During the late 2000s, the Great Recession was characterized by a dramatic drop in economic activity. It is often regarded as the worst downturn since the Great Depression. The term “Great Recession” refers to both the United States’ recession, which lasted from December 2007 to June 2009, and the worldwide recession that followed in 2009. When the housing market in the United States transitioned from boom to bust, large sums of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and derivatives lost significant value, the economic depression began.
What triggered the 2008 Great Recession?
The Great Recession, which ran from December 2007 to June 2009, was one of the worst economic downturns in US history. The economic crisis was precipitated by the collapse of the housing market, which was fueled by low interest rates, cheap lending, poor regulation, and hazardous subprime mortgages.
How long did it take to recover from the financial crisis of 2008?
When the decade-long expansion in US housing market activity peaked in 2006, the Great Moderation came to an end, and residential development began to decline. Losses on mortgage-related financial assets began to burden global financial markets in 2007, and the US economy entered a recession in December 2007. Several prominent financial firms were in financial difficulties that year, and several financial markets were undergoing substantial upheaval. The Federal Reserve responded by providing liquidity and support through a variety of measures aimed at improving the functioning of financial markets and institutions and, as a result, limiting the damage to the US economy. 1 Nonetheless, the economic downturn deteriorated in the fall of 2008, eventually becoming severe and long enough to be dubbed “the Great Recession.” While the US economy reached bottom in the middle of 2009, the recovery in the years that followed was exceptionally slow in certain ways. In response to the severity of the downturn and the slow pace of recovery that followed, the Federal Reserve provided unprecedented monetary accommodation. Furthermore, the financial crisis prompted a slew of important banking and financial regulation reforms, as well as congressional legislation that had a substantial impact on the Federal Reserve.
Rise and Fall of the Housing Market
Following a long period of expansion in US house building, home prices, and housing loans, the recession and crisis struck. This boom began in the 1990s and accelerated in the mid-2000s, continuing unabated through the 2001 recession. Between 1998 and 2006, average home prices in the United States more than doubled, the largest increase in US history, with even bigger advances in other locations. During this time, home ownership increased from 64 percent in 1994 to 69 percent in 2005, while residential investment increased from around 4.5 percent of US GDP to nearly 6.5 percent. Employment in housing-related sectors contributed for almost 40% of net private sector job creation between 2001 and 2005.
The development of the housing market was accompanied by an increase in household mortgage borrowing in the United States. Household debt in the United States increased from 61 percent of GDP in 1998 to 97 percent in 2006. The rise in home mortgage debt appears to have been fueled by a number of causes. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) maintained a low federal funds rate after the 2001 recession, and some observers believe that by keeping interest rates low for a “long period” and only gradually increasing them after 2004, the Federal Reserve contributed to the expansion of housing market activity (Taylor 2007). Other researchers, on the other hand, believe that such variables can only explain for a small part of the rise in housing activity (Bernanke 2010). Furthermore, historically low interest rates may have been influenced by significant savings accumulations in some developing market economies, which acted to keep interest rates low globally (Bernanke 2005). Others attribute the surge in borrowing to the expansion of the mortgage-backed securities market. Borrowers who were deemed a bad credit risk in the past, maybe due to a poor credit history or an unwillingness to make a big down payment, found it difficult to get mortgages. However, during the early and mid-2000s, lenders offered high-risk, or “subprime,” mortgages, which were bundled into securities. As a result, there was a significant increase in access to housing financing, which helped to drive the ensuing surge in demand that drove up home prices across the country.
Effects on the Financial Sector
The extent to which home prices might eventually fall became a significant question for the pricing of mortgage-related securities after they peaked in early 2007, according to the Federal Housing Finance Agency House Price Index, because large declines in home prices were viewed as likely to lead to an increase in mortgage defaults and higher losses to holders of such securities. Large, nationwide drops in home prices were uncommon in US historical data, but the run-up in home prices was unique in terms of magnitude and extent. Between the first quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2011, property values declined by more than a fifth on average across the country. As financial market participants faced significant uncertainty regarding the frequency of losses on mortgage-related assets, this drop in home values contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-08. Money market investors became concerned of subprime mortgage exposures in August 2007, putting pressure on certain financial markets, particularly the market for asset-backed commercial paper (Covitz, Liang, and Suarez 2009). The investment bank Bear Stearns was bought by JPMorgan Chase with the help of the Federal Reserve in the spring of 2008. Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in September, and the Federal Reserve aided AIG, a significant insurance and financial services firm, the next day. The Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation were all approached by Citigroup and Bank of America for assistance.
