The Great Inflation was the defining macroeconomic event of the twentieth century’s second half. After the roughly two decades it lasted, the worldwide monetary system built during World War II was abandoned, four economic recessions occurred, two catastrophic energy shortages occurred, and wage and price restrictions were implemented for the first time in peacetime. It was “the worst failure of American macroeconomic policy in the postwar century,” according to one eminent economist (Siegel 1994).
However, that failure ushered in a paradigm shift in macroeconomic theory and, ultimately, the laws that now govern the Federal Reserve and other central banks across the world. If the Great Inflation was the result of a major blunder in American macroeconomic policy, its defeat should be celebrated.
Forensics of the Great Inflation
Inflation was a bit over 1% per year in 1964. It had been in the area for the last six years. Inflation began to rise in the mid-1960s, reaching a high of more than 14% in 1980. In the second half of the 1980s, it had dropped to an average of barely 3.5 percent.
While economists dispute the relative importance of the causes that have spurred and sustained inflation for more than a decade, there is little disagreement about where it comes from. The actions of the Federal Reserve, which allowed for an excessive expansion in the quantity of money, were at the root of the Great Inflation.
It would be helpful to describe the story in three distinct but related parts to comprehend this phase of particularly terrible policy, particularly monetary policy. This is a kind of forensic examination into the motive, means, and opportunity for the Great Inflation to happen.
The Motive: The Phillips Curve and the Pursuit of Full Employment
The first section of the story, the motivation behind the Great Inflation, takes place in the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression, a period in macroeconomic theory and policy that was similarly momentous. Following World War II, Congress focused on programs that it anticipated would foster better economic stability. The Employment Act of 1946 was the most prominent of the new legislation. The act, among other things, stated that the federal government’s role is to “advance maximum employment, production, and purchasing power” and called for more coordination between fiscal and monetary policy. 1 The Federal Reserve’s current twin mandate to “maintain long-run expansion of the monetary and credit aggregates…in order to achieve effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” is based on this legislation (Steelman 2011).
The orthodoxy that guided policy in the postwar era was Keynesian stabilization policy, which was driven in part by the painful memory of the unprecedented high unemployment in the United States and around the world during the 1930s. The fundamental focus of these policies was the regulation of aggregate expenditure (demand) through the fiscal authority’s spending and taxation policies, as well as the central bank’s monetary policies. The notion that monetary policy can and should be used to manage aggregate spending and stabilize economic activity remains a widely held belief that governs the Federal Reserve’s and other central banks’ operations today. However, one crucial and incorrect assumption in the implementation of stabilization policy in the 1960s and 1970s was that unemployment and inflation had a stable, exploitable relationship. In particular, it was widely assumed that permanently lower unemployment rates could be “purchased” with somewhat higher inflation rates.
The idea that the “Phillips curve” indicated a longer-term trade-off between unemployment, which was very destructive to economic well-being, and inflation, which was sometimes seen as more of a nuisance, was an appealing assumption for policymakers who sought to enforce the Employment Act’s requirements.
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But the Phillips curve’s stability was a dangerous assumption, as economists Edmund Phelps (1967) and Milton Friedman (1968) cautioned. “If the statical’optimum’ is chosen,” Phelps says, “it is logical to assume that participants in product and labor markets will learn to expect inflation…and that, as a result of their rational, anticipatory behavior, the Phillips Curve will progressively shift upward…” Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967). In other words, the authorities’ desired trade-off between reduced unemployment and higher inflation would almost certainly be a false bargain, requiring ever higher inflation to maintain.
The Means: The Collapse of Bretton Woods
If the Federal Reserve’s policies were well-anchored, chasing the Phillips curve in search of lower unemployment would not have been possible. Through the Bretton Woods agreement in the 1960s, the US dollar was tied if shakily to gold. As a result, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the severance of the US dollar from its last link to gold play a part in the story of the Great Inflation.
During World War II, the world’s industrial nations agreed to a worldwide monetary system, which they thought would promote global trade and offer more economic stability and peace. The Bretton Woods system, hammered out by forty-four nations in New Hampshire in July 1944, established a fixed rate of exchange between the world’s currencies and the US dollar, with the latter linked to gold.3
The Bretton Woods system, on the other hand, had a number of faults in its implementation, the most serious of which was the attempt to maintain constant parity across world currencies, which was incompatible with their domestic economic goals. Many countries were pursuing monetary policies that claimed to move up the Phillips curve, resulting in a more favorable unemployment-inflation nexus.
