Inflation in the United States was substantially overestimated by forecasters in 2021. The initial spike in inflation was greeted with hope. Most analysts predicted that supply chain disruptions due by the epidemic would be brief, and that inflation would not endure or climb further. People were confident that inflation would not become self-perpetuating after three decades of low and stable inflation.
Between February and August 2021, projections suggested that inflation will grow in 2021, but then fall to significantly lower levels in 2022, with personal consumption expenditures inflation near to the Federal Reserve’s 2% objective.
However, data from the last few months has shattered that optimism. Inflation was previously restricted to product categories with obvious supply shocks, but it is now widespread, with anecdotal evidence of earnings pursuing higher prices and prices adjusting for increasing expenses. Forecasters had lowered inflation predictions for 2022 to 3.1 percent by February 2022. Energy price shocks from Russian sanctions will almost certainly lead to more higher revisions.
When it comes to effectively forecasting future inflation, the stakes are considerable. This is crucial for assessing how quickly monetary policy should return to a neutral position in order to prevent a scenario of sustained inflation, which would necessitate further tightening in the future and risk another recession.
What will be the rate of inflation in 2022?
According to a Bloomberg survey of experts, the average annual CPI is expected to grow 5.1 percent in 2022, up from 4.7 percent last year.
What is the projected rate of inflation over the next five years?
CPI inflation in the United States is predicted to be about 2.3 percent in the long run, up to 2024. The balance between aggregate supply and aggregate demand in the economy determines the inflation rate.
What will be the rate of inflation in 2023?
The revelation of new economic predictions that saw the Fed’s key policy interest rate climbing to 2.8 percent by sometime next year was the big news from the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC or Fed) meeting on March 16. This is somewhat higher than the predicted neutral rate of 2.4 percent and significantly higher than the previously forecast peak of 2.1 percent in 2024. The Fed is justified to aim for a rate above neutral, given the persistence of high inflation and the strength of the US job market, but it may need to go much further if it wants to get inflation back to 2%. The Fed began its tightening course with a 0.25 percentage point raise at this meeting, as expected.
The Fed also caught up with the realities of inflation, which reached 4.6 percent in 2021 according to the Fed’s core measure. It now expects inflation to fall to 4.1 percent this year, down from 2.7 percent previously forecast. The Fed’s latest prognosis for this year is realistic, but it remains cautious in its projections for core inflation to drop to 2.6 percent in 2023 and 2.3 percent in 2024. Inflation is expected to be at or over 3% in the coming year.
Another hopeful, if not perplexing, component of the Fed’s forecasts is that the unemployment rate would remain steady at 3.5 percent over the next three years, despite monetary policy tightening. It’s unclear why inflation should fall as quickly as the Fed expects if unemployment stays around 0.5 percentage point below the Fed’s equilibrium rate projection.
In the future, the Fed will have several opportunity to change its mind and rectify these difficulties. For the time being, it appears to be on the right track.
Why is inflation in 2022 so high?
As the debate over inflation continues, it’s worth emphasizing a few key factors that policymakers should keep in mind as they consider what to do about the problem that arose last year.
- Even after accounting for fast growth in the last quarter of 2021, the claim that too-generous fiscal relief and recovery efforts played a big role in the 2021 acceleration of inflation by overheating the economy is unconvincing.
- Excessive inflation is being driven by the COVID-19 epidemic, which is causing demand and supply-side imbalances. COVID-19’s economic distortions are expected to become less harsh in 2022, easing inflation pressures.
- Concerns about inflation “It is misguided to believe that “expectations” among employees, households, and businesses will become ingrained and keep inflation high. What is more important than “The leverage that people and businesses have to safeguard their salaries from inflation is “expectations” of greater inflation. This leverage has been entirely one-sided for decades, with employees having no capacity to protect their salaries against pricing pressures. This one-sided leverage will reduce wage pressure in the coming months, lowering inflation.
- Inflation will not be slowed by moderate interest rate increases alone. The benefits of these hikes in persuading people and companies that policymakers are concerned about inflation must be balanced against the risks of reducing GDP.
Dean Baker recently published an excellent article summarizing the data on inflation and macroeconomic overheating. I’ll just add a few more points to his case. Rapid increase in gross domestic product (GDP) brought it 3.1 percent higher in the fourth quarter of 2021 than it had been in the fourth quarter of 2019. (the last quarter unaffected by COVID-19).
