A recession is a natural element of the business cycle that occurs when the economy declines for two consecutive quarters. A depression, on the other hand, is a prolonged decline in economic activity that lasts years rather than months. This makes recessions far more common: in the United States, there have been 33 recessions and only one depression since 1854.
What are the terms “depression” and “recession”?
Depression vs. Anxiety A recession is a natural element of the business cycle that occurs when the economy declines for two consecutive quarters. A depression, on the other hand, is a prolonged decline in economic activity that lasts years rather than months.
Is a recession or depression worse?
A recession is a negative trend in the business cycle marked by a reduction in production and employment. As a result of this downward trend in household income and spending, many businesses and people are deferring big investments or purchases.
A depression is a strong downswing in the business cycle (much more severe than a downward trend) marked by severely reduced industrial production, widespread unemployment, a considerable decline or suspension of construction growth, and significant cutbacks in international commerce and capital movements. Aside from the severity and impacts of each, another distinction between a recession and a depression is that recessions can be geographically confined (limited to a single country), but depressions (such as the Great Depression of the 1930s) can occur throughout numerous countries.
Now that the differences between a recession and a depression have been established, we can all return to our old habits of cracking awful jokes and blaming them on individuals who most likely never said them.
What is the primary distinction between a recession and a depression?
The main distinction between a recession and a depression is that the former refers to a short-term economic downturn, whilst the latter refers to a long-term drop in economic activity. The duration of each event varies in general.
There have been 50 recessions in the United States’ history. The Great Depression of the 1930s was the only time there was a depression.
Continue reading to understand more about a recession, how it differs from a depression, and a snapshot of our present financial situation.
What happens when the economy is in a slump?
A prolonged, long-term slowdown in economic activity in one or more economies is referred to as an economic depression. It is a more severe economic downturn than a recession, which is a regular business cycle slowdown in economic activity.
Economic depressions are defined by their length, abnormally high unemployment, decreased credit availability (often due to some form of banking or financial crisis), shrinking output as buyers dry up and suppliers cut back on production and investment, increased bankruptcies, including sovereign debt defaults, significantly reduced trade and commerce (especially international trade), and highly volatile relative currency value fl (often due to currency devaluations). Price deflation, financial crises, stock market crashes, and bank collapses are all prominent features of a depression that aren’t seen during a recession.
Can a downturn become a depression?
Although the following definition is bleak and detailed, its dullness serves to emphasize the fact that the recession/depression question is not so easy to solve. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco attempted to come to a conclusion in 2007 – What is the difference between a recession and a depression? They agreed with the National Bureau of Economic Research’s definition of a recession:
A recession is defined as a major drop in economic activity across the economy that lasts more than a few months and is reflected in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial output, and wholesale-retail sales. A recession starts when the economy reaches its peak of activity and concludes when it hits its lowest point. The economy is expanding between the trough and the peak. The typical state of the economy is expansion; most recessions are brief and have been uncommon in recent decades.
And I turned to Gregory Mankiw to help me understand the difference between two types of economic contraction:
Real GDP has been falling for many years, the most striking example being the early 1930s. If the period is moderate, it is referred to as a recession; if it is more severe, it is referred to as a depression.
Despite the Federal Reserve’s best efforts, the simpler and more widely recognized definition of a recession is a drop in GDP for two consecutive quarters. However, there is little agreement when it comes to depressions; the two most prevalent descriptions are:
While the two meanings are not mutually exclusive, they do differ significantly. The distinction between a recession and a depression, in my opinion, is more complex. A recession is an unavoidable component of the business (or credit, as the case may be) cycle. A depression, on the other hand, entails the physical ruin of the economy: enterprises are irrevocably damaged, job possibilities are obliterated, and investment must be completely written off.
Examining prior Great Depressions is an alternative technique. Unfortunately, this strategy is also inconclusive. The Great Depression of the 1930s, for example, is widely thought to have lasted from 1929 to 1941, yet as the graph below shows, there were only two separate phases of decreased GDP growth between 1930 and 1933, and again between 1937 and 1938:
Despite my more practical definition above, I prefer the two-year-plus definition to the one based on a dramatic drop in GDP. Some aspects of the economy are harmed during a recession. Depression is becoming more common.
A rise in the unemployment rate is another element frequently linked to recessions and depressions. Historically, increased unemployment has preceded the commencement of recessions, and recessions have only been labeled depressions after they have lasted for a long time.
Another factor to consider is the absolute degree of inflation. In general, central banks respond to rising inflation by boosting short-term interest rates. This aids in the cooling of overheated economies. However, if they tighten too quickly, they risk triggering a recession by forcing the credit cycle into a rapid contraction. A depression, on the other hand, is frequently accompanied by an absolute drop in the price level, which is produced by an excessive amount of domestic or corporate debt.