The US dollar faced an additional challenge as the world’s reserve currency. The need for US dollar reserves expanded in tandem with global trade. For a period, an expanding balance of payments deficit met the demand for US dollars, and foreign central banks accumulated ever-increasing dollar reserves. The amount of dollar reserves held overseas eventually exceeded the US gold stock, meaning that the US could not sustain total convertibility at the current gold pricea fact that foreign governments and currency speculators were quick to note.
As inflation rose in the second half of the 1960s, more US dollars were changed to gold, and in the summer of 1971, President Richard Nixon put a stop to foreign central banks exchanging dollars for gold. The short-lived Smithsonian Agreement attempted to save the global monetary system during the next two years, but the new arrangement performed no better than Bretton Woods and quickly fell apart. The worldwide monetary system that had existed since World War II had come to an end.
Most of the world’s currencies, including the US dollar, were now entirely unanchored after the last link to gold was destroyed. Except during times of global crisis, this was the first time in history that the industrialized world’s currencies were based on an irredeemable paper money standard.
The Opportunity: Fiscal Imbalances, Energy Shortages, and Bad Data
The US economy was in a state of flux throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. At a time when the US economic situation was already stressed by the Vietnam War, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society Act ushered in large spending programs across a broad range of social initiatives. The monetary policy was complicated by the developing budgetary imbalances.
The Federal Reserve used a “even-keel” policy approach to avoid monetary policy actions that would conflict with the Treasury’s funding plans. In practice, this meant that the central bank would not change policy and would maintain interest rates at their current levels during the time between the announcement of a Treasury issuance and its market sale. Treasury difficulties were rare under normal circumstances, and the Fed’s even-keeled policies didn’t obstruct monetary policy implementation considerably. The Federal Reserve’s adherence to the even-keel principle, however, became progressively limited as debt difficulties became more prominent (Meltzer 2005).
The periodic energy crises, which raised oil prices and stifled US GDP, were a more disruptive force. The first crisis was a five-month-long Arab oil embargo that began in October 1973. Crude oil prices quadrupled at this time, reaching a plateau that lasted until 1979, when the Iranian revolution triggered a second energy crisis. The price of oil tripled during the second crisis.
In the 1970s, economists and policymakers began to classify increases in aggregate prices into various inflation kinds. Macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy, had a direct influence on “demand-pull” inflation. It was caused by policies that resulted in expenditure levels that were higher than what the economy could produce without pushing the economy beyond its normal productive capacity and requiring the use of more expensive resources. However, supply interruptions, particularly in the food and energy industries, might push inflation higher (Gordon 1975). 4 This “cost-push” inflation was also passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail prices.
Inflation driven by the growing price of oil was mainly beyond the control of monetary policy, according to the central bank. However, the increase in unemployment that occurred as a result of the increase in oil prices was not.
The Federal Reserve accommodated huge and rising budget imbalances and leaned against the headwinds created by energy costs, motivated by a duty to generate full employment with little or no anchor for reserve management. These policies hastened the money supply expansion and increased overall prices without reducing unemployment.
Policymakers were also hampered by faulty data (or, at the very least, a lack of understanding of the facts). Looking back at the data available to policymakers in the run-up to and during the Great Inflation, economist Athanasios Orphanides found that the real-time estimate of potential output was significantly overstated, while the estimate of the unemployment rate consistent with full employment was significantly understated. To put it another way, officials were probably underestimating the inflationary effects of their measures as well. In reality, they couldn’t continue on their current policy path without rising inflation (Orphanides 1997; Orphanides 2002).
To make matters worse, the Phillips curve began to fluctuate, indicating that the Federal Reserve’s policy actions were being influenced by its stability.
From High Inflation to Inflation TargetingThe Conquest of US Inflation
Friedman and Phelps were correct. The previously stable inflation-unemployment trade-off has become unstable. Policymakers’ power to regulate any “real” variable was fleeting. This included the unemployment rate, which fluctuated about its “natural” level. The trade-off that policymakers were hoping to take advantage of didn’t exist.