Shouldn’t this amount of GDP have put the economy’s ability to produce it without inflation under serious strain? Inflation was low (and continuing to reduce) in 2019. The supply side of the economy has been harmed since 2019, although it’s easy to exaggerate. While employment fell by 1.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021 compared to the same quarter in 2019, total hours worked in the economy fell by only 0.7 percent (and Baker notes in his post that including growth in self-employed hours would reduce this to 0.4 percent ). While some of this is due to people working longer hours than they did prior to the pandemic, the majority of it is due to the fact that the jobs that have yet to return following the COVID-19 shock are low-hour jobs. Given that labor accounts for only roughly 60% of total inputs, a 0.4 percent drop in economy-side hours would only result in a 0.2 percent drop in output, all else being equal.
Is inflation expected to fall in 2022?
Inflation increased from 2.5 percent in January 2021 to 7.5 percent in January 2022, and it is expected to rise even more when the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on oil prices is felt. However, economists predict that by December, inflation would be between 2.7 percent and 4%.
In 2022, which country will have the greatest inflation rate?
Venezuela has the world’s highest inflation rate, with a rate that has risen past one million percent in recent years. Prices in Venezuela have fluctuated so quickly at times that retailers have ceased posting price tags on items and instead urged consumers to just ask employees how much each item cost that day. Hyperinflation is an economic crisis caused by a government overspending (typically as a result of war, a regime change, or socioeconomic circumstances that reduce funding from tax collection) and issuing massive quantities of additional money to meet its expenses.
Venezuela’s economy used to be the envy of South America, with high per-capita income thanks to the world’s greatest oil reserves. However, the country’s substantial reliance on petroleum revenues made it particularly vulnerable to oil price swings in the 1980s and 1990s. Oil prices fell from $100 per barrel in 2014 to less than $30 per barrel in early 2016, sending the country’s economy into a tailspin from which it has yet to fully recover.
Sudan had the second-highest inflation rate in the world at the start of 2022, at 340.0 percent. Sudanese inflation has soared in recent years, fueled by food, beverages, and an underground market for US money. Inflationary pressures became so severe that protests erupted, leading to President Omar al-ouster Bashir’s in April 2019. Sudan’s transitional authorities are now in charge of reviving an economy that has been ravaged by years of mismanagement.
What happens if inflation rises too quickly?
If inflation continues to rise over an extended period of time, economists refer to this as hyperinflation. Expectations that prices will continue to rise fuel inflation, which lowers the real worth of each dollar in your wallet.
Spiraling prices can lead to a currency’s value collapsing in the most extreme instances imagine Zimbabwe in the late 2000s. People will want to spend any money they have as soon as possible, fearing that prices may rise, even if only temporarily.
Although the United States is far from this situation, central banks such as the Federal Reserve want to prevent it at all costs, so they normally intervene to attempt to curb inflation before it spirals out of control.
The issue is that the primary means of doing so is by rising interest rates, which slows the economy. If the Fed is compelled to raise interest rates too quickly, it might trigger a recession and increase unemployment, as happened in the United States in the early 1980s, when inflation was at its peak. Then-Fed head Paul Volcker was successful in bringing inflation down from a high of over 14% in 1980, but at the expense of double-digit unemployment rates.
Americans aren’t experiencing inflation anywhere near that level yet, but Jerome Powell, the Fed’s current chairman, is almost likely thinking about how to keep the country from getting there.
The Conversation has given permission to reprint this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the full article here.
Photo credit for the banner image:
Prices for used cars and trucks are up 31% year over year. David Zalubowski/AP Photo
Is the US currency doomed?
The dollar’s demise is still a long way off. Only the likelihood of greater inflation looks credible among the preconditions required to induce a collapse. Because the United States is such an important customer, foreign exporters such as China and Japan do not want the dollar to fall. Even if the US had to renegotiate or default on some of its debt obligations, there is no evidence that the rest of the world would allow the dollar to collapse and risk contagion.
Is now a good time to invest in US dollars for 2021?