Why does a depression definition matter to you as an investor? Because financial markets are anticipatory. If investors believe the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic will be ‘V’-Shaped, even a 20% drop in GDP, combined with zero interest rates, price support for government bonds, and fiscal expansion on a scale not seen since FDR’s ‘New Deal,’ will result in a steeply rising stock market. If, on the other hand, it becomes evident that a tsunami of creative destruction is sweeping entire industries away, even the most sumptuous of New Deals may not be enough to stem the flood of stock liquidation as investors flee to the safety of cash.
So far, the official policy response has been enough to persuade investors that a slump will not occur. If you scratch the surface of the S&P 500, though, you’ll see a very different image. The graph below depicts the market’s performance through the end of May. Since then, the S&P 500 index has been driven by the same five technology stocks:
The most successful industry has been technology. One rationale for such high valuations is that the pandemic has hastened a wide range of technological advancements, resulting in the possibility of considerably faster profits. The net present value of future technology cash flows has been shifted forward by several years, according to some analysts. It’s no surprise, they say, that these equities have shattered new all-time highs and will continue to rise.
The broader stock market has been riding the coattails of tech since May (at the time of writing, the MSCI World Index is up 1.73 percent YTD). For the time being, hope wins out over fear, although vaccines are still months away from becoming publicly available. Meanwhile, autumn is approaching in the Northern Hemisphere, bringing with it fears of a second wave of diseases.
The scenario is even worse for emerging markets. In Foreign Affairs The Pandemic Depression, Carmen and Vincent Reinhart wrote:
Despite being labeled a “global financial crisis,” the 2008 downturn was mostly a banking crisis in 11 advanced economies. Emerging economies were remarkably immune to the volatility of the recent global crisis, thanks to double-digit growth in China, strong commodity prices, and lean balance sheets. The current economic downturn is unique. Because of the worldwide nature of this shockthe new coronavirus knows no national bordersa bigger percentage of the global society is in recession than at any point since the Great Depression. As a result, the recovery will be slower and less robust than the downturn. Finally, the fiscal and monetary policies implemented to combat the contraction will alleviate rather than erase economic losses, implying that the global economy will take a long time to recover to where it was at the beginning of 2020.
According to the World Bank, more than 60 million people will be forced into extreme poverty globally. Meanwhile, in wealthy countries, bankruptcies that have been postponed due to government involvement may experience personal epiphanies as fiscal generosity is abruptly withdrawn. The demise of broad swaths of sophisticated market economies has just been postponed unless the lockdown limitations are relaxed and people feel safe, both medically and financially, to venture out and spend.
We will have had two quarters of reduced growth by next month, indicating that we are already in a serious recession. Large swaths of the economy have been irreversibly transformed, increasing the likelihood of a slump. Millions of workers have been displaced, and retraining them will take far longer than a few months. It will be difficult for new and existing businesses to grow and hire new staff without the consumer demand from these former employees.
Fiscal spending will have to be done on a far larger scale and for much longer than previously anticipated. Since 1850, it has taken an average of eight years for per capita GDP to recover to pre-crisis levels in all major financial crises. The G20 response to the epidemic is estimated to have cost $11 trillion so far. The majority of these actions have been described as “temporary” or “short-term.” It is becoming increasingly evident that the disruption to employment, business, and economic sectors will be lengthy and, in many cases, permanent.
According to the IMF, the deficit-to-GDP ratio in advanced nations will grow from 3.3 percent in 2019 to 16.6 percent this year. The ratio is predicted to rise from 4.9 percent last year to 10.6 percent in 2020 for emerging nations, where budgetary expansion is more limited. While borrowing rates in established economies have stayed low, they have increased in emerging markets. The burden of fiscal stimulus will invariably fall most heavily on the advanced economies’ treasuries.
Conclusion
This isn’t the conclusion of the story. This isn’t even the start of the end. But it’s possible that this is the end of the beginning.
Individual economic needs are still important in Western (and other) aging civilizations. Governments in developed countries are fortunate in that they can borrow at lower rates than at any other period in history. While it goes against my Austrian, free-market principles, I have to admit that fiscal policy is the least painful weapon available to resist the pandemic’s economic catharsis. There will be a significant cost in terms of economics, but the alternative is a deadly mix of political fragmentation and polarization.
The goal of securing consistent real income for investors remains difficult. High-yielding private debt and asset-backed lending carries both default and liquidity risk. Financial repression is rampant across the credit spectrum, as shown in the chart below, which looks at some of the public market options:
High-income stocks may be a viable option, but no matter how ‘blue-chip’ the name, there is no certainty. Growth stocks, in general, are benefiting from the historically low-interest environment, but there will be a higher number of failures because the cost of speculative capital is also at an all-time low. Active management has been out of favor for at least a decade, but in the future, capital preservation will be more important than reaping large returns.
