Margaret Thatcher was the freshly elected leader of the opposition, and Harold Wilson was the prime minister. The first cricket world cup final was held at Lord’s, David Bowie released Young Americans, and inflation hit a post-war high of more than 25%. That was Britain in 1975, when the economy experienced a double-dip recession for the first time.
Until now, at the very least. The Office for National Statistics is set to reveal growth estimates for November on Friday, indicating that the UK is on track to decrease in the final three months of 2020. The four-week lockdown in England, which ended in early December, hurt an economy that was already losing steam in early October.
When was the last major recession in the United Kingdom?
RECOVERY OF THE ECONOMY The UK economy officially emerged from recession in the fourth quarter of 2009, after six quarters of negative growth. In the third quarter of 2008, the economy entered a technical recession as GDP declined for the second quarter in a row.
What triggered the UK recession in 2008?
In September 2008, Lehman Brothers, one of the world’s largest financial organizations, went bankrupt in a matter of weeks; the value of Britain’s largest corporations was wiped out in a single day; and cash ATMs were rumored to be running out.
When did it begin?
Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. This is widely regarded as the official start of the economic crisis. There would be no bailout, according to then-President George W. Bush. “Lehman Brothers, one of the world’s oldest, wealthiest, and most powerful investment banks, was not too big to fail,” the Telegraph reports.
What caused the 2008 financial crash?
The financial crisis of 2008 has deep roots, but it wasn’t until September 2008 that the full extent of its consequences became clear to the rest of the globe.
According to Scott Newton, emeritus professor of modern British and international history at the University of Cardiff, the immediate trigger was a combination of speculative activity in financial markets, with a particular focus on property transactions particularly in the United States and Western Europe and the availability of cheap credit.
“A massive amount of money was borrowed to fund what appeared to be a one-way bet on rising property values.” However, the boom was short-lived since, starting around 2005, the gap between income and debt began to expand. This was brought about by growing energy prices on worldwide markets, which resulted in a rise in global inflation.
“Borrowers were squeezed as a result of this trend, with many struggling to repay their mortgages. Property prices have now begun to decrease, causing the value of many banking institutions’ holdings to plummet. The banking sectors of the United States and the United Kingdom were on the verge of collapsing and had to be rescued by government action.”
“Excessive financial liberalisation, backed by a drop in regulation, from the late twentieth century was underpinned by trust in the efficiency of markets,” says Martin Daunton, emeritus professor of economic history at the University of Cambridge.
Where did the crisis start?
“The crash first hit the United States’ banking and financial system, with spillovers throughout Europe,” Daunton adds. “Another crisis emerged here, this time involving sovereign debt, as a result of the eurozone’s defective design, which allowed nations like Greece to borrow on similar conditions to Germany in the expectation that the eurozone would bail out the debtors.
“When the crisis struck, the European Central Bank declined to reschedule or mutualize debt, instead offering a bailout package – on the condition that the afflicted countries implement austerity policies.”
Was the 2008 financial crisis predicted?
Ann Pettifor, a UK-based author and economist, projected an Anglo-American debt-deflationary disaster in 2003 as editor of The Real World Economic Outlook. Following that, The Coming First World Debt Crisis (2006), which became a best-seller following the global financial crisis, was published.
“The crash caught economists and observers off guard since most of them were brought up to regard the free market order as the only workable economic model available,” Newton adds. The demise of the Soviet Union and China’s conversion to capitalism, as well as financial advancements, reinforced this conviction.”
Was the 2008 financial crisis unusual in being so sudden and so unexpected?
“There was a smug notion that crises were a thing of the past, and that there was a ‘great moderation’ – the idea that macroeconomic volatility had diminished over the previous 20 or so years,” says Daunton.
“Inflation and output fluctuation had decreased to half of what it had been in the 1980s, reducing economic uncertainty for individuals and businesses and stabilizing employment.
“In 2004, Ben Bernanke, a Federal Reserve governor who served as chairman from 2006 to 2014, believed that a variety of structural improvements had improved economies’ ability to absorb shocks, and that macroeconomic policy particularly monetary policy had improved inflation control significantly.
