During times of national crises, Congress has responded by directing federal resources and programs to help struggling Americans. While it is critical to respond rapidly to crises, it is also critical to ensure that federal programs and public resources are used as intended.
The GAO’s involvement during times of crisis is examined in today’s WatchBlog piece, which focuses on the federal response to the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the coronavirus outbreak.
When the stock market crashed in 1929, precipitating the lengthy period of economic decline known as the Great Depression, GAO was still a relatively young organization.
In reaction to the Great Depression, Congress passed President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, which included $41.7 billion in funding for domestic initiatives such as unemployment compensation.
GAO’s workload grew as federal funds were poured into the 1930s’ recovery and relief efforts. GAO, which had around 1,700 employees at the time, quickly ran out of employees and needed to hire more to handle paperwork such as vouchers. Our staff had nearly tripled to 5,000 by 1939.
Our auditors began extending their involvement in overseeing federal programs at the same time. Fieldwork in Kentucky and numerous southern states began in the mid-1930s, and included examinations of government agriculture programs. This steady shift in goal from acting as federal accountants to serving as program and policy analysts would last until 2003, when the General Accounting Office was renamed the Government Accountability Office.
The Great Recession, which began in December 2007, was widely regarded as the country’s worst economic downturn since the Great Depression.
As a result, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which contained $800 billion in stimulus funding to help the economy recover.
GAO was given a number of tasks under the Recovery Act to help enhance accountability and openness in the use of those funds. For example, we conducted bimonthly assessments of how monies were spent by various states and municipalities. In addition, we conducted specialized research in areas such as small company loans, education, and trade adjustment aid.
Despite the fact that the Great Recession ended in 2009, we are still investigating its effects on the soundness of our financial system and related government support. For example, in response to the 2008 housing crisis, the Treasury Department established three housing programs utilizing TARP funds to assist struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure and keep their homes. TARP programs were assessed every 60 days during the recession and subsequent years, and we proposed steps to improve Treasury’s management and use of funds. This effort continues today, with annual audits of TARP financial statements and updates on active TARP projects. In December 2020, we released our most current report.
We’re also keeping an eye on the health of the nation’s housing finance system, which includes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which buy mortgages from lenders and either hold them or bundle them into mortgage-backed securities that can be sold.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over by the federal government in 2008, and the role has remained unchanged for the past 13 years, keeping taxpayers on the line for any possible losses sustained by the two corporations. We wrote about the dangers of this prolonged conservatorship and the need to overhaul the home finance system in January 2019.
Congress approved $4.7 trillion in emergency funding for people, businesses, the health-care system, and state and municipal governments in response to the pandemic. We’ve been following the federal response by, among other things, providing reports on the pandemic’s and response efforts’ effects on federal programs and operations on a regular basis.
Vaccine development and distribution, small business lending, unemployment payments, economic relief checks, tax refund delays, K-12 and higher education’s response to COVID-19, housing protections, and other topics have all been covered in our work.
On July 19, we released our most recent report on the federal response, as well as our recommendations for how this effort might be improved further. In October, we will publish our next report. Visit our Coronavirus Oversight page often because we’ll keep you updated on the federal reaction to COIVD-19 as the situation unfolds.
GAO has played a key role in overseeing federal expenditures and programs during times of crisis, and we continue to do so in more normal times. We produce hundreds of reports each year and testify before dozens of congressional committees and subcommittees on problems that affect our country. We saved taxpayers $77.6 billion in government spending in fiscal year 2020. For every dollar Congress invests in us, we get $114!
What did the government do to alleviate the 2008 recession?
Congress passed the Struggling Asset Relief Scheme (TARP) to empower the US Treasury to implement a major rescue program for troubled banks. The goal was to avoid a national and global economic meltdown. To end the recession, ARRA and the Economic Stimulus Plan were passed in 2009.
During the Great Recession, what steps did the government take?
The Great Recession lasted from December 2007 to June 2009, making it the longest downturn since World War II. The Great Recession was particularly painful in various ways, despite its short duration. From its peak in 2007Q4 to its bottom in 2009Q2, real gross domestic product (GDP) plummeted 4.3 percent, the greatest drop in the postwar era (based on data as of October 2013). The unemployment rate grew from 5% in December 2007 to 9.5 percent in June 2009, before peaking at 10% in October 2009.