The Federal Reserve’s assistance to specific financial firms was hardly the only instance of central bank credit expansion in reaction to the crisis. The Federal Reserve also launched a slew of new lending programs to help a variety of financial institutions and markets. A credit facility for “primary dealers,” the broker-dealers that act as counterparties to the Fed’s open market operations, as well as lending programs for money market mutual funds and the commercial paper market, were among them. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which was launched in collaboration with the US Department of Treasury, was aimed to relieve credit conditions for families and enterprises by offering credit to US holders of high-quality asset-backed securities.
To avoid an increase in bank reserves that would drive the federal funds rate below its objective as banks attempted to lend out their excess reserves, the Federal Reserve initially funded the expansion of Federal Reserve credit by selling Treasury securities. The Federal Reserve, on the other hand, got the right to pay banks interest on their excess reserves in October 2008. This encouraged banks to keep their reserves rather than lending them out, reducing the need for the Federal Reserve to offset its increased lending with asset reductions.2
Effects on the Broader Economy
The housing industry was at the forefront of not only the financial crisis, but also the broader economic downturn. Residential construction jobs peaked in 2006, as did residential investment. The total economy peaked in December 2007, the start of the recession, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. The drop in general economic activity was slow at first, but it accelerated in the fall of 2008 when financial market stress reached a peak. The US GDP plummeted by 4.3 percent from peak to trough, making this the greatest recession since World War II. It was also the most time-consuming, spanning eighteen months. From less than 5% to 10%, the jobless rate has more than doubled.
The FOMC cut its federal funds rate objective from 4.5 percent at the end of 2007 to 2 percent at the start of September 2008 in response to worsening economic conditions. The FOMC hastened its interest rate decreases as the financial crisis and economic contraction worsened in the fall of 2008, bringing the rate to its effective floor a target range of 0 to 25 basis points by the end of the year. The Federal Reserve also launched the first of several large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs in November 2008, purchasing mortgage-backed assets and longer-term Treasury securities. These purchases were made with the goal of lowering long-term interest rates and improving financial conditions in general, hence boosting economic activity (Bernanke 2012).
Although the recession ended in June 2009, the economy remained poor. Economic growth was relatively mild in the first four years of the recovery, averaging around 2%, and unemployment, particularly long-term unemployment, remained at historically high levels. In the face of this sustained weakness, the Federal Reserve kept the federal funds rate goal at an unusually low level and looked for new measures to provide extra monetary accommodation. Additional LSAP programs, often known as quantitative easing, or QE, were among them. In its public pronouncements, the FOMC began conveying its goals for future policy settings more fully, including the situations in which very low interest rates were likely to be appropriate. For example, the committee stated in December 2012 that exceptionally low interest rates would likely remain appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remained above a threshold of 6.5 percent and inflation remained no more than a half percentage point above the committee’s longer-run goal of 2 percent. This “forward guidance” technique was meant to persuade the public that interest rates would remain low at least until specific economic conditions were met, exerting downward pressure on longer-term rates.
Effects on Financial Regulation
When the financial market upheaval calmed, the focus naturally shifted to financial sector changes, including supervision and regulation, in order to avoid such events in the future. To lessen the risk of financial difficulty, a number of solutions have been proposed or implemented. The amount of needed capital for traditional banks has increased significantly, with bigger increases for so-called “systemically essential” institutions (Bank for International Settlements 2011a;2011b). For the first time, liquidity criteria will legally limit the amount of maturity transformation that banks can perform (Bank for International Settlements 2013). As conditions worsen, regular stress testing will help both banks and regulators recognize risks and will require banks to spend earnings to create capital rather than pay dividends (Board of Governors 2011).
New provisions for the treatment of large financial institutions were included in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. The Financial Stability Oversight Council, for example, has the authority to classify unconventional credit intermediaries as “Systemically Important Financial Institutions” (SIFIs), putting them under Federal Reserve supervision. The act also established the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), which authorizes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to wind down specific institutions if their failure would pose a significant risk to the financial system. Another section of the legislation mandates that large financial institutions develop “living wills,” which are detailed plans outlining how the institution could be resolved under US bankruptcy law without endangering the financial system or requiring government assistance.