We’ve just come out of an incredible year. We would have anticipated a difficult year for global financial markets if we had known in December that 2020 would bring a worldwide pandemic, 11th-hour Brexit discussions, and extraordinary efforts to overturn the US election outcome. Despite this, major equity indexes have had a great year. Similarly, if we had anticipated that the United States would become a pandemic hotspot, we would have predicted major dollar depreciation. Nonetheless, given that this is the first year of a longer-term U.S. dollar bear market a period in the cycle when currency rates are most volatile the 3% trade-weighted loss thus far in 2020 is low (Exhibit 1).
Exhibit 1: U.S. trade-weighted dollar
Why hasn’t the greenback dropped even more? We believe the explanation is that investors have shied away from shorting the dollar due to shorter-term issues such as the pandemic, Brexit, and political uncertainty in the United States. Each of these danger factors, it may be argued, is on the verge of being resolved: COVID-19 vaccinations are on their way, the United Kingdom and the European Union are close to reaching an agreement on the United Kingdom’s leave, and President Trump is showing signs of permitting a smooth transition of power to Vice President-elect Joe Biden. Longer-term considerations will take precedence in the market narrative as tensions relax, and investors will be more confident in selling the dollar. While we cannot predict what 2021 will bring, we are becoming increasingly sure that the dollar will decline next year. Fundamental fundamentals such as the United States’ fiscal and current-account deficits, as well as relatively strong economic growth in the rest of the globe, are among the key headwinds that should force the dollar lower.
One thing we can say with some certainty is that the Federal Reserve of the United States’ (Fed) monetary policy is working against the dollar an uncommon claim given that most industrialized countries have nominal interest rates near zero. With little room to manoeuvre short-term interest rates, the Fed has become the first major central bank to say it will allow, if not promote, a period of higher-than-target inflation to compensate for recent price shifts. The result of this strategy, known as “average inflation targeting,” is likely to enhance inflation expectations while further depressing real interest rates (nominal interest minus inflation expectations). Indeed, real rates in the United States have plummeted to negative levels in the eight months since the end of March, despite nominal 10-year yields rising. This disparity is a direct outcome of investors’ predictions that US inflation will grow, and the US today has one of the lowest real rates among G10 countries (Exhibit 2).
Exhibit 2: G10 real yields
Will other central banks follow suit and place a greater emphasis on real yields? Maybe. The European Central Bank (ECB) has discussed the notion, but we doubt the governing council, which has a history of sticking to its inflation target, would ever accept inflation above 2%. The ECB has remained silent about the Fed’s policy and the ensuing euro strength to date. At a news appearance on October 29, ECB President Christine Lagarde barely mentioned the currency, lessening the chances that she would try to talk down the euro as easily as her predecessors did (Exhibit 3). The lack of resistance to the dollar’s drop, as well as a reluctance to follow the Fed down the inflation-inducing road, suggests that the greenback has a long way to fall (Exhibit 4).
Signs point to emerging-market appreciation
We’ve gotten more optimistic about emerging-market currencies, and we expect them to gain faster than developed-market currencies in 2021. Improved economic development expectations, not only in emerging-market economies, but also in many of the export destinations they serve, are driving the shift in view. For example, China has successfully exited pandemic lockdowns and achieved a rapid recovery in economic activity. China’s economy is growing at an ever-increasing rate, and its clout has expanded even more this year, thanks to a new trade agreement signed in November with 14 of its Asian neighbors.
The recovery of emerging markets has not been restricted to Asia. Economic sentiment indicators such as purchasing managers’ indices and economic-momentum indicators imply that activity in developing markets has improved broadly. Furthermore, the recent disclosure of extremely effective vaccines should instill trust in consumers and businesses. Many emerging-market countries won’t get low-cost, easy-to-distribute vaccines until late 2021, but investors are already anticipating a reduction in budgetary stress and better economic development.
Given China’s economic clout, the strength of the Chinese yuan is also crucial for emerging-market currencies. Because China accounts for a rising amount of their trade, a higher Chinese yuan improves the competitiveness of China’s trading partners. Furthermore, the strength of the Chinese yuan (up 8% against the dollar since June) helps emerging-market currencies to increase against the dollar, undermining US assertions that they are purposefully depreciating their currencies. Reduced use of foreign-exchange reserves to purchase dollars – historically a mechanism for managing the currency rate – is one sign that Chinese policymakers are growing more tolerant of a stronger yuan. Given the ever-increasing capital flows into China as a result of the inclusion of Chinese assets in major global bond and equities indexes, China’s willingness to loosen its grip on this market is particularly important.