As businesses and families began to appreciate, if not anticipate, rising prices, any trade-off between inflation and unemployment became a less favorable trade-off until both inflation and unemployment reached unacceptably high levels. This became known as the “stagflationary age.” When this narrative began in 1964, inflation was at 1% and unemployment was at 5%. Inflation would be over 12% and unemployment would be over 7% ten years later. Inflation was near 14.5 percent in the summer of 1980, while unemployment was over 7.5 percent.
Officials at the Federal Reserve were not ignorant to the escalating inflation, and they were fully aware of the dual mandate, which required monetary policy to be calibrated to achieve full employment and price stability. Indeed, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, more generally known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act after the bill’s authors, re-codified the Employment Act of 1946 in 1978. Humphrey-Hawkins tasked the Federal Reserve with pursuing full employment and price stability, as well as requiring the central bank to set growth targets for several monetary aggregates and submit a semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress. 5 When full employment and inflation collided, however, the employment part of the mandate appeared to have the upper hand. Full employment was the foremost objective in the minds of the people and the government, if not also at the Federal Reserve, as Fed Chairman Arthur Burns would later declare (Meltzer 2005). However, there was a general consensus that confronting the inflation problem head-on would be too costly to the economy and jobs.
Attempts to reduce inflation without the costly side effect of increasing unemployment had been made in the past. Between 1971 and 1974, the Nixon government implemented wage and price controls in three stages. These measures only delayed the rise in prices for a short time while aggravating shortages, particularly in food and energy. The Ford administration did not fare any better. Following his declaration of inflation as “enemy number one,” President Gerald Ford initiated the Whip Inflation Now (WIN) initiative in 1974, which included voluntary steps to encourage increased thrift. It was a colossal flop.
By the late 1970s, the public had come to anticipate monetary policy to be inflationary. They were also becoming increasingly dissatisfied with inflation. In the latter half of the 1970s, survey after survey revealed a deterioration in popular confidence in the economy and government policy. Inflation was frequently singled out as a particular scourge. Since 1965, interest rates have appeared to be on the rise, and as the 1970s drew to a conclusion, they jumped even higher. Business investment stagnated, productivity fell, and the country’s trade balance with the rest of the globe worsened during this time. Inflation was largely seen as either a substantial contributing factor or the primary cause of the economic downturn.
However, once the country was in the midst of unacceptably high inflation and unemployment, officials were confronted with a difficult choice. Combating high unemployment would almost surely drive inflation even higher, while combating inflation would almost certainly cause unemployment to rise much more.
Paul Volcker, formerly of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was elected chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in 1979. Year-over-year inflation was above 11 percent when he assumed office in August, and national unemployment was slightly under 6 percent. By this time, it was widely understood that lowering inflation necessitated tighter control over the pace of increase of reserves in particular, as well as broad money in general. As mandated by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had already began setting targets for monetary aggregates. However, it was evident that with the new chairman, attitude was shifting and that greater measures to restrict the expansion of the money supply were needed. The FOMC announced in October 1979 that instead of using the fed funds rate as a policy tool, it would target reserve growth.
Fighting inflation was now considered as important to meet both of the dual mandate’s goals, even if it temporarily disrupted economic activity and resulted in a greater rate of unemployment. “My core idea is that over time we have no choice but to deal with the inflationary situation since inflation and the unemployment rate go together,” Volcker declared in early 1980. Isn’t that what the 1970s taught us?” (Meltzer, 1034, 2009).
While not perfect, better control of reserve and money expansion over time resulted in a desired slowdown of inflation. The establishment of credit limits in early 1980, as well as the Monetary Control Act, aided this stricter reserve management. Interest rates surged, decreased for a short time, and then spiked again in 1980. Between January and July, lending activity decreased, unemployment increased, and the economy experienced a temporary recession. Even as the economy improved in the second half of 1980, inflation declined but remained high.
The Volcker Fed, on the other hand, kept up the pressure on rising inflation by raising interest rates and slowing reserve growth. In July 1981, the economy suffered another recession, this time more severe and long-lasting, lasting until November 1982. Unemployment peaked at over 11%, but inflation continued to fall, and by the conclusion of the recession, year-over-year inflation had dropped below 5%. As the Fed’s commitment to low inflation gained traction, unemployment fell and the economy entered a period of steady growth and stability. The Great Inflation had come to an end.