The financial crisis of 2008 and the accompanying recession, like the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Inflation of the 1970s, are important areas of research for economists and policymakers. While it may be years before the causes and ramifications of these events are fully known, the attempt to unravel them provides a valuable opportunity for the Federal Reserve and other agencies to acquire lessons that can be used to shape future policy.
When did the Great Recession begin and end?
The Great Recession lasted from December 2007 to June 2009, making it the longest downturn since World War II. The Great Recession was particularly painful in various ways, despite its short duration. From its peak in 2007Q4 to its bottom in 2009Q2, real gross domestic product (GDP) plummeted 4.3 percent, the greatest drop in the postwar era (based on data as of October 2013). The unemployment rate grew from 5% in December 2007 to 9.5 percent in June 2009, before peaking at 10% in October 2009.
The financial repercussions of the Great Recession were also disproportionate: home prices plummeted 30% on average from their peak in mid-2006 to mid-2009, while the S&P 500 index dropped 57% from its peak in October 2007 to its trough in March 2009. The net worth of US individuals and charity organizations dropped from around $69 trillion in 2007 to around $55 trillion in 2009.
As the financial crisis and recession worsened, worldwide policies aimed at reviving economic growth were enacted. Like many other countries, the United States enacted economic stimulus measures that included a variety of government expenditures and tax cuts. The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 were two of these projects.
The Federal Reserve’s response to the financial crisis varied over time and included a variety of unconventional approaches. Initially, the Federal Reserve used “conventional” policy actions by lowering the federal funds rate from 5.25 percent in September 2007 to a range of 0-0.25 percent in December 2008, with the majority of the drop taking place between January and March 2008 and September and December 2008. The significant drop in those periods represented a significant downgrading in the economic outlook, as well as increasing downside risks to output and inflation (including the risk of deflation).
By December 2008, the federal funds rate had reached its effective lower bound, and the FOMC had begun to utilize its policy statement to provide future guidance for the rate. The phrasing mentioned keeping the rate at historically low levels “for some time” and later “for an extended period” (Board of Governors 2008). (Board of Governors 2009a). The goal of this guidance was to provide monetary stimulus through lowering the term structure of interest rates, raising inflation expectations (or lowering the likelihood of deflation), and lowering real interest rates. With the sluggish and shaky recovery from the Great Recession, the forward guidance was tightened by adding more explicit conditionality on specific economic variables such as inflation “low rates of resource utilization, stable inflation expectations, and tame inflation trends” (Board of Governors 2009b). Following that, in August 2011, the explicit calendar guidance of “At least through mid-2013, the federal funds rate will remain at exceptionally low levels,” followed by economic-threshold-based guidance for raising the funds rate from its zero lower bound, with the thresholds based on the unemployment rate and inflationary conditions (Board of Governors 2012). This forward guidance is an extension of the Federal Reserve’s conventional approach of influencing the funds rate’s current and future direction.
The Fed pursued two more types of policy in addition to forward guidance “During the Great Recession, unorthodox” policy initiatives were taken. Credit easing programs, as explored in more detail in “Federal Reserve Credit Programs During the Meltdown,” were one set of unorthodox policies that aimed to facilitate credit flows and lower credit costs.
The large scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs were another set of non-traditional policies. The asset purchases were done with the federal funds rate near zero to help lower longer-term public and private borrowing rates. The Federal Reserve said in November 2008 that it would buy US agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and debt issued by housing-related US government agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan banks). 1 The asset selection was made in part to lower the cost and increase the availability of finance for home purchases. These purchases aided the housing market, which was at the heart of the crisis and recession, as well as improving broader financial conditions. The Fed initially planned to acquire up to $500 billion in agency MBS and $100 billion in agency debt, with the program being expanded in March 2009 and finished in 2010. The FOMC also announced a $300 billion program to buy longer-term Treasury securities in March 2009, which was completed in October 2009, just after the Great Recession ended, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. The Federal Reserve purchased approximately $1.75 trillion of longer-term assets under these programs and their expansions (commonly known as QE1), with the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet increasing by slightly less because some securities on the balance sheet were maturing at the same time.