“Bernanke did not take into account the financial sector’s instability when congratulating himself on the Fed’s successful management of monetary policy (and nor were most of his fellow economists). Those who believe that an economy is intrinsically prone to shocks, on the other hand, could see the dangers.”
Newton also mentions the 2008 financial crisis “The property crash of the late 1980s and the currency crises of the late 1990s were both more abrupt than the two prior catastrophes of the post-1979 era. This is largely due to the central role that major capitalist governments’ banks play. These institutions lend significant sums of money to one another, as well as to governments, enterprises, and individuals.
“Given the advent of 24-hour and computerized trading, as well as continuous financial sector deregulation, a big financial crisis in capitalist centers as large as the United States and the United Kingdom was bound to spread quickly throughout global markets and banking systems. It was also unavoidable that monetary flows would suddenly stop flowing.”
How closely did the events of 2008 mirror previous economic crises, such as the Wall Street Crash of 1929?
According to Newton, there are certain parallels with 1929 “The most prominent of these are irresponsible speculation, credit reliance, and extremely unequal wealth distribution.
“The Wall Street Crash, on the other hand, spread more slowly over the world than its predecessor in 200708. Currency and banking crises erupted in Europe, Australia, and Latin America, but not until the 1930s or even later. Bank failures occurred in the United States in 193031, but the big banking crisis did not come until late 1932 and early 1933.”
Dr. Linda Yueh, an Oxford University and London Business School economist, adds, “Every crisis is unique, but this one resembled the Great Crash of 1929 in several ways. Both stocks in 1929 and housing in 2008 show the perils of having too much debt in asset markets.”
Daunton draws a distinction between the two crises, saying: “Overconfidence followed by collapse is a common pattern in crises, but the ones in 1929 and 2008 were marked by different fault lines and tensions. In the 1930s, the state was much smaller, which limited its ability to act, and international financial flows were negligible.
“There were also monetary policy discrepancies. Britain and America acquired monetary policy sovereignty by quitting the gold standard in 1931 and 1933. The Germans and the French, on the other hand, stuck to gold, which slowed their comeback.
“In 1929, the postwar settlement impeded international cooperation: Britain resented her debt to the US, while Germany despised having to pay war reparations. Meanwhile, primary producers have been impacted hard by the drop in food and raw material prices, as well as Europe’s move toward self-sufficiency.”
How did politicians and policymakers try to ‘solve’ the 2008 financial crisis?
According to Newton, policymakers initially responded well. “Governments did not employ public spending cuts to reduce debt, following the theories of John Maynard Keynes. Instead, there were small national reflations, which were intended to keep economic activity and employment going while also replenishing bank and corporate balance sheets.
“These packages were complemented by a significant increase in the IMF’s resources to help countries with severe deficits and offset pressures on them to cut back, which may lead to a trade downturn. These actions, taken together, averted a significant worldwide output and employment decline.
“Outside of the United States, these tactics had been largely abandoned in favor of ‘austerity,’ which entails drastic cuts in government spending. Austerity slowed national and international growth, particularly in the United Kingdom and the eurozone. It did not, however, cause a downturn, thanks in large part to China’s huge investment, which consumed 45 percent more cement between 2011 and 2013 than the United States had used in the whole twentieth century.”
Daunton goes on to say: “Quantitative easing was successful in preventing the crisis from being as severe as it was during the Great Depression. The World Trade Organization’s international institutions also played a role in averting a trade war. However, historians may point to frustrations that occurred as a result of the decision to bail out the banking sector, as well as the impact of austerity on the quality of life of residents.”
What were the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis?
In the short term, a massive bailout governments injecting billions into failing banks prevented the financial system from collapsing completely. The crash’s long-term consequences were enormous: lower wages, austerity, and severe political instability. We’re still dealing with the fallout ten years later.
How long did it take to recover from the financial crisis of 2008?