The political transition in the United States should also help to boost emerging-market currencies. To begin with, Biden’s big-government ideas are perceived as dollar-negative since they will increase budget deficits. Increased regulations, higher corporate taxes, and higher minimum wages are all part of the President-plans elect’s to erode the significant competitive edge that American businesses have enjoyed for several years under President Trump. Second, Biden’s more friendly foreign-policy posture provides comfort to a market that has been worn down by Trump’s confrontational tweets, as well as a boost to the countries that have received the most attention from the White House. While China remains a significant US opponent, and Biden may eventually shift his focus to Russia, Iran, and other countries, we believe he has more pressing domestic issues to address within his first 100 days in office. Emerging-market currencies will benefit the most from a falling US dollar in the run-up to the inauguration and for the next 100 days. Since March, this group has been lagging other hazardous assets, but it is now showing more convincing signs of strength (Exhibit 5).
Euro
The euro is gaining favor among investors. We believe the currency will continue to rise reaching a seven-year high of 1.27 next year, having recently broken above 1.20 per dollar from 1.07 in March. For various reasons, we are bullish:
- The euro serves as the “anti-dollar” as the world’s second most traded currency. Many investors who avoid the dollar will naturally switch to euros.
- Despite its recent gains, the euro remains significantly undervalued (Exhibit 6). Furthermore, in our purchasing-power-parity model, the rising fair value of the euro is a result of lower inflation in Europe than in the United States, a trend that will likely increase given the Fed’s inflation-tolerant stance.
- Europe as a whole has a better balance of payments, with trade surpluses boosted by closer ties to Chinese economic growth (Exhibit 7).
Exhibit 7: European exports closely linked to China
As of October 31, 2020. Bloomberg, PBOC, China General Administration of Customs, RBC GAM, PBOC, PBOC, PBOC, PBOC, PBOC, PBOC, PBOC
Perhaps most importantly, progress has been made in tackling the risks of a Eurozone breakup. Long-term investors, notably the vast US$12 trillion collectively invested by global reserve managers, will want more European debt as a result of the European nations’ solidarity in agreeing to a shared 750 billion-euro recovery fund. Investor demand for a COVID-19-relief bond issued by the European Commission was 14 times greater than the number of bonds released, indicating that these reforms are already having an impact.
The severity of the pandemic will determine how quickly the euro gains. While lockdowns will undoubtedly stifle economic activity and put a strain on government finances, they are being gradually reduced in areas of Europe in response to a decrease in reported infections.
Japanese yen
There are parallels between today’s situation and the years following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, when the yen rose sharply. One similarity is that deflation has returned to Japan, boosting real yields and making Japanese government bonds more appealing. Japanese investors have been favoring domestic assets due to lower yields abroad (Exhibit 8), and decreased hedging costs have led to higher hedges on foreign investments.
Exhibit 8: Japanese buying fewer overseas assets
The yen’s spike in demand is also a reflection of overseas demand for yen-denominated assets. China is a major buyer of Japanese debt, and this reserve-diversification flow away from the US dollar could provide the yen with long-term support.
The Japanese monetary and fiscal regime under new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga will be crucial in the coming year, and we will be looking for any policy changes because these measures were major drivers of yen weakening during the Abe government. We’re also waiting to see how relations between Japan and the United States develop after Biden’s inauguration in January. We believe that capital inflows will continue to boost the yen, and that it will appreciate to 99 per dollar in the coming year.
British pound
Finally. Hopefully, after four and a half years, the deadline is real this time. In any case, the Brexit crisis will be resolved in the few weeks remaining before the December 31 deadline. The pound has risen in tandem with these reports, aided by the weakening of the US dollar, and is reflecting greater confidence than UK equities, implying that the pound is overvalued (Exhibit 9). Even if the UK and EU reach an agreement, we remain skeptical about the pound’s prospects for appreciation.
Exhibit 9: FX market is optmistic on sterling
The truth is that the pound has very few redeeming qualities. Although the United Kingdom may grow rapidly in 2021 in absolute terms, its underperformance in 2020 was so severe that the country is still on track to lag behind most of its peers in terms of the timing of its return to economic normalcy, a dynamic exacerbated by Chancellor Sunak’s decision to unwind pandemic-related fiscal spending in late November. This increases the likelihood that the Bank of England will carry out its promise to implement negative interest rates next year. Additional political drama is expected in the coming year, as Scottish elections raise the prospect of the country’s secession from the United Kingdom, should another referendum be held. The pound is expected to stay at 1.33 for the next 12 months, weakening against other currencies as the US dollar falls.