The financial repercussions of the Great Recession were also disproportionate: home prices plummeted 30% on average from their peak in mid-2006 to mid-2009, while the S&P 500 index dropped 57% from its peak in October 2007 to its trough in March 2009. The net worth of US individuals and charity organizations dropped from around $69 trillion in 2007 to around $55 trillion in 2009.
As the financial crisis and recession worsened, worldwide policies aimed at reviving economic growth were enacted. Like many other countries, the United States enacted economic stimulus measures that included a variety of government expenditures and tax cuts. The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 were two of these projects.
The Federal Reserve’s response to the financial crisis varied over time and included a variety of unconventional approaches. Initially, the Federal Reserve used “conventional” policy actions by lowering the federal funds rate from 5.25 percent in September 2007 to a range of 0-0.25 percent in December 2008, with the majority of the drop taking place between January and March 2008 and September and December 2008. The significant drop in those periods represented a significant downgrading in the economic outlook, as well as increasing downside risks to output and inflation (including the risk of deflation).
By December 2008, the federal funds rate had reached its effective lower bound, and the FOMC had begun to utilize its policy statement to provide future guidance for the rate. The phrasing mentioned keeping the rate at historically low levels “for some time” and later “for an extended period” (Board of Governors 2008). (Board of Governors 2009a). The goal of this guidance was to provide monetary stimulus through lowering the term structure of interest rates, raising inflation expectations (or lowering the likelihood of deflation), and lowering real interest rates. With the sluggish and shaky recovery from the Great Recession, the forward guidance was tightened by adding more explicit conditionality on specific economic variables such as inflation “low rates of resource utilization, stable inflation expectations, and tame inflation trends” (Board of Governors 2009b). Following that, in August 2011, the explicit calendar guidance of “At least through mid-2013, the federal funds rate will remain at exceptionally low levels,” followed by economic-threshold-based guidance for raising the funds rate from its zero lower bound, with the thresholds based on the unemployment rate and inflationary conditions (Board of Governors 2012). This forward guidance is an extension of the Federal Reserve’s conventional approach of influencing the funds rate’s current and future direction.
The Fed pursued two more types of policy in addition to forward guidance “During the Great Recession, unorthodox” policy initiatives were taken. Credit easing programs, as explored in more detail in “Federal Reserve Credit Programs During the Meltdown,” were one set of unorthodox policies that aimed to facilitate credit flows and lower credit costs.
The large scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs were another set of non-traditional policies. The asset purchases were done with the federal funds rate near zero to help lower longer-term public and private borrowing rates. The Federal Reserve said in November 2008 that it would buy US agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and debt issued by housing-related US government agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan banks). 1 The asset selection was made in part to lower the cost and increase the availability of finance for home purchases. These purchases aided the housing market, which was at the heart of the crisis and recession, as well as improving broader financial conditions. The Fed initially planned to acquire up to $500 billion in agency MBS and $100 billion in agency debt, with the program being expanded in March 2009 and finished in 2010. The FOMC also announced a $300 billion program to buy longer-term Treasury securities in March 2009, which was completed in October 2009, just after the Great Recession ended, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. The Federal Reserve purchased approximately $1.75 trillion of longer-term assets under these programs and their expansions (commonly known as QE1), with the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet increasing by slightly less because some securities on the balance sheet were maturing at the same time.
However, real GDP is only a little over 4.5 percent above its prior peak as of this writing in 2013, and the jobless rate remains at 7.3 percent. With the federal funds rate at zero and the current recovery slow and sluggish, the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy plan has evolved in an attempt to stimulate the economy and meet its statutory mandate. The Fed has continued to change its communication policies and implement more LSAP programs since the end of the Great Recession, including a $600 billion Treasuries-only purchase program in 2010-11 (often known as QE2) and an outcome-based purchase program that began in September 2012. (in addition, there was a maturity extension program in 2011-12 where the Fed sold shorter-maturity Treasury securities and purchased longer-term Treasuries). Furthermore, the increasing attention on financial stability and regulatory reform, the economic consequences of the European sovereign debt crisis, and the restricted prospects for global growth in 2013 and 2014 reflect how the Great Recession’s fallout is still being felt today.