Macroeconomic theory had undergone a metamorphosis by this time, influenced in large part by the economic lessons of the day. In macroeconomic models, the importance of public expectations in the interaction between economic policy and economic performance has become standard. The need of time-consistent policy choicespolicies that do not sacrifice long-term prosperity for short-term gainsas well as policy credibility became widely recognized as essential for excellent macroeconomic outcomes.
Today’s central banks recognize that price stability is critical to sound monetary policy, and several, like the Federal Reserve, have set specific numerical inflation targets. These numerical inflation targets have reinstated an anchor to monetary policy to the extent that they are credible. As a result, they have improved the transparency of monetary policy decisions and reduced uncertainty, both of which are now recognized as critical preconditions for achieving long-term growth and maximum employment.
What triggered the 1980 Great Inflation?
The 1981-82 recession was the greatest economic slump in the United States since the Great Depression, prior to the 2007-09 recession. Indeed, the over 11% unemployment rate attained in late 1982 remains the postwar era’s pinnacle (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). During the 1981-82 recession, unemployment was widespread, but manufacturing, construction, and the auto industries were especially hard hit. Despite the fact that goods manufacturers accounted for only 30% of overall employment at the time, they lost 90% of their jobs in 1982. Manufacturing accounted for three-quarters of all job losses in the goods-producing sector, with unemployment rates of 22% and 24%, respectively, in the home building and auto manufacturing industries (Urquhart and Hewson 1983, 4-7).
The economy was already in poor health prior to the slump, with unemployment hovering at 7.5 percent following a recession in 1980. Tight monetary policy in an attempt to combat rising inflation sparked both the 1980 and 1981-82 recessions. During the 1960s and 1970s, economists and politicians thought that raising inflation would reduce unemployment, a tradeoff known as the Phillips Curve. In the 1970s, the Fed used a “stop-go” monetary strategy, in which it alternated between combating high unemployment and high inflation. The Fed cut interest rates during the “go” periods in order to loosen the money supply and reduce unemployment. When inflation rose during the “stop” periods, the Fed raised interest rates to lessen inflationary pressure. However, as inflation and unemployment rose concurrently in the mid-1970s, the Phillips Curve tradeoff proved unstable in the long run. While unemployment was on the decline towards the end of the decade, inflation remained high, hitting 11% in June 1979. (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
Because of his anti-inflation ideas, Paul Volcker was chosen chairman of the Federal Reserve in August 1979. He had previously served as president of the New York Fed, where he had expressed his displeasure with Fed actions that he believed contributed to rising inflation expectations. In terms of future economic stability, he believes that rising inflation should be the Fed’s top concern: “It is what is going to give us the most troubles and cause the biggest recession” (FOMC transcript 1979, 16). He also thought the Fed had a credibility problem when it comes to controlling inflation. The Fed had proved in the preceding decade that it did not place a high priority on maintaining low inflation, and the public’s belief that this conduct would continue would make it increasingly difficult for the Fed to drive inflation down. “Failure to continue the fight against inflation now would simply make any subsequent effort more difficult,” he said (Volcker 1981b).
Instead of focusing on interest rates, Volcker altered the Fed’s policy to aggressively target the money supply. He chose this strategy for two reasons. To begin with, rising inflation made it difficult to determine which interest rate targets were suitable. Due to the expectation of inflation, the nominal interest rates the Fed targeted could be relatively high, but the real interest rates (that is, the effective interest rates after adjusting for inflation) could still be quite low. Second, the new policy was intended to show the public that the Federal Reserve was serious about keeping inflation low. The anticipation of low inflation was significant, as present inflation is influenced in part by future inflation forecasts.
Volcker’s initial efforts to reduce inflation and inflationary expectations were ineffective. The Carter administration’s credit-control scheme, which began in March 1980, triggered a severe recession (Schreft 1990). As unemployment rose, the Fed relented, reverting to the “stop-go” practices that the public had grown accustomed to. The Fed tightened the money supply further in late 1980 and early 1981, causing the federal funds rate to approach 20%. Long-term interest rates, despite this, have continued to grow. The ten-year Treasury bond rate surged from around 11% in October 1980 to more than 15% a year later, probably due to market expectations that the Fed would soften its restrictive monetary policy if unemployment soared (Goodfriend and King 2005). Volcker, on the other hand, was insistent that the Fed not back down this time: “We have set our course to control money and credit growth.” We intend to stay the course” (Volcker 1981a).