Canadian dollar
This year, we have been more bullish on the Canadian currency, believing that the high in the US dollar had passed once the March safe-haven flows receded. While investors have began to buy the Canadian dollar as a result of our views, we do not believe that the currency’s recent rise represents this newfound optimism. The better forecast for the loonie reflects the fact that the US dollar is weakening and global equities are rising, two factors that are more relevant to the Canadian dollar than commodities or interest rates (Exhibit 10). Investors are pointing out that Canada is better positioned than many other countries to give the budgetary support needed to strengthen the domestic economy in the aftermath of the pandemic. Furthermore, Canada has pre-ordered more immunizations per capita than any other developed country (Exhibit 11), implying that once those doses are provided, the economy will recover faster. In a universal health-care system, that goal may also be easier to do than in the largely private US system. Given the economy’s greater sensitivity to global growth, the licensing of COVID-19 vaccinations is critical. Finally, when pent-up immigration materializes after borders are reopened, a return to normal may result in greater population increase in the years ahead, helping to shore up the economic growth rate.
Exhibit 11: Vaccine supply available*
Note: *Through 2021, including advanced purchases and other purchase options. *Each person usually receives two doses. As of November 30, 2020 RBC GAM, RBC Goldman Sachs
While some argue that lower crude oil prices are a drag on the Canadian economy, we believe this is overstated. Yes, the oil patch is still crucial to the Canadian economy, but not nearly as much as it once was. Over the last five years, oil extraction as a percentage of GDP has fallen to 2% from 6%, and the energy sector’s share of business investment has also fallen (Exhibit 12). After being forced to pivot, western provinces are now eager to join the global race to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, and political support for hydrogen and natural gas as western provinces’ saviors is growing. The province of Alberta presented a study in October outlining a strategy for substantial investments, incentives, and collaborations to reposition the economy and capitalize on new prospects in this field. In addition, non-energy goods such as metals, lumber, and wheat account for approximately the same weight in Canada’s exports as oil. Prices for these exports have risen significantly in recent months. Lumber prices, for example, rose dramatically throughout the summer, while wheat futures traded at levels not seen in six years this fall.
Exhibit 12: Oil is now a smaller share of Canadian economy
The fact that many Canadian-dollar negatives are being ignored by investors continues to worry us about the prospects for the Canadian currency. These are largely domestic issues that were formerly a source of concern but are now being minimized. Negative press surrounding Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s ties to a foundation, as well as his government’s efforts to bury what many are calling a scandal, have mostly gone unnoticed outside of Canada. Another source of concern is high consumer leverage, with household debt exceeding the country’s yearly economic output. Lower borrowing costs and pandemic-related income support have, however, put these economic risks on hold. Personal bankruptcies decreased by 15% and corporate bankruptcies decreased by 19% year over year, despite rising unemployment and springtime lockdowns. A third source of concern is the country’s balance of payments, which has been plagued by trade deficits and direct investment outflows for the past decade (Exhibit 13). Foreign purchases of Canadian stocks and bonds have placed this structural issue to the back burner for the time being.
Exhibit 13: Canada basic balance of payments
We are still cautiously optimistic about the loonie, expecting it to increase to 1.27 per US dollar from its current level of 1.31. During a broad U.S. dollar depreciation, however, several Canadian-specific issues may prevent the currency from rising as much as the euro, yen, or emerging-market currencies.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we foresee a steady decrease in the US dollar in 2021 as structural headwinds take precedence over short-term factors that have delayed the greenback’s decline in the previous year. The United States’ twin deficits and the Federal Reserve’s goal to raise inflation, along with economic and political improvements as well as unusually favorable financial circumstances abroad, could consolidate the dollar’s downward trajectory. The euro, yen, and loonie are expected to surpass the British pound next year, allowing emerging-market currencies to thrive.
Is the dollar going to appreciate or depreciate in 2022?
As a junior US Embassy staffer in Bonn, Germany, I sat in on a senior official’s discussion regarding the dollar’s prospects. ‘Anybody who thinks he knows where the dollar is headed is a fool,’ Ambassador Arthur Burns said, carefully drawing on his pipe for emphasis. Next.’
