, and museums balance a decline in purchases of motor vehicles, which are scarce due to a global semiconductor shortage.
Inflation rose at a 6.9% annual pace, the fastest since the second quarter of 1981, far beyond the Federal Reserve’s target of 2%. As a result, the amount of money available to households fell by 5.8%, limiting consumer expenditure.
Households were still buffered by large savings, which totaled $1.34 trillion. Wages increased by 8.9% before accounting for inflation, indicating that the labor market is experiencing a severe labor shortage, with 10.6 million job opportunities at the end of November.
Though the job market slowed in early January as Omicron rose, it is now at or near full employment. Initial jobless claims fell 30,000 to a seasonally adjusted 260,000 in the week ending Jan. 22, according to a second Labor Department report released on Thursday.
Claims decreased dramatically in Illinois, Kentucky, Texas, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Last quarter’s GDP growth was aided by a resurgence in corporate equipment spending. Government spending, on the other hand, has decreased at the federal, state, and municipal levels.
After being a drag on GDP growth for five quarters, trade made no contribution, while homebuilding investment fell for the third quarter in a row. Expensive building materials are constraining the sector, resulting in a record backlog of homes yet to be built.
Despite the economy’s difficulties at the start of the year, most experts predict the good luck will continue. This year’s growth forecasts are at least 4%.
“This year, the economy could be even better,” said Scott Hoyt, a senior economist with Moody’s Analytics in West Chester, Pennsylvania. “The economy will stagnate, and monthly employment increases will fall short of last year’s high levels. Nonetheless, by the end of the year, the economy should be close to full employment and inflation should be close to the Fed’s target.”
(Paragraph 7 was removed from this story because it contained incorrect information.)
How long does it take for a recession to end?
A recession is a long-term economic downturn that affects a large number of people. A depression is a longer-term, more severe slump. Since 1854, there have been 33 recessions. 1 Recessions have lasted an average of 11 months since 1945.
What is the state of the US economy right now?
Following a 2.3 percent gain in the third quarter, real gross domestic product (GDP) expanded at a 6.9% annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2021. The rise was lowered down 0.1 percentage point from the February “second” estimate. Inventory investment, upturns in exports and residential fixed investment, and an acceleration in consumer spending all contributed to the fourth-quarter acceleration. COVID-19 instances resulted in continuous restrictions and disruptions in the functioning of enterprises in several parts of the country throughout the fourth quarter. As sections of numerous federal programs expired or tapered off, government aid payments in the form of forgiving loans to enterprises, grants to state and local governments, and social benefits to households all reduced.
Was it a depression or a recession in 2008?
- The Great Recession was a period of economic slump that lasted from 2007 to 2009, following the bursting of the housing bubble in the United States and the worldwide financial crisis.
- The Great Recession was the worst economic downturn in the United States since the 1930s’ Great Depression.
- Federal authorities unleashed unprecedented fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policy in reaction to the Great Recession, which some, but not all, credit with the ensuing recovery.
When was the last recession in the United States?
The Great Recession lasted from December 2007 to June 2009, making it the longest downturn since World War II. The Great Recession was particularly painful in various ways, despite its short duration. From its peak in 2007Q4 to its bottom in 2009Q2, real gross domestic product (GDP) plummeted 4.3 percent, the greatest drop in the postwar era (based on data as of October 2013). The unemployment rate grew from 5% in December 2007 to 9.5 percent in June 2009, before peaking at 10% in October 2009.
The financial repercussions of the Great Recession were also disproportionate: home prices plummeted 30% on average from their peak in mid-2006 to mid-2009, while the S&P 500 index dropped 57% from its peak in October 2007 to its trough in March 2009. The net worth of US individuals and charity organizations dropped from around $69 trillion in 2007 to around $55 trillion in 2009.
As the financial crisis and recession worsened, worldwide policies aimed at reviving economic growth were enacted. Like many other countries, the United States enacted economic stimulus measures that included a variety of government expenditures and tax cuts. The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 were two of these projects.
The Federal Reserve’s response to the financial crisis varied over time and included a variety of unconventional approaches. Initially, the Federal Reserve used “conventional” policy actions by lowering the federal funds rate from 5.25 percent in September 2007 to a range of 0-0.25 percent in December 2008, with the majority of the drop taking place between January and March 2008 and September and December 2008. The significant drop in those periods represented a significant downgrading in the economic outlook, as well as increasing downside risks to output and inflation (including the risk of deflation).
By December 2008, the federal funds rate had reached its effective lower bound, and the FOMC had begun to utilize its policy statement to provide future guidance for the rate. The phrasing mentioned keeping the rate at historically low levels “for some time” and later “for an extended period” (Board of Governors 2008). (Board of Governors 2009a). The goal of this guidance was to provide monetary stimulus through lowering the term structure of interest rates, raising inflation expectations (or lowering the likelihood of deflation), and lowering real interest rates. With the sluggish and shaky recovery from the Great Recession, the forward guidance was tightened by adding more explicit conditionality on specific economic variables such as inflation “low rates of resource utilization, stable inflation expectations, and tame inflation trends” (Board of Governors 2009b). Following that, in August 2011, the explicit calendar guidance of “At least through mid-2013, the federal funds rate will remain at exceptionally low levels,” followed by economic-threshold-based guidance for raising the funds rate from its zero lower bound, with the thresholds based on the unemployment rate and inflationary conditions (Board of Governors 2012). This forward guidance is an extension of the Federal Reserve’s conventional approach of influencing the funds rate’s current and future direction.
The Fed pursued two more types of policy in addition to forward guidance “During the Great Recession, unorthodox” policy initiatives were taken. Credit easing programs, as explored in more detail in “Federal Reserve Credit Programs During the Meltdown,” were one set of unorthodox policies that aimed to facilitate credit flows and lower credit costs.
The large scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs were another set of non-traditional policies. The asset purchases were done with the federal funds rate near zero to help lower longer-term public and private borrowing rates. The Federal Reserve said in November 2008 that it would buy US agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and debt issued by housing-related US government agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan banks). 1 The asset selection was made in part to lower the cost and increase the availability of finance for home purchases. These purchases aided the housing market, which was at the heart of the crisis and recession, as well as improving broader financial conditions. The Fed initially planned to acquire up to $500 billion in agency MBS and $100 billion in agency debt, with the program being expanded in March 2009 and finished in 2010. The FOMC also announced a $300 billion program to buy longer-term Treasury securities in March 2009, which was completed in October 2009, just after the Great Recession ended, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. The Federal Reserve purchased approximately $1.75 trillion of longer-term assets under these programs and their expansions (commonly known as QE1), with the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet increasing by slightly less because some securities on the balance sheet were maturing at the same time.
However, real GDP is only a little over 4.5 percent above its prior peak as of this writing in 2013, and the jobless rate remains at 7.3 percent. With the federal funds rate at zero and the current recovery slow and sluggish, the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy plan has evolved in an attempt to stimulate the economy and meet its statutory mandate. The Fed has continued to change its communication policies and implement more LSAP programs since the end of the Great Recession, including a $600 billion Treasuries-only purchase program in 2010-11 (often known as QE2) and an outcome-based purchase program that began in September 2012. (in addition, there was a maturity extension program in 2011-12 where the Fed sold shorter-maturity Treasury securities and purchased longer-term Treasuries). Furthermore, the increasing attention on financial stability and regulatory reform, the economic consequences of the European sovereign debt crisis, and the restricted prospects for global growth in 2013 and 2014 reflect how the Great Recession’s fallout is still being felt today.