What did the government do to help end the recession?
The Federal Reserve’s decisive response, along with huge government expenditure, averted the US economy from collapsing completely.
The Federal Reserve cut interest rates to zero for the first time in history and initiated a quantitative easing program, in which it bought financial assets to inject additional money into the economy.
The federal government, on the other hand, is launching two major programs to help people in need:
- The Struggling Asset Relief Program (TARP) helped to stabilize the economy by allowing the government to buy up to $700 billion in toxic assets, the majority of which was used to bail out troubled banks.
- The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) is a federal law that was passed in 2009 to help the economy recover. ARRA was established in 2009 as part of a stimulus package that included tax cuts, government spending mandates, loan guarantees, and unemployment benefits.
These steps were successful in keeping the recession from becoming a decade-long affair, as was the case during the Great Depression. In 2009, the stock market began to recover. Other areas of the economy, however, took several years to recover, resulting in what economists call an L-shaped recovery.
What steps did the government take in 2009 to combat the Great Recession?
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) was a key vehicle for fiscal stimulus, allowing spending on infrastructure, health care, and education, as well as increasing automatic stabilizers and reducing taxes.
What was the government’s reaction to the Great Depression?
How did the US government respond to the Great Depression? Jobs were created, farmers were helped, Social Security was established, and the stock market was regulated under Roosevelt’s New Deal, which first provided very modest support.
What government policies aided the recovery of the economy following WWII?
Many conservatives believe that our economy can only thrive if the federal government stays out of the way. Many progressives argue that in our free market system, the government must intervene at times to defend the public welfare and ensure broad-based economic growth. Today’s politics are defined by this discussion.
Americans of all political stripes should agree, however, that between 2008 and 2010, swift and decisive government action was required to avoid a second Great Depression and to aid our economy’s recovery from the biggest recession since the 1930s. After all, the evidence shows that between 2008 and 2010, three acts of Congress signed by two presidents led to the conclusion of the Great Recession of 20072009 and the ensuing economic recovery. Specifically:
- The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008 saved our financial system from near-certain collapse, sparing the United States’ financial system from tragedy.
- The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 averted a second Great Depression and ushered in a new era of economic development.
- By lowering the payroll tax and extending prolonged unemployment insurance benefits, the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 bolstered the economy’s fragile recovery.
The top ten reasons why these three major government interventions in the economy were effective will be discussed in this column. But first, let’s go through why such government intervention was required in the first place.
Do you recall the circumstances in 2008? Our economy, job market, and Wall Street were all on the verge of collapsing. Between then and today, there was a strong economic contraction accompanied by large job losses and steep stock market losses, which was followed by slow, uneven, but nonetheless steady economic growth and labor and financial market recoveries. Federal government actions played a significant role in ensuring that the deep dive was not prolonged and that the recovery occurred sooner than it would have otherwise. The job market, the economy, and the financial markets are all showing signs of improvement. This is a tremendous improvement over the condition in 2008.
The Troubled Asset Relief Program of 2008, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 all contributed to the United States’ economic recovery. These three moves happened at a critical juncture in the economy’s development, when the economy was on the verge of significant damage unless policymakers took decisive, targeted, and swift action.
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was established in October 2008 to allow the federal government to utilize $700 billion to help the banking system recover. During the last months of 2008, much of that money was spent infusing capital into failing banks, ensuring that our financial system would not collapse. In February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was signed into law, enacting a package of tax cuts and expenditure initiatives totaling $787 billion that would last almost two years, through the end of 2010. The Recovery Act provided additional unemployment insurance and Social Security benefits almost immediately, but infrastructure funding did not begin until the summer of 2009. As the Recovery Act’s benefits expired in December 2010, Congress enacted fresh payroll tax cuts and provided extended unemployment insurance benefits.
The result: After each measure was passed, financial markets, the economy, and the labor market began to improve fast, and money began to flow into critical ailing markets. These three policy measures did exactly what they were supposed to do: policymakers intervened to prevent the economy from deteriorating.