However, real GDP is only a little over 4.5 percent above its prior peak as of this writing in 2013, and the jobless rate remains at 7.3 percent. With the federal funds rate at zero and the current recovery slow and sluggish, the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy plan has evolved in an attempt to stimulate the economy and meet its statutory mandate. The Fed has continued to change its communication policies and implement more LSAP programs since the end of the Great Recession, including a $600 billion Treasuries-only purchase program in 2010-11 (often known as QE2) and an outcome-based purchase program that began in September 2012. (in addition, there was a maturity extension program in 2011-12 where the Fed sold shorter-maturity Treasury securities and purchased longer-term Treasuries). Furthermore, the increasing attention on financial stability and regulatory reform, the economic consequences of the European sovereign debt crisis, and the restricted prospects for global growth in 2013 and 2014 reflect how the Great Recession’s fallout is still being felt today.
How long was the Great Recession of 2008?
Between 2007 and 2009, the Great Recession was a period of substantial overall deterioration (recession) in national economies around the world. The severity and timing of the recession differed by country (see map). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) declared it the worst economic and financial crisis since the Great Depression at the time. As a result, normal international ties were severely disrupted.
The Great Recession was triggered by a combination of financial system vulnerabilities and a series of triggering events that began with the implosion of the United States housing bubble in 20052012. In 20072008, when property values collapsed and homeowners began to default on their mortgages, the value of mortgage-backed assets held by investment banks fell, prompting some to fail or be bailed out. The subprime mortgage crisis occurred between 2007 and 2008. The Great Recession began in the United States officially in December 2007 and lasted for 19 months, due to banks’ inability to give financing to businesses and households’ preference for paying off debt rather than borrowing and spending. Except for tiny signs in the sudden rise of forecast probabilities, which were still significantly below 50%, it appears that no known formal theoretical or empirical model was able to effectively foresee the progression of this recession, as with most earlier recessions.
While most of the world’s developed economies, particularly in North America, South America, and Europe, experienced a severe, long-term recession, many more recently developed economies, particularly China, India, and Indonesia, experienced far less impact, with their economies growing significantly during this time. Oceania, meanwhile, was spared the brunt of the damage, thanks to its proximity to Asian markets.
Who were the hardest hit by the Great Recession?
Rising unemployment, dropping property values, and the stock market decline all had an impact on those approaching retirement, either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, many elderly persons who were not directly impacted by the recession had children or other relatives who were. For many older persons, the recession’s financial difficulties resulted in changes in wealth and spending patterns, as well as physical and mental health issues with long-term effects.
Is there going to be a recession in 2021?
Unfortunately, a worldwide economic recession in 2021 appears to be a foregone conclusion. The coronavirus has already wreaked havoc on businesses and economies around the world, and experts predict that the devastation will only get worse. Fortunately, there are methods to prepare for a downturn in the economy: live within your means.
Is a recession in 2020 likely?
Domestic demand and supply, commerce, and finance are all expected to be significantly disrupted in advanced economies by 2020, resulting in a 7% drop in economic activity. This year, emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) are predicted to fall by 2.5 percent, the first time in at least sixty years. Per capita incomes are predicted to fall by 3.6 percent this year, plunging millions more people into poverty.
The damage is being felt most acutely in nations where the pandemic has been the most severe and where global trade, tourism, commodity exports, and external financing are heavily reliant. While the severity of the disruption will differ by location, all EMDEs have vulnerabilities that are exacerbated by external shocks. Furthermore, disruptions in education and primary healthcare are likely to have long-term consequences for human capital development.
Global growth is forecast to rebound to 4.2 percent in 2021, with advanced economies growing 3.9 percent and EMDEs growing 4.6 percent, according to the baseline forecast, which assumes that the pandemic recedes sufficiently to allow the lifting of domestic mitigation measures by mid-year in advanced economies and a bit later in EMDEs, that adverse global spillovers ease during the second half of the year, and that financial market dislocations are not long-lasting. However, the future is bleak, and negative risks abound, including the likelihood of a longer-lasting epidemic, financial turmoil, and a pullback from global commerce and supply chains. In a worst-case scenario, the world economy might fall by as much as 8% this year, followed by a sluggish recovery of just over 1% in 2021, with output in EMDEs contracting by about 5% this year.