Given the enormous uncertainties surrounding Covid-19, inflation, geopolitics, and monetary policy, one must now approach the arena of dollar outlook folly even more humbly.
Many analysts expect the dollar will strengthen significantly in 2022 as a result of the Federal Reserve’s hawkish posture in comparison to other major central banks, particularly the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan. The dollar should be supported by these relative stances, especially since Fed raises bolster the short end of the curve, where exchange rates are sensitive.
However, the narrative of a big strengthening of the dollar may be exaggerated, just as expectations of a sharp drop in 2021 were exaggerated.
Analysts should define the term “dollar” in their reports. The DXY index, which has a big influence on market analysts, is almost entirely made up of euro and euro bloc currencies. Even if the dollar gains ground against the euro, major currencies account for less than half of the dollar’s overall trade-weighted index, with the eurozone and Japan accounting for a quarter.
Despite the fact that the market has begun to price in relative monetary policy attitudes, US financial conditions remain extremely accommodating. Rising US yields tend to push up European yields, keeping the spread from widening.
In 2022, the US will have a substantial current account deficit of roughly 3.5 percent of GDP, comparable to 2021.
The effective ‘dollar’ is already heavily weighted at the top. It peaked in the mid-1980s, soared in the early 2000s when the euro was introduced, and is presently higher than it was in the early 2000s (see Figure 1).
According to projections, US economy will decline in 2022. The failure to approve the ‘Build Back Better’ bill so far has resulted in a downgrade in the US outlook. The United States’ fiscal policy will be one of consolidation. The dollar is often heavily bid during periods of high risk-off and high risk-on, but demand is more subdued in the between. Markets may find themselves in that intermediate condition in the absence of geopolitical shocks or a significant underestimating of inflation pressure and the Fed’s response, both of which are distinct possibilities.
The Canadian dollar and the Mexican peso, which account for nearly a fifth of the US trade-weighted index, deserve special attention. The Canadian dollar makes up about a third of the Fed’s trade-weighted basket, but only about a tenth of the DXY. Lower (higher) oil prices may mitigate (raise) Canadian currency buoyancy over the year, owing to a more aggressive Bank of Canada attitude relative to the Fed; lower (higher) oil prices may moderate (increase) Canadian dollar buoyancy.
The peso should remain quite stable the Banco de Mxico has taken a hawkish approach thus far, remittances have been high, the current account is nearly balanced, and fiscal policy has been relatively restricted. However, structural issues remain unaddressed, obstructing the investment climate and inflows.
In 2022, Chinese authorities will most certainly try to limit renminbi pressures against the dollar, but it will be a difficult task. The authorities are loosening policy in the face of slowing growth, particularly in light of recent developments in the real estate market, and sending clear signals that further renminbi appreciation against the dollar is undesirable, such as by raising reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits or weakening fixings.
The balance of payments, on the other hand, indicates that renminbi demand is strong. Given the decline of outbound tourism, the pandemic has contributed to a rise in China’s current account surplus to 1.5 percent to 2% of GDP. Increased direct and portfolio investment opportunities in China’s financial industry, relatively favorable yields, and lackluster portfolio demand for other emerging market currencies continue to support the renminbi.
The Chinese central bank wants the trade-weighted renminbi to remain stable, but it also wants to avoid abrupt renminbi movements, particularly upward, against the dollar. When the dollar is strong against emerging market currencies and/or the balance of payments is uncooperative, these goals can collide. Questions will grow regarding whether the People’s Bank of China is employing Chinese banks to engage in covert intervention or is doing so directly in order to prevent renminbi appreciation, particularly versus the dollar.
The EM complex is far too complex to be studied in one fell swoop. Turkey, Argentina, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, to name a few, have unique challenges. The situation in Latin America cannot be comparable to that of Eastern Europe or non-China East Asia. However, fears of a rerun of the 2013 taper tantrum are exaggerated, particularly as key emerging markets (EMs) float, have built up reserves, and have fewer external vulnerabilities. With several EM central banks adopting a hawkish approach, the dollar should continue resilient against the non-China EM complex, while slowing global growth could depress commodities prices.
When all is said and done, the dollar should maintain a robust tone, but forecasts of significant strengthening are unlikely to materialize.