To be true, if these policy initiatives had provided more bang for their money, they would have been more effective and efficient. More assistance for distressed homeowners may have been included in the Troubled Asset Relief Program. More infrastructure money might have been included in the Recovery Act, and payroll tax cuts and prolonged unemployment insurance benefits should have been separated from needless tax cuts for the wealthy. However, conservative hostility to more effective and efficient policy interventions made none of this additional assistance for our economy and workers conceivable.
Nonetheless, the Troubled Asset Relief Program averted the financial system’s collapse. While there are reasonable concerns about the program’s design, whether the benefits were distributed equally, and if the monies were spent as efficiently as possible in the long term, there’s little doubt that it benefited the economy. A new Great Depression was averted thanks to the Recovery Act. The payroll tax cuts and prolonged unemployment insurance benefits are still helping to boost the economy today.
Starting with the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Recovery Act, and the most recent payroll tax cuts and extended unemployment insurance benefits, here’s a review of the 10 ways recent economic and financial data prove that each of these three policy initiatives succeeded as intended.
Loan tightening eased with the introduction of the Troubled Asset Relief Program
In the fourth quarter of 2008, a net high of 83.6 percent of senior loan officers said they were tightening lending conditions for commercial and industrial loans, up from 19.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2007. Throughout 2009, this ratio decreased steadily. The senior loan officer ratio is an oblique but informative indicator of how simple or difficult it is for firms and individuals to obtain a bank loan.
Similarly, in the fourth quarter of 2008, a net 69.2 percent of senior loan officers said they were tightening prime mortgage criteria, up from 40.8 percent in December 2007, before declining to 24.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009. After the Troubled Asset Relief Program stabilized the US financial sector, banks began to relax lending criteria. Following TARP, the business and mortgage credit markets became less tight.
Interest rates ease shortly after the Troubled Asset Relief Program is enacted
The risk premium, or the difference between the interest rate on risk-free U.S. Treasury bonds and the interest rate on mortgages, peaked at 2.2 percent in December 2010, up from 1.5 percent when the Great Recession began in December 2007. After money from the Troubled Asset Relief Program came into credit markets, the gap narrowed to 1.6 percent by January 2009. During normal economic times, this risk premium is normally approximately 1%.
Corporate bond risk premiums rose from 0.9 percent in December 2007 to 1.9 percent in December 2008, before decreasing to 1.6 percent in January 2009. The risk premium rose at first as lenders became concerned about the health of other banks, then declined as the Troubled Asset Relief Program stepped in to help struggling institutions. Because the program’s effectiveness reduced financial market risk, homeowners and businesses had to pay less for their loans.
The specter for deflation disappeared after the passage of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the Recovery Act
Falling inflationary expectations have the potential to lead to deflation, or a downward spiral in prices. Deflation exacerbates a recession by causing firms and consumers to postpone big purchases in the hope of lower costs. In the fall of 2008 and winter of 2009, the United States’ economy was threatened by deflation; however, the adoption of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the Recovery Act put people’s minds at ease.
Based on the difference between inflation-protected and noninflation-protected U.S. Treasury bonds, the predicted inflation rate for the next five years was -0.24 percent in December 2008, down from 2.2 percent in December 2007, indicating that deflation was a real concern among investors. The difference between Treasury Inflation Protected Securities and Treasury bonds of the same maturity is what determines the predicted inflation rate for that particular maturityin this case, five years. By May 2009, inflation predictions had surpassed 1% once more, and by December 2009, they had risen to 1.9 percent. Expected price rises of roughly 2% will encourage businesses to invest more and consumers to spend more than they would otherwise, while lesser price increases will cause them to hold off on their purchases.
Economic growth prospects brightened with the passage of the Recovery Act
Expectations for future economic growth are important for actual growth because businesses will invest more, banks will lend more, and consumers would spend more than they would otherwise if they believe the economy will improve more quickly. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office raised its growth forecasts for 2010the first full year following the Recovery Act’s enactmentfrom 1.5 percent to 2.9 percent in March 2009. And, sure enough, economic activity accelerated.
Three of the four quarters of 2008 saw the economy contract, and annual inflation-adjusted GDP growth in the first quarter of 2009 was -6.7 percent. However, once the Recovery Act was signed into law in the second quarter of 2009, our GDP only shrank by 0.7 percent in that quarter as government spending increased. The economy then increased by 1.7 percent and 3.8 percent in the third and fourth quarters of 2009, owing in large part to the tax cuts and expenditure measures approved under the Recovery Act starting to trickle into people’s and businesses’ pockets.