High interest rates put pressure on sectors of the economy that rely on borrowing, such as manufacturing and construction, and the economy officially entered a recession in the third quarter of 1981. Unemployment increased from 7.4% at the beginning of the recession to nearly 10% a year later. Volcker faced repeated calls from Congress to loosen monetary policy as the recession worsened, but he insisted that failing to lower long-run inflation expectations now would result in “more catastrophic economic situations over a much longer period of time” (Monetary Policy Report 1982, 67).
This perseverance paid off in the end. Inflation had dropped to 5% by October 1982, and long-term interest rates had begun to fall. The Fed permitted the federal funds rate to drop to 9%, and unemployment fell fast from over 11% at the end of 1982 to 8% a year later (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Goodfriend and King 2005). Inflation was still a threat, and the Fed would have to deal with several “inflation scares” during the 1980s. However, Volcker’s and his successors’ dedication to actively pursue price stability helped ensure that the 1970s’ double-digit inflation did not reappear.
In 1980, what were the rates of inflation?
In 1980, the inflation rate was 13.50 percent. The inflation rate in 1980 was greater than the average annual inflation rate of 2.99 percent between 1980 and 2022. The change in the consumer price index is used to calculate inflation (CPI). In 1980, the CPI was 82.40.
What was the highest rate of inflation ever recorded in the United States?
The highest year-over-year inflation rate recorded since the formation of the United States in 1776 was 29.78 percent in 1778. In the years since the CPI was introduced, the greatest inflation rate recorded was 19.66 percent in 1917.
What is the current value of a dollar from 1980?
$1 in 1980 has the purchasing power of nearly $3.44 today, a $2.44 gain in 42 years. Between 1980 and present, the dollar saw an average annual inflation rate of 2.99 percent, resulting in a total price increase of 244.32 percent. In 1980, the inflation rate was 13.50 percent.
In the 1980s, how did inflation be stopped?
The Fed was dead set on bringing inflation to a halt. So, in 1980 and 1981, Chairman Paul Volcker (shown above) maintained raising rates, eventually bringing the economy and inflation to a halt.
How did the recession of the 1980s end?
Beginning in January 1980, there was a recession. Credit for vehicle and home loans became more difficult to obtain as a result of the rising federal funds rate. This resulted in significant contractions in industry and housing, both of which were reliant on consumer credit. The majority of the jobs lost during the recession were in the manufacturing sector, while the service sector remained mostly unaffected.
Manufacturing lost 1.1 million jobs during the crisis, for a total of 1.3 million jobs lost during the recession, accounting for 1.2 percent of payrolls. In 1979, the automotive industry, which was already in bad shape due to low sales, lost 310,000 jobs, or 33 percent of its workforce. A similar 300,000 people lost their jobs in the construction industry. Unemployment peaked at 7.8% in June 1980, but it remained relatively stable until the remainder of the year, averaging 7.5 percent through the first quarter of 1981.
In July 1980, the recession was declared officially over. Beginning in May, when interest rates fell, payrolls began to rise. Unemployment among auto employees climbed from 4.8 percent in 1979 to a record high of 24.7 percent in 1980, before falling to 17.4 percent by the end of the year. Unemployment in the construction industry increased to 16.3 percent in the third quarter and then began to decline at the end of the year.
There were questions in the final quarter of 1980 that the economy was recovering, and that it was instead experiencing a short pause. Poor house and auto sales in the closing months of 1980, as well as a second wave of rising interest rates and a stagnating jobless rate, reinforced these fears.
Why was inflation in the 1970s so high?
- Rapid inflation occurs when the prices of goods and services in an economy grow rapidly, reducing savings’ buying power.
- In the 1970s, the United States had some of the highest rates of inflation in recent history, with interest rates increasing to nearly 20%.
- This decade of high inflation was fueled by central bank policy, the removal of the gold window, Keynesian economic policies, and market psychology.
Has the United States ever had hyperinflation?