When the decade-long expansion in US housing market activity peaked in 2006, the Great Moderation came to an end, and residential development began to decline. Losses on mortgage-related financial assets began to burden global financial markets in 2007, and the US economy entered a recession in December 2007. Several prominent financial firms were in financial difficulties that year, and several financial markets were undergoing substantial upheaval. The Federal Reserve responded by providing liquidity and support through a variety of measures aimed at improving the functioning of financial markets and institutions and, as a result, limiting the damage to the US economy. 1 Nonetheless, the economic downturn deteriorated in the fall of 2008, eventually becoming severe and long enough to be dubbed “the Great Recession.” While the US economy reached bottom in the middle of 2009, the recovery in the years that followed was exceptionally slow in certain ways. In response to the severity of the downturn and the slow pace of recovery that followed, the Federal Reserve provided unprecedented monetary accommodation. Furthermore, the financial crisis prompted a slew of important banking and financial regulation reforms, as well as congressional legislation that had a substantial impact on the Federal Reserve.
Rise and Fall of the Housing Market
Following a long period of expansion in US house building, home prices, and housing loans, the recession and crisis struck. This boom began in the 1990s and accelerated in the mid-2000s, continuing unabated through the 2001 recession. Between 1998 and 2006, average home prices in the United States more than doubled, the largest increase in US history, with even bigger advances in other locations. During this time, home ownership increased from 64 percent in 1994 to 69 percent in 2005, while residential investment increased from around 4.5 percent of US GDP to nearly 6.5 percent. Employment in housing-related sectors contributed for almost 40% of net private sector job creation between 2001 and 2005.
The development of the housing market was accompanied by an increase in household mortgage borrowing in the United States. Household debt in the United States increased from 61 percent of GDP in 1998 to 97 percent in 2006. The rise in home mortgage debt appears to have been fueled by a number of causes. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) maintained a low federal funds rate after the 2001 recession, and some observers believe that by keeping interest rates low for a “long period” and only gradually increasing them after 2004, the Federal Reserve contributed to the expansion of housing market activity (Taylor 2007). Other researchers, on the other hand, believe that such variables can only explain for a small part of the rise in housing activity (Bernanke 2010). Furthermore, historically low interest rates may have been influenced by significant savings accumulations in some developing market economies, which acted to keep interest rates low globally (Bernanke 2005). Others attribute the surge in borrowing to the expansion of the mortgage-backed securities market. Borrowers who were deemed a bad credit risk in the past, maybe due to a poor credit history or an unwillingness to make a big down payment, found it difficult to get mortgages. However, during the early and mid-2000s, lenders offered high-risk, or “subprime,” mortgages, which were bundled into securities. As a result, there was a significant increase in access to housing financing, which helped to drive the ensuing surge in demand that drove up home prices across the country.
Effects on the Financial Sector
The extent to which home prices might eventually fall became a significant question for the pricing of mortgage-related securities after they peaked in early 2007, according to the Federal Housing Finance Agency House Price Index, because large declines in home prices were viewed as likely to lead to an increase in mortgage defaults and higher losses to holders of such securities. Large, nationwide drops in home prices were uncommon in US historical data, but the run-up in home prices was unique in terms of magnitude and extent. Between the first quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2011, property values declined by more than a fifth on average across the country. As financial market participants faced significant uncertainty regarding the frequency of losses on mortgage-related assets, this drop in home values contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-08. Money market investors became concerned of subprime mortgage exposures in August 2007, putting pressure on certain financial markets, particularly the market for asset-backed commercial paper (Covitz, Liang, and Suarez 2009). The investment bank Bear Stearns was bought by JPMorgan Chase with the help of the Federal Reserve in the spring of 2008. Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in September, and the Federal Reserve aided AIG, a significant insurance and financial services firm, the next day. The Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation were all approached by Citigroup and Bank of America for assistance.
The Federal Reserve’s assistance to specific financial firms was hardly the only instance of central bank credit expansion in reaction to the crisis. The Federal Reserve also launched a slew of new lending programs to help a variety of financial institutions and markets. A credit facility for “primary dealers,” the broker