Job losses quickly abated due to Recovery Act spending
Job losses fell by 82.3 percent in the final three months of 2009, from an average of 780,000 per month in the first three months of 2009, when the law was passed, to 138,000 per month in the final three months of 2009. During the same time period, employment losses in the private sector fell by 83.2 percent, from 784,000 to 131,000 on average. The first quarter of 2009 was a clear turning point in the labor market, with the steepest employment losses of the Great Recession.
Personal disposable incomes started to rise again with help from the Recovery Act
People lost jobs in droves from the middle of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009, resulting in a drop in personal disposable after-tax income. Higher unemployment insurance benefits, bigger Social Security payments, and lower personal taxes, all of which were part of the Recovery Act, boosted personal disposable earnings in the second quarter of 2009. This provided immediate assistance to families in need.
Families ended up with more money in their pockets as a result of the new law’s immediate expenditure, despite job losses continuing at the same time. However, other Recovery Act provisions that took a bit longer to promote consumer spending aided in improving employment prospects by putting more money in people’s pockets.
Industrial production turned around with infrastructure spending spurred by the Recovery Act
From December 2007 to June 2009, industrial productionthe output of manufacturing and utilitiesdeclined steadily. When infrastructure expenditure from the Recovery Act began to pour into the economy in July 2009, industrial production began to grow again. After six months of sustained growth, industrial production was 3.7 percent higher in December 2009 than in June 2009.
After-tax income grew more quickly following the payroll tax cut
In the first quarter of 2011, when the payroll tax cut and an extension of extended unemployment insurance benefits were granted, after-tax income increased by 1.3 percent, the quickest rate of growth since the second quarter of 2010. As the labor market continued to add new positions at a modest pace, the payroll tax cut put more money in people’s pockets. The new funds bolstered an economy that was still struggling to establish its feet, assisting in the expansion of jobs.
Job growth accelerated with the payroll tax cut
Indeed, during the first three months of 2011, the labor market added an average of 192,000 jobs each month, up from 154,000 jobs in the previous three months. The payroll tax cut gave a sluggish labor market some more impetus.
Household debt burdens fell more quickly with the payroll tax cut
Households had more money in their pockets, and they used some of it to pay down their crushing debts. In the first quarter of 2011, the ratio of total household debt to after-tax income declined 2.5 percentage points, more than twice as fast as in the fourth quarter of 2010 and quicker than in any other quarter of 2010.
These ten reasons why the federal government’s rapid and decisive action changed an impending second Great Depression into the difficult but steady economic recovery we are witnessing today are based on credible economic statistics. There is plenty of room for argument regarding the amount to which the government should be involved in the day-to-day operations of the economy, but there is no reason to doubt why our economy isn’t locked in a long-term depression like to the Great Depression of the 1930s. In this situation, well-intentioned government measures did exactly what they were designed to do.
Endnotes
The net percentage is the difference between the share of loan officers who say lending standards are tightening and the share who say lending standards are loosening. A positive number indicates that more loan officers tightened lending criteria than loosened them, whereas a negative number indicates that more loan officers softened loan standards. The Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Board of Governor “Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices,” Federal Reserve Board Docs, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/201205/fullreport.pdf.
Calculations are based on the following: “http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/, “H.15 ReleaseSelected Interest Rates.” The interest rates on conventional mortgages are shown below. Bond rates are for corporate bonds with a AAA rating.
The interest rate differential between nominal five-year US Treasury bonds and inflation-indexed five-year Treasury bonds is known as inflation expectations. Similar tendencies can be seen when comparing Treasury bonds of various maturities. Calculations are based on the following: “H.15 Interest RatesSelected Rates.”
