The figure below shows the annual change in the Consumer Price Index from 1913 to 1940. The graph has two distinct peaks and valleys. The first is the depression of 19201921, which some argue was caused by the reintegration of millions of war veterans into the economy, lowering labor costs and causing severe deflation. Between 1920 and 1921, the CPI fell by roughly 16 percent. According to the Department of Commerce, deflation was 18 percent over this time period.
The Great Depression, which lasted from 1929 to 1932, was the chart’s second trough. The over-indebtedness of the United States, according to economist Irving Fisher, was the primary cause of the Great Depression. When the bubble burst in 1929, it set off a deflationary cycle that no amount of fiscal or monetary intervention could stop. As far as he could tell, Irving Fisher identified nine basic causes. High debt levels, a contracting money supply, falling asset prices, rising bankruptcies, and a loss of confidence are just a few of the reasons.
Keep in mind that Irving Fisher named these reasons with the benefit of hindsight. Just days before the stock market fell in 1929, his “foresight” lead him to say, “stock prices had hit what appears to be a permanently high level.” If you swap out Irving Fisher with Dave Portnoy (and a slew of other Wall Street pundits), you’ve got all the ingredients for the same dish.
During the Great Depression, the CPI fell by a total of 24%. Despite deflation during the Great Depression, inflation returned to the United States in 1933. The Consumer Price Index, on the other hand, did not return to 1929 levels until 1943, 14 years later.
What caused the Great Depression’s inflation?
Austrian economists claim that the Great Depression was a foregone conclusion as a result of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies in the 1920s. The central bank’s strategy of “loose credit” resulted in an unsustainable credit-fueled boom. During this time, money supply inflation caused an unsustainable boom in asset values (stocks and bonds) as well as capital goods. It was too late to avoid a major economic recession when the Federal Reserve finally tightened monetary policy in 1928. Government involvement after the 1929 catastrophe, according to Austrians, slowed the market’s adjustment and made the road to full recovery more arduous.
Acceptance or denial of the Monetarist explanation is compatible with acceptance or denial of the Austrian account of what caused the Great Depression. Murray Rothbard, an Austrian economist who wrote America’s Great Depression (1963), dismissed the Monetarist theory. He disputed Milton Friedman’s contention that the central bank did not do enough to expand the money supply, saying instead that the Federal Reserve did pursue an inflationary strategy when it purchased $1.1 billion in government assets in 1932, bringing its total holdings to $1.8 billion. “Total bank reserves barely climbed by $212 million, but the total money supply declined by $3 billion,” Rothbard claims, despite the central bank’s measures. He claims that the reason for this is that the American public lost faith in the banking system and began hoarding more currency, a factor outside the Central Bank’s control. Because of the risk of a bank run, local bankers were more cautious in lending out their reserves, which, according to Rothbard, was the reason of the Federal Reserve’s incapacity to inflate.
In the 1930s, Friedrich Hayek chastised the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England for not taking a more contractionary position. Hayek admitted in 1975 that he made a mistake in the 1930s by not opposing the Central Bank’s deflationary policy, and explained why: “At the time, I believed that a process of deflation of some short duration might break the rigidity of wages, which I thought was incompatible with a functioning economy.” He stated in 1978 that he agreed with the Monetarists’ point of view, adding, “I agree with Milton Friedman that once the Crash occurred, the Federal Reserve System pursued a stupid deflationary policy,” and that he opposed deflation as much as he opposed inflation. In a similar vein, economist Lawrence White claims that Hayek’s business cycle theory is incompatible with a monetary policy that allows for a large reduction of the money supply.
What is creating 2021 inflation?
As fractured supply chains combined with increased consumer demand for secondhand vehicles and construction materials, 2021 saw the fastest annual price rise since the early 1980s.
During the Great Depression, did prices rise?
- During the Great Depression in the United States, between 1929 and 1933, real GDP fell by more than 25%, the unemployment rate rose to 25%, and prices fell by more than 9% in both 1931 and 1932, and by nearly 25% overall.
- The Great Depression is still a mystery today. The origins of this severe economic downturn, as well as why it lasted so long, are still hotly debated topics in economics.