The trend of inflation in the rest of the world has been quite diverse, as seen in Figure 2, which illustrates inflation rates over the last several decades. Inflation rates were relatively high in many industrialized countries, not only the United States, in the 1970s. In 1975, for example, Japan’s inflation rate was over 8%, while the United Kingdom’s inflation rate was around 25%. Inflation rates in the United States and Europe fell in the 1980s and have largely remained stable since then.
In the 1970s, countries with tightly controlled economies, such as the Soviet Union and China, had historically low measured inflation rates because price increases were prohibited by law, except in circumstances where the government regarded a price increase to be due to quality improvements. These countries, on the other hand, were plagued by constant shortages of products, as prohibiting price increases works as a price limit, resulting in a situation in which demand much outnumbers supply. Although the statistics for these economies should be viewed as slightly shakier, Russia and China suffered outbursts of inflation as they transitioned toward more market-oriented economies. For much of the 1980s and early 1990s, China’s inflation rate was around 10% per year, however it has since declined. In the early 1990s, Russia suffered hyperinflationa period of extremely high inflationover 2,500 percent a year, yet by 2006, Russia’s consumer price inflation had dropped to 10% per year, as seen in Figure 3. The only time the United States came close to hyperinflation was in the Confederate states during the Civil War, from 1860 to 1865.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, many Latin American countries experienced rampant hyperinflation, with annual inflation rates typically exceeding 100%. In 1990, for example, inflation in both Brazil and Argentina surpassed 2000 percent. In the 1990s, several African countries had exceptionally high inflation rates, sometimes bordering on hyperinflation. In 1995, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, experienced a 75 percent inflation rate.
In most countries, the problem of inflation appeared to have subsided in the early 2000s, at least when compared to the worst periods of prior decades. As we mentioned in an earlier Bring it Home feature, the world’s worst example of hyperinflation in recent years was in Zimbabwe, where the government was issuing bills with a face value of $100 trillion (in Zimbabwean dollars) at one pointthat is, the bills had $100,000,000,000,000 written on the front but were nearly worthless. In many nations, double-digit, triple-digit, and even quadruple-digit inflation are still fresh in people’s minds.
Who is the hardest hit by inflation?
Inflation is defined as a steady increase in the price level. Inflation means that money loses its purchasing power and can buy fewer products than before.
- Inflation will assist people with huge debts, making it simpler to repay their debts as prices rise.
Losers from inflation
Savers. Historically, savers have lost money due to inflation. When prices rise, money loses its worth, and savings lose their true value. People who had saved their entire lives, for example, could have the value of their savings wiped out during periods of hyperinflation since their savings became effectively useless at higher prices.
Inflation and Savings
This graph depicts a US Dollar’s purchasing power. The worth of a dollar decreases during periods of increased inflation, such as 1945-46 and the mid-1970s. Between 1940 and 1982, the value of one dollar plummeted by 85 percent, from 700 to 100.
- If a saver can earn an interest rate higher than the rate of inflation, they will be protected against inflation. If, for example, inflation is 5% and banks offer a 7% interest rate, those who save in a bank will nevertheless see a real increase in the value of their funds.
If we have both high inflation and low interest rates, savers are far more likely to lose money. In the aftermath of the 2008 credit crisis, for example, inflation soared to 5% (owing to cost-push reasons), while interest rates were slashed to 0.5 percent. As a result, savers lost money at this time.
Workers with fixed-wage contracts are another group that could be harmed by inflation. Assume that workers’ wages are frozen and that inflation is 5%. It means their salaries will buy 5% less at the end of the year than they did at the beginning.
CPI inflation was higher than nominal wage increases from 2008 to 2014, resulting in a real wage drop.
Despite the fact that inflation was modest (by UK historical norms), many workers saw their real pay decline.
- Workers in non-unionized jobs may be particularly harmed by inflation since they have less negotiating leverage to seek higher nominal salaries to keep up with growing inflation.
- Those who are close to poverty will be harmed the most during this era of negative real wages. Higher-income people will be able to absorb a drop in real wages. Even a small increase in pricing might make purchasing products and services more challenging. Food banks were used more frequently in the UK from 2009 to 2017.
- Inflation in the UK was over 20% in the 1970s, yet salaries climbed to keep up with growing inflation, thus workers continued to see real wage increases. In fact, in the 1970s, growing salaries were a source of inflation.