New growth data for 2008 and 2009 was added by the Congressional Budget Office, indicating that the recession was worse than previously anticipated. Congressional Budget Office, “Budget and Economic Outlook” (2009); Congressional Budget Office, “A Preliminary Analysis of the President’s Budget and an Update on CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook” (2009); Congressional Budget Office, “A Preliminary Analysis of the President’s Budget and an Update on CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook” (2009). (2009). For 2010, the real inflation-adjusted economic growth rate was 3%. National Income and Product Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis (Department of Commerce, 2012). The brighter forecast for 2010 helped to offset a recession that was worse than expected. The CBO lowered the 2009 growth rate from -2.2 percent in January to -3 percent in March. However, the CBO forecasted a -1.5 percent growth rate from December 2008 to December 2009 in both January and March 2009. If the economy is predicted to enter a worse recession and then recover more swiftly in 2009, the changes from December to December can stay the same, even if total year growth rates fall. That is, the CBO predicted that the Recovery Act would add quickly to growth in the second half of 2009, offsetting a higher forecast fall in the first half. However, there are no quarterly growth predictions provided.
National Income and Product Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis were used to compile this data.
Calculations based on Current Employment Statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Department of Labor, 2011). Because monthly job changes are rather unpredictable, the bullet point shows three-month averages. However, monthly job changes follow the same pattern as quarterly averages.
Calculations based on Current Employment Statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Lower taxes and other forms of social spending had a greater impact on rising personal disposable incomes in the second quarter of 2009 than in the following quarters. In the following quarters, neither taxes nor other forms of social spending decreased. Instead, taxes remained low, and social spending remained high, with the exception of Social Security, health care, and unemployment insurance. Throughout the rest of 2009, as more people retired and claimed unemployment insurance benefits, Social Security and unemployment insurance payouts grew. Calculations based on National Income and Product Accounts from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Calculations are based on the following: “http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/default.htm, “Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization G-17.”
Calculations based on National Income and Product Accounts from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
How does the government employ expansionary fiscal policy to get out of a recession?
- The use of government spending and tax policies to impact economic circumstances is referred to as fiscal policy.
- Fiscal policy is largely founded on the views of John Maynard Keynes, who claimed that governments could regulate economic activity and stabilize the business cycle.
- During a recession, the government may use expansionary fiscal policy to boost aggregate demand and boost economic growth by decreasing tax rates.
- A government may follow a contractionary fiscal strategy in the face of rising inflation and other expansionary signs.
What tools did the government employ to combat the Great Recession, and how successful were they?
Lessons for Macroeconomic Policy from the Great Recession’s Policy Challenges Eskander Alvi edited the piece. W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI, 2017, 137 pages., $28.32 hardback
The collapse of the U.S. housing market in 2007 triggered a series of negative economic events, including a financial crisis, high unemployment, a weakening international economy, and, ultimately, the Great Recession of 200709, the greatest post-World War II economic disaster. The housing bubble burst as a result of banks’ aggressive lending, easy credit, and mortgage securitization. The practice of pooling and repackaging financial instruments, such as mortgages, and selling them to investors is known as securitization. Lenders would securitize and sell mortgages after making loans to home buyers, obtaining more capital for lending. The subprime mortgage crisis predicted the ensuing upheaval in the banking system, most notably Lehman Brothers’ demise. Because so many industries were affected by these developmentsand because the global economy is so intertwinedthe consequences were disastrous.
Editor Eskander Alvi and his team of economists examine the tactics employed by policymakers to tackle the Great Recession in Confronting Policy Challenges of the Great Recession: Lessons for Macroeconomic Policy. Alvi forecasts the recession’s devastating economic impacts in the book’s first chapter, including huge layoffs, unpredictable financial markets, investment cutbacks, and a sinking gross domestic product. In reaction to the crisis, which resembled the Great Depression, authorities attempted to build on what had succeeded in the 1930s while also correcting what had gone wrong. Despite the fact that the Great Recession did not approach the depths of the Great Depression, it was followed by a delayed recovery and policy mistakes in fiscal and monetary policy. Alvi and his coauthors analyze the triumphs and failures of legislators who dealt with the crisis and its aftermath, the reasons for the adoption of various fiscal and monetary policy measures, and the elements for the slow recovery throughout the book.