- A decline in the economy’s ability to create goods and services is one explanation for the Great Depression. The economy’s overall demand for goods and services is reduced, according to the second major explanation.
How did inflation do throughout the Great Recession?
The Great Inflation was the defining macroeconomic event of the twentieth century’s second half. After the roughly two decades it lasted, the worldwide monetary system built during World War II was abandoned, four economic recessions occurred, two catastrophic energy shortages occurred, and wage and price restrictions were implemented for the first time in peacetime. It was “the worst failure of American macroeconomic policy in the postwar century,” according to one eminent economist (Siegel 1994).
However, that failure ushered in a paradigm shift in macroeconomic theory and, ultimately, the laws that now govern the Federal Reserve and other central banks across the world. If the Great Inflation was the result of a major blunder in American macroeconomic policy, its defeat should be celebrated.
Forensics of the Great Inflation
Inflation was a bit over 1% per year in 1964. It had been in the area for the last six years. Inflation began to rise in the mid-1960s, reaching a high of more than 14% in 1980. In the second half of the 1980s, it had dropped to an average of barely 3.5 percent.
While economists dispute the relative importance of the causes that have spurred and sustained inflation for more than a decade, there is little disagreement about where it comes from. The actions of the Federal Reserve, which allowed for an excessive expansion in the quantity of money, were at the root of the Great Inflation.
It would be helpful to describe the story in three distinct but related parts to comprehend this phase of particularly terrible policy, particularly monetary policy. This is a kind of forensic examination into the motive, means, and opportunity for the Great Inflation to happen.
The Motive: The Phillips Curve and the Pursuit of Full Employment
The first section of the story, the motivation behind the Great Inflation, takes place in the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression, a period in macroeconomic theory and policy that was similarly momentous. Following World War II, Congress focused on programs that it anticipated would foster better economic stability. The Employment Act of 1946 was the most prominent of the new legislation. The act, among other things, stated that the federal government’s role is to “advance maximum employment, production, and purchasing power” and called for more coordination between fiscal and monetary policy. 1 The Federal Reserve’s current twin mandate to “maintain long-run expansion of the monetary and credit aggregates…in order to achieve effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” is based on this legislation (Steelman 2011).
The orthodoxy that guided policy in the postwar era was Keynesian stabilization policy, which was driven in part by the painful memory of the unprecedented high unemployment in the United States and around the world during the 1930s. The fundamental focus of these policies was the regulation of aggregate expenditure (demand) through the fiscal authority’s spending and taxation policies, as well as the central bank’s monetary policies. The notion that monetary policy can and should be used to manage aggregate spending and stabilize economic activity remains a widely held belief that governs the Federal Reserve’s and other central banks’ operations today. However, one crucial and incorrect assumption in the implementation of stabilization policy in the 1960s and 1970s was that unemployment and inflation had a stable, exploitable relationship. In particular, it was widely assumed that permanently lower unemployment rates could be “purchased” with somewhat higher inflation rates.
The idea that the “Phillips curve” indicated a longer-term trade-off between unemployment, which was very destructive to economic well-being, and inflation, which was sometimes seen as more of a nuisance, was an appealing assumption for policymakers who sought to enforce the Employment Act’s requirements.
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But the Phillips curve’s stability was a dangerous assumption, as economists Edmund Phelps (1967) and Milton Friedman (1968) cautioned. “If the statical’optimum’ is chosen,” Phelps says, “it is logical to assume that participants in product and labor markets will learn to expect inflation…and that, as a result of their rational, anticipatory behavior, the Phillips Curve will progressively shift upward…” Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967). In other words, the authorities’ desired trade-off between reduced unemployment and higher inflation would almost certainly be a false bargain, requiring ever higher inflation to maintain.
The Means: The Collapse of Bretton Woods
If the Federal Reserve’s policies were well-anchored, chasing the Phillips curve in search of lower unemployment would not have been possible. Through the Bretton Woods agreement in the 1960s, the US dollar was tied if shakily to gold. As a result, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the severance of the US dollar from its last link to gold play a part in the story of the Great Inflation.
During World War II, the world’s industrial nations agreed to a worldwide monetary system, which they thought would promote global trade and offer more economic stability and peace. The Bretton Woods system, hammered out by forty-four nations in New Hampshire in July 1944, established a fixed rate of exchange between the world’s currencies and the US dollar, with the latter linked to gold.3
The Bretton Woods system, on the other hand, had a number of faults in its implementation, the most serious of which was the attempt to maintain constant parity across world currencies, which was incompatible with their domestic economic goals. Many countries were pursuing monetary policies that claimed to move up the Phillips curve, resulting in a more favorable unemployment-inflation nexus.
The US dollar faced an additional challenge as the world’s reserve currency. The need for US dollar reserves expanded in tandem with global trade. For a period, an expanding balance of payments deficit met the demand for US dollars, and foreign central banks accumulated ever-increasing dollar reserves. The amount of dollar reserves held overseas eventually exceeded the US gold stock, meaning that the US could not sustain total convertibility at the current gold pricea fact that foreign governments and currency speculators were quick to note.
As inflation rose in the second half of the 1960s, more US dollars were changed to gold, and in the summer of 1971, President Richard Nixon put a stop to foreign central banks exchanging dollars for gold. The short-lived Smithsonian Agreement attempted to save the global monetary system during the next two years, but the new arrangement performed no better than Bretton Woods and quickly fell apart. The worldwide monetary system that had existed since World War II had come to an end.
Most of the world’s currencies, including the US dollar, were now entirely unanchored after the last link to gold was destroyed. Except during times of global crisis, this was the first time in history that the industrialized world’s currencies were based on an irredeemable paper money standard.
The Opportunity: Fiscal Imbalances, Energy Shortages, and Bad Data
The US economy was in a state of flux throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. At a time when the US economic situation was already stressed by the Vietnam War, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society Act ushered in large spending programs across a broad range of social initiatives. The monetary policy was complicated by the developing budgetary imbalances.
The Federal Reserve used a “even-keel” policy approach to avoid monetary policy actions that would conflict with the Treasury’s funding plans. In practice, this meant that the central bank would not change policy and would maintain interest rates at their current levels during the time between the announcement of a Treasury issuance and its market sale. Treasury difficulties were rare under normal circumstances, and the Fed’s even-keeled policies didn’t obstruct monetary policy implementation considerably. The Federal Reserve’s adherence to the even-keel principle, however, became progressively limited as debt difficulties became more prominent (Meltzer 2005).
The periodic energy crises, which raised oil prices and stifled US GDP, were a more disruptive force. The first crisis was a five-month-long Arab oil embargo that began in October 1973. Crude oil prices quadrupled at this time, reaching a plateau that lasted until 1979, when the Iranian revolution triggered a second energy crisis. The price of oil tripled during the second crisis.
In the 1970s, economists and policymakers began to classify increases in aggregate prices into various inflation kinds. Macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy, had a direct influence on “demand-pull” inflation. It was caused by policies that resulted in expenditure levels that were higher than what the economy could produce without pushing the economy beyond its normal productive capacity and requiring the use of more expensive resources. However, supply interruptions, particularly in the food and energy industries, might push inflation higher (Gordon 1975). 4 This “cost-push” inflation was also passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail prices.
Inflation driven by the growing price of oil was mainly beyond the control of monetary policy, according to the central bank. However, the increase in unemployment that occurred as a result of the increase in oil prices was not.
The Federal Reserve accommodated huge and rising budget imbalances and leaned against the headwinds created by energy costs, motivated by a duty to generate full employment with little or no anchor for reserve management. These policies hastened the money supply expansion and increased overall prices without reducing unemployment.
Policymakers were also hampered by faulty data (or, at the very least, a lack of understanding of the facts). Looking back at the data available to policymakers in the run-up to and during the Great Inflation, economist Athanasios Orphanides found that the real-time estimate of potential output was significantly overstated, while the estimate of the unemployment rate consistent with full employment was significantly understated. To put it another way, officials were probably underestimating the inflationary effects of their measures as well. In reality, they couldn’t continue on their current policy path without rising inflation (Orphanides 1997; Orphanides 2002).
To make matters worse, the Phillips curve began to fluctuate, indicating that the Federal Reserve’s policy actions were being influenced by its stability.
From High Inflation to Inflation TargetingThe Conquest of US Inflation
Friedman and Phelps were correct. The previously stable inflation-unemployment trade-off has become unstable. Policymakers’ power to regulate any “real” variable was fleeting. This included the unemployment rate, which fluctuated about its “natural” level. The trade-off that policymakers were hoping to take advantage of didn’t exist.
As businesses and families began to appreciate, if not anticipate, rising prices, any trade-off between inflation and unemployment became a less favorable trade-off until both inflation and unemployment reached unacceptably high levels. This became known as the “stagflationary age.” When this narrative began in 1964, inflation was at 1% and unemployment was at 5%. Inflation would be over 12% and unemployment would be over 7% ten years later. Inflation was near 14.5 percent in the summer of 1980, while unemployment was over 7.5 percent.
Officials at the Federal Reserve were not ignorant to the escalating inflation, and they were fully aware of the dual mandate, which required monetary policy to be calibrated to achieve full employment and price stability. Indeed, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, more generally known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act after the bill’s authors, re-codified the Employment Act of 1946 in 1978. Humphrey-Hawkins tasked the Federal Reserve with pursuing full employment and price stability, as well as requiring the central bank to set growth targets for several monetary aggregates and submit a semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress. 5 When full employment and inflation collided, however, the employment part of the mandate appeared to have the upper hand. Full employment was the foremost objective in the minds of the people and the government, if not also at the Federal Reserve, as Fed Chairman Arthur Burns would later declare (Meltzer 2005). However, there was a general consensus that confronting the inflation problem head-on would be too costly to the economy and jobs.
Attempts to reduce inflation without the costly side effect of increasing unemployment had been made in the past. Between 1971 and 1974, the Nixon government implemented wage and price controls in three stages. These measures only delayed the rise in prices for a short time while aggravating shortages, particularly in food and energy. The Ford administration did not fare any better. Following his declaration of inflation as “enemy number one,” President Gerald Ford initiated the Whip Inflation Now (WIN) initiative in 1974, which included voluntary steps to encourage increased thrift. It was a colossal flop.
By the late 1970s, the public had come to anticipate monetary policy to be inflationary. They were also becoming increasingly dissatisfied with inflation. In the latter half of the 1970s, survey after survey revealed a deterioration in popular confidence in the economy and government policy. Inflation was frequently singled out as a particular scourge. Since 1965, interest rates have appeared to be on the rise, and as the 1970s drew to a conclusion, they jumped even higher. Business investment stagnated, productivity fell, and the country’s trade balance with the rest of the globe worsened during this time. Inflation was largely seen as either a substantial contributing factor or the primary cause of the economic downturn.
However, once the country was in the midst of unacceptably high inflation and unemployment, officials were confronted with a difficult choice. Combating high unemployment would almost surely drive inflation even higher, while combating inflation would almost certainly cause unemployment to rise much more.
Paul Volcker, formerly of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was elected chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in 1979. Year-over-year inflation was above 11 percent when he assumed office in August, and national unemployment was slightly under 6 percent. By this time, it was widely understood that lowering inflation necessitated tighter control over the pace of increase of reserves in particular, as well as broad money in general. As mandated by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had already began setting targets for monetary aggregates. However, it was evident that with the new chairman, attitude was shifting and that greater measures to restrict the expansion of the money supply were needed. The FOMC announced in October 1979 that instead of using the fed funds rate as a policy tool, it would target reserve growth.
Fighting inflation was now considered as important to meet both of the dual mandate’s goals, even if it temporarily disrupted economic activity and resulted in a greater rate of unemployment. “My core idea is that over time we have no choice but to deal with the inflationary situation since inflation and the unemployment rate go together,” Volcker declared in early 1980. Isn’t that what the 1970s taught us?” (Meltzer, 1034, 2009).
While not perfect, better control of reserve and money expansion over time resulted in a desired slowdown of inflation. The establishment of credit limits in early 1980, as well as the Monetary Control Act, aided this stricter reserve management. Interest rates surged, decreased for a short time, and then spiked again in 1980. Between January and July, lending activity decreased, unemployment increased, and the economy experienced a temporary recession. Even as the economy improved in the second half of 1980, inflation declined but remained high.
The Volcker Fed, on the other hand, kept up the pressure on rising inflation by raising interest rates and slowing reserve growth. In July 1981, the economy suffered another recession, this time more severe and long-lasting, lasting until November 1982. Unemployment peaked at over 11%, but inflation continued to fall, and by the conclusion of the recession, year-over-year inflation had dropped below 5%. As the Fed’s commitment to low inflation gained traction, unemployment fell and the economy entered a period of steady growth and stability. The Great Inflation had come to an end.
Macroeconomic theory had undergone a metamorphosis by this time, influenced in large part by the economic lessons of the day. In macroeconomic models, the importance of public expectations in the interaction between economic policy and economic performance has become standard. The need of time-consistent policy choicespolicies that do not sacrifice long-term prosperity for short-term gainsas well as policy credibility became widely recognized as essential for excellent macroeconomic outcomes.
Today’s central banks recognize that price stability is critical to sound monetary policy, and several, like the Federal Reserve, have set specific numerical inflation targets. These numerical inflation targets have reinstated an anchor to monetary policy to the extent that they are credible. As a result, they have improved the transparency of monetary policy decisions and reduced uncertainty, both of which are now recognized as critical preconditions for achieving long-term growth and maximum employment.
Is inflation capable of causing a depression?
Recessions aren’t always caused by inflation. High interest rates, a loss of confidence, a decrease in bank lending, and a decrease in investment are all common causes of recessions. Cost-push inflation, on the other hand, may contribute to a recession, particularly if inflation exceeds nominal wage growth.
- In 2008, for example, inflation was higher than nominal wages (resulting in a drop in real earnings), resulting in fewer consumer spending and contributing to the 2008 recession.
- It’s also feasible that inflation will produce a recession in the long run. If economic growth is too high, it can lead to increased inflation and unsustainable growth, resulting in a ‘boom and bust’ economic cycle. To put it another way, inflationary growth is frequently followed by a downturn.
- In addition, if inflation becomes too high, the Central Bank and/or the government may respond by tightening monetary and fiscal policies. This lowers inflation while simultaneously lowering aggregate demand and slowing economic development. As a result, initiatives aimed at lowering inflation are frequently the cause of a recession.
Cost-Push Inflation and Recession
Consumers will perceive a decrease in disposable income if commodity prices rise rapidly (aggregate supply will shift to the left). As a result of the compression on living standards, growth and aggregate demand may suffer. Firms will also be confronted with growing transportation costs, and they may respond by reducing investment. Another issue that could push the economy into recession is this.
The tripling of oil prices in 1974 was undoubtedly one element in the UK’s short-lived but devastating recession.
Recession
Consumer spending fell in 2008 as a result of rising oil costs, which was one factor. Cost-push inflation also pushed Central Banks to keep interest rates higher than they should have been, which may have contributed to the drop in aggregate demand.
In 2008, inflation outpaced nominal pay growth, resulting in a drop in real wages and contributing to the recession.
Cost-push inflation, on the other hand, was not the primary driver of the 2008-11 recession. The following were more significant elements in the economy’s descent into recession:
- Credit crunch – Credit market booms and busts resulted in a lack of money and, as a result, less investment.
- Falling house prices decreased wealth and consumer spending are caused by falling house prices.
- Loss of confidence – bank failures, stock market crashes, and declining housing values have all altered consumer and company expectations, causing people to conserve rather than spend.
Boom and Bust Cycles
The United Kingdom enjoyed an economic boom in the late 1980s, with growth exceeding the long-run trend rate. Inflation rose to 10% as a result of this.
The boom, however, eventually ran out of steam. In addition, the government determined that it needed to combat the 10% inflation rate, therefore it pursued a tight monetary policy (high-interest rates). This rise in interest rates (coupled with a strong exchange rate, the UK was in the ERM) resulted in a drop in aggregate demand and a recession.
Inflation does not mean demand falls
It would be a blunder to simply sa.- Inflation means that prices rise, and individuals can no longer afford goods. As a result, demand diminishes, and we have a recession. Students at the A level frequently write this, however the analysis is at best incomplete. Inflation is more likely to be induced by increased demand.
- The significant increase in consumer spending generated inflation in the 1980s. Efforts to lower the inflation rate precipitated the recession.
- During the 1981 recession, the scenario was similar. The Conservatives were determined to bring down the high inflation rates in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s. They were successful in lowering inflation by following monetarist policies, although this resulted in a recession.
What were the Great Depression’s four key causes?
Many researchers, however, agree that at least one of the four elements listed below played a role.
- The 1929 stock market meltdown. The stock market in the United States had a remarkable expansion in the 1920s.
What is creating inflation in 2022?
As the debate over inflation continues, it’s worth emphasizing a few key factors that policymakers should keep in mind as they consider what to do about the problem that arose last year.
- Even after accounting for fast growth in the last quarter of 2021, the claim that too-generous fiscal relief and recovery efforts played a big role in the 2021 acceleration of inflation by overheating the economy is unconvincing.
- Excessive inflation is being driven by the COVID-19 epidemic, which is causing demand and supply-side imbalances. COVID-19’s economic distortions are expected to become less harsh in 2022, easing inflation pressures.
- Concerns about inflation “It is misguided to believe that “expectations” among employees, households, and businesses will become ingrained and keep inflation high. What is more important than “The leverage that people and businesses have to safeguard their salaries from inflation is “expectations” of greater inflation. This leverage has been entirely one-sided for decades, with employees having no capacity to protect their salaries against pricing pressures. This one-sided leverage will reduce wage pressure in the coming months, lowering inflation.
- Inflation will not be slowed by moderate interest rate increases alone. The benefits of these hikes in persuading people and companies that policymakers are concerned about inflation must be balanced against the risks of reducing GDP.
Dean Baker recently published an excellent article summarizing the data on inflation and macroeconomic overheating. I’ll just add a few more points to his case. Rapid increase in gross domestic product (GDP) brought it 3.1 percent higher in the fourth quarter of 2021 than it had been in the fourth quarter of 2019. (the last quarter unaffected by COVID-19).
Shouldn’t this amount of GDP have put the economy’s ability to produce it without inflation under serious strain? Inflation was low (and continuing to reduce) in 2019. The supply side of the economy has been harmed since 2019, although it’s easy to exaggerate. While employment fell by 1.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021 compared to the same quarter in 2019, total hours worked in the economy fell by only 0.7 percent (and Baker notes in his post that including growth in self-employed hours would reduce this to 0.4 percent ). While some of this is due to people working longer hours than they did prior to the pandemic, the majority of it is due to the fact that the jobs that have yet to return following the COVID-19 shock are low-hour jobs. Given that labor accounts for only roughly 60% of total inputs, a 0.4 percent drop in economy-side hours would only result in a 0.2 percent drop in output, all else being equal.
RELATED: Inflation: Gas prices will get even higher
Inflation is defined as a rise in the price of goods and services in an economy over time. When there is too much money chasing too few products, inflation occurs. After the dot-com bubble burst in the early 2000s, the Federal Reserve kept interest rates low to try to boost the economy. More people borrowed money and spent it on products and services as a result of this. Prices will rise when there is a greater demand for goods and services than what is available, as businesses try to earn a profit. Increases in the cost of manufacturing, such as rising fuel prices or labor, can also produce inflation.
There are various reasons why inflation may occur in 2022. The first reason is that since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, oil prices have risen dramatically. As a result, petrol and other transportation costs have increased. Furthermore, in order to stimulate the economy, the Fed has kept interest rates low. As a result, more people are borrowing and spending money, contributing to inflation. Finally, wages have been increasing in recent years, putting upward pressure on pricing.