The GDP of the United States is expected to fall by 6.1 percent this year, owing to the interruptions caused by pandemic-control measures. As a result of widespread epidemics, output in the Euro Area is predicted to fall 9.1 percent in 2020. The Japanese economy is expected to contract by 6.1 percent as a result of preventative measures that have hampered economic activity.
Key features of this historic economic shock are addressed in analytical sections in this edition of Global Economic Prospects:
- What will the depth of the COVID-19 recession be? A study of 183 economies from 1870 through 2021 provides a historical perspective on global recessions.
- Scenarios of potential growth outcomes: Near-term growth estimates are unusually uncertain; various scenarios are investigated.
- How does the pandemic’s impact be exacerbated by informality? The pandemic’s health and economic implications are anticipated to be severe in countries where informality is widespread.
- The situation in low-income countries: The pandemic is wreaking havoc on the poorest countries’ people and economies.
- Regional macroeconomic implications: Each region is vulnerable to the epidemic and the ensuing downturn in its own way.
- Impact on global value chains: Global value chain disruptions can magnify the pandemic’s shocks to trade, production, and financial markets.
- Deep recessions are likely to harm investment in the long run, destroy human capital through unemployment, and promote a retreat from global trade and supply links. (June 2nd edition)
- The Consequences of Low-Cost Oil: Low oil prices, resulting from a historic decline in demand, are unlikely to mitigate the pandemic’s consequences, but they may provide some support during the recovery. (June 2nd edition)
The pandemic emphasizes the urgent need for health and economic policy action, particularly global cooperation, to mitigate its effects, protect vulnerable populations, and build countries’ capacities to prevent and respond to future crises. Strengthening public health systems, addressing difficulties posed by informality and weak safety nets, and enacting reforms to promote robust and sustainable growth are vital for rising market and developing countries, which are particularly vulnerable.
If the pandemic’s effects persist, emerging market and developing economies with fiscal space and reasonable financing circumstances may seek extra stimulus. This should be supported by actions that help restore medium-term fiscal sustainability in a credible manner, such as strengthening fiscal frameworks, increasing domestic revenue mobilization and expenditure efficiency, and improving fiscal and debt transparency. Transparency of all government financial commitments, debt-like instruments, and investments is a critical step toward fostering a favorable investment climate, and it may be achieved this year.
East Asia and the Pacific: The region’s growth is expected to slow to 0.5 percent in 2020, the lowest pace since 1967, due to the pandemic’s interruptions. See the regional overview for further information.
Europe and Central Asia: The regional economy is expected to fall by 4.7 percent, with practically all nations experiencing recessions. See the regional overview for further information.
Latin America and the Caribbean: Pandemic-related shocks will produce a 7.2 percent drop in regional economic activity in 2020.
See the regional overview for further information.
Middle East and North Africa: As a result of the pandemic and oil market changes, economic activity in the Middle East and North Africa is expected to fall by 4.2 percent. See the regional overview for further information.
South Asia: The region’s economy is expected to fall by 2.7 percent in 2020 as pandemic preparedness measures stifle consumption and services, and uncertainty about the virus’s trajectory chills private investment. See the regional overview for further information.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s economy is expected to decline by 2.8 percent in 2020, the steepest contraction on record. See the regional overview for further information.
How many recessions has the United States experienced?
A recession is defined as a two-quarters or longer decline in economic growth as measured by the gross domestic product (GDP). Since World War II and up until the COVID-19 epidemic, the US economy has endured 12 different recessions, beginning with an eight-month depression in 1945 and ending with the longest run of economic expansion on record.
Recessions in the United States have lasted an average of 10 months, while expansions have averaged 57 months.
What was the country’s longest recession?
The greatest recession since the Great Depression resulted from strict monetary policies aimed at lowering inflation. Unemployment in the manufacturing, auto, and construction industries increased by roughly 4% from 1981 and 1982. In October 1982, Fed chairman Paul Volcker defied congressional demands to ease monetary policy, resulting in a 5% decline in inflation and the end of the recession.
What happened during the financial crisis of 2008?
In 2008, the stock market plummeted. The Dow had one of the most significant point declines in history. Congress passed the Struggling Asset Relief Scheme (TARP) to empower the US Treasury to implement a major rescue program for troubled banks. The goal was to avoid a national and global economic meltdown.