In June, I published a piece called A Brave New World for Value Investing, in which I concluded that:
Since late March, the stock and corporate bond markets have restored most of their stability. The repercussions of the global economic slowdown have been mitigated by central banks and governments. As the dust settles, the financial markets will adjust to a new environment, one in which value-based stock and bond market analysis will be an invaluable tool for navigating the waters.
The simultaneous supply and demand shocks, as well as their impact on global supply networks, have heightened the geopolitics of trade policy, which was already a source of conflict before the epidemic arrived. Supply networks will become shorter and more diverse. In the months and years ahead, robustness, not efficiency, will be the watchword. This shift in the global economy’s functioning will not come without a price. It will manifest itself in higher pricing or lower corporate profits. In this brave new world, value-based investment analysis will be the finest guidance.
An additional approach, a momentum overlay, would be added to the investment toolbox. Capital flows will be a formidable arbiter of investment return as fiscal and monetary policy continue to support economies as they transition to the new world order. By most conventional measures, technology companies appear to be overvalued, yet the trend is undeniable. After all, financial market liquidity flows like a tide, so don’t be like Cnut The Great and follow Brutus’ advice in the opening statement.
Is it possible for another Great Depression to occur?
The 12-year Great Depression in America began with a crash 72 years ago. On October 24, 1929, the stock market bottomed out, indicating the start of the country’s longest and severe economic downturn. Everyone wants to know if a crash may happen again given that we are in an economic downturn.
Many industries in Washington state were shaken on October 24, dubbed “Black Thursday.” Although the disaster did not have the same impact on Washington as it did on other states, the consequences of the downturn and various government actions hurt certain sectors substantially.
After the 1929 Federal Reserve-industry catastrophe, unemployment in the United States skyrocketed. In the 1930s, the government’s ballooning taxes and regulations left the country entrenched in economic hardship.
Wheat prices in Washington had decreased to.38 cents per bushel by 1932, from $1.83 in the early 1920s. By 1935, the value of Washington farmland and buildings had decreased from $920 million to $551 million, despite a 300 percent increase in county debt statewide and a 36 percent drop in payrolls.
The state’s lumber industry was particularly heavily damaged by the economic downturn. Between 1929 and 1932, per capita lumber consumption in the United States fell by two-thirds. Washington’s annual lumber production fell from 7.3 billion feet to 2.2 billion feet during the same time period. By the end of 1931, at least half of mill workers had lost their jobs.
The Roosevelt administration’s measures accomplished little to boost the lumber business. Individual industries were subjected to tight production limitations and price controls under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933. Before the Act was declared unlawful in 1935, it barred the construction of new sawmills and limited individual operators to a set quota of production. More sawmills were erected as a result of failed federal monitoring, and total production per firm declined.
One part of the NIRA significantly increased big labor’s organizing strength and required managers to bargain with unions. Historians now consider the implementation of New Deal measures in the Pacific Northwest as a direct result of the solidification of Washington’s labor movement.
Is it possible for another Great Depression to occur? Perhaps, but it would require a recurrence of the bipartisan and disastrously dumb policies of the 1920s and 1930s.
Economists now know, for the most part, that the stock market did not trigger the 1929 crisis. It was a symptom of the country’s money supply’s extraordinarily unpredictable changes. The Federal Reserve System was the main culprit, having sparked a boom in the early 1920s with ultra-low interest rates and easy money. By 1929, the central bank had raised rates so high that the boom had been choked off, and the money supply had been reduced by one-third between 1929 and 1933.
A recession was turned into a Great Depression by Congress in 1930. It slashed tariffs to the point where imports and exports were effectively shut down. In 1932, it quadrupled income tax rates. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who ran on a platform of less government, gave America far more than he promised. His “New Deal” increased taxes (he once proposed a tax rate of 99.5 percent on incomes above $100,000), penalized investment, and suffocated business with regulations and red tape.
Washington, like all states, is subject to the whims of federal policymakers. And the recipe for economic depression remains the same: suffocating market freedom, crushing incentives with high tax rates, and overwhelming firms with suffocating regulations.
The 1929 stock market crash and the accompanying Great Depression are worth remembering not just because they caused so much suffering in Washington and abroad, but also because, as philosopher George Santayana warned, “Those who cannot recall history are destined to repeat it.”
Lawrence W. Reed is the director of Michigan’s Mackinac Center for Public Policy and an adjunct scholar at Seattle’s Washington Policy Center. Jason Smosna, a WPC researcher, contributed to this commentary.
Why did money become scarce during the Great Depression?
During the Great Depression, the money stock decreased mostly due to banking panics. Depositors’ faith that they will be able to access their cash in banks whenever they need them is crucial to banking systems.
How long do economic depressions last?
A recession is a long-term economic downturn that affects a large number of people. A depression is a longer-term, more severe slump. Since 1854, there have been 33 recessions. 1 Recessions have lasted an average of 11 months since 1945.