Inflationary pressures may prompt the government or central bank to raise interest rates. A higher borrowing rate will result as a result of this. As a result, homeowners with variable mortgage rates may notice considerable increases in their monthly payments.
The UK underwent an economic boom in the late 1980s, with high growth but close to 10% inflation; as a result of the overheating economy, the government hiked interest rates. This resulted in a sharp increase in mortgage rates, which was generally unanticipated. Many homeowners were unable to afford increasing mortgage payments and hence defaulted on their obligations.
Indirectly, rising inflation in the 1980s increased mortgage payments, causing many people to lose their homes.
- Higher inflation, on the other hand, does not always imply higher interest rates. There was cost-push inflation following the 2008 recession, but the Bank of England did not raise interest rates (they felt inflation would be temporary). As a result, mortgage holders witnessed lower variable rates and lower mortgage payments as a percentage of income.
Inflation that is both high and fluctuating generates anxiety for consumers, banks, and businesses. There is a reluctance to invest, which could result in poorer economic growth and fewer job opportunities. As a result, increased inflation is linked to a decline in economic prospects over time.
If UK inflation is higher than that of our competitors, UK goods would become less competitive, and exporters will see a drop in demand and find it difficult to sell their products.
Winners from inflation
Inflationary pressures might make it easier to repay outstanding debt. Businesses will be free to boost prices to consumers and utilize the extra cash to pay outstanding debts.
- However, if a bank borrowed money from a bank at a variable mortgage rate. If inflation rises and the bank raises interest rates, the cost of debt repayments will climb.
Inflation can make it easier for the government to pay off its debt in real terms (public debt as a percent of GDP)
This is especially true if inflation exceeds expectations. Because markets predicted low inflation in the 1960s, the government was able to sell government bonds at cheap interest rates. Inflation was higher than projected in the 1970s and higher than the yield on a government bond. As a result, bondholders experienced a decrease in the real value of their bonds, while the government saw a reduction in the real value of its debt.
In the 1970s, unexpected inflation (due to an oil price shock) aided in the reduction of government debt burdens in a number of countries, including the United States.
The nominal value of government debt increased between 1945 and 1991, although inflation and economic growth caused the national debt to shrink as a percentage of GDP.
Those with savings may notice a quick drop in the real worth of their savings during a period of hyperinflation. Those who own actual assets, on the other hand, are usually safe. Land, factories, and machines, for example, will keep their value.
During instances of hyperinflation, demand for assets such as gold and silver often increases. Because gold cannot be printed, it cannot be subjected to the same inflationary forces as paper money.
However, it is important to remember that purchasing gold during a period of inflation does not ensure an increase in real value. This is due to the fact that the price of gold is susceptible to speculative pressures. The price of gold, for example, peaked in 1980 and then plummeted.
Holding gold, on the other hand, is a method to secure genuine wealth in a way that money cannot.
Bank profit margins tend to expand during periods of negative real interest rates. Lending rates are greater than saving rates, with base rates near zero and very low savings rates.
Anecdotal evidence
Germany’s inflation rate reached astronomical levels between 1922 and 1924, making it a good illustration of high inflation.
Middle-class workers who had put a lifetime’s earnings into their pension fund discovered that it was useless in 1924. One middle-class clerk cashed his retirement fund and used money to buy a cup of coffee after working for 40 years.
Fear, uncertainty, and bewilderment arose as a result of the hyperinflation. People reacted by attempting to purchase anything physical such as buttons or cloth that might carry more worth than money.
However, not everyone was affected in the same way. Farmers fared handsomely as food prices continued to increase. Due to inflation, which reduced the real worth of debt, businesses that had borrowed huge sums realized that their debts had practically vanished. These companies could take over companies that had gone out of business due to inflationary costs.
Inflation this high can cause enormous resentment since it appears to be an unfair means to allocate wealth from savers to borrowers.
What is the current value of a million dollars from 1970?
$1,000,000 in 1970 has the purchasing power of roughly $7,312,268.04 now, a $6,312,268.04 gain in 52 years. Between 1970 to present, the dollar experienced an average annual inflation rate of 3.90 percent, resulting in a cumulative price increase of 631.23 percent.