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the Great Depression loomed big. Emergency aid in the form of bank bailouts, as well as fiscal stimulus, were top priorities. Many common anti-recessionary policies were implemented by Congress, including tax cuts and increases in unemployment insurance and food stamp payments, which helped to prevent the crisis from extending further. Despite reaching an exceptionally high rate of 10%, unemployment was still significantly lower than the 24-percent rate seen in the 1930s. While Congress’ response to the recession was better in many ways, it also replicated several previous policy blunders. The authorities’ decision to let Lehman Brothers fail, according to one of the book’s writers, was the “one incident that most undermined the stability of global financial markets.” The choice was similar to Henry Ford’s decision to let his Guardian Group of banks to fail in the 1930s, and both incidents wreaked havoc on the financial markets. In 2010, Congress passed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in an effort to regulate lenders and safeguard customers, although this policy didn’t go nearly as far as the GlassSteagall Act, which was passed during the Great Depression. The fact that the worst-case scenario was avoided may have deterred Congress from taking additional steps to boost the economy and regulate the financial sector. Another possible contributor was public pressure on politicians as the country struggled to negotiate its way out of the recession. As Eichengreen points out, public criticism frequently influences policy decisions due to the “dominance of ideology and politics over economic research.”
After repeated criticism of the bank bailouts and mounting concerns about the national debt, fiscal stimulus came to an end. Given the severity of the recession, the lack of enthusiasm for additional fiscal policy intervention resulted in a substantially slower recovery. This inaction was the “single worst miscalculation in macroeconomic policymaking following the financial crisis in 2008,” according to Gary Burtless, who wrote one of the book’s chapters. In a similar spirit, authors Laurence Ball, J. Bradford DeLong, and Lawrence H. Summers contend that to supplement the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) attempts to raise aggregate demand, a more aggressive fiscal policyprimarily more tax cuts and government expenditure on public projectswas required. Despite popular belief that expansionary fiscal measures increase the national debt and exacerbate the problem, the authors argue that, during a recession, such programs increase the national debt in the short run but have no impact in the long run due to increased employment and output. As a result, fiscal contractions during recessions exacerbate the debt problem, prolonging the economic downturn. In the end, public pressure restricted fiscal policy during the Great Recession in numerous ways.
The Fed attempted to fill in the gaps created by the current fiscal policy discussion. Many economists feel that the country’s initial financial threat was larger during the Great Recession than it was during the Depression. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, the Fed made a conscious effort to avoid the errors of the 1930s. It lent large sums of money to foreign banks and nonbank institutions such as broker-dealers, money market funds, and buyers of securitized debt to keep credit flowing and boost consumer confidence. With the federal funds rate already near zero, the Fed used large-scale asset purchases to further slash intermediate- and long-term interest ratesa strategy known as quantitative easing. The Fed also utilized forward guidance, stating that interest rates will remain at zero for the foreseeable future. Interest rates have been lowered and asset prices have risen as a result of these efforts, according to most experts. According to the authors, the Fed was nevertheless under to the same forces that prohibited the implementation of new fiscal policy measures, albeit to a lesser extent. Some detractors argued that central bankers had no place in the mortgage-backed securities market, while others warned of hyperinflation. The Fed chairman at the time, Ben Bernanke, attempted to explain the Fed’s actions to Congress and the public, with mixed results. In order to show its independence, the Fed began decreasing its balance sheet sooner rather than later, ignoring the Depression’s lesson. Nonetheless, the authors believe that the Fed aided the economy in avoiding the worst-case scenario by implementing new monetary policy measures that can be depended on in future downturns.
Any reader interested in learning more about the Great Recession can benefit from Confronting Policy Challenges of the Great Recession: Lessons for Macroeconomic Policy. The book describes how Congress, the executive branch, and the Federal Reserve responded to the crisis, as well as the obstacles they encountered. The writers support their argument with historical comparisons (mostly to the Great Depression), visual aids such as charts and graphs, and a wealth of relevant data. While the book delves into a variety of complex economic issues, it is accessible to all readers.
What measures were successful in promoting economic growth?
- Consumer spending and company investment are generally the driving forces behind economic growth.
- Tax cuts and rebates are used to give money back to consumers and encourage them to spend more.
- Deregulation loosens the laws that firms must follow and is credited with spurring growth, but it can also lead to excessive risk-taking.
- Infrastructure funding is intended to boost productivity by allowing firms to function more effectively and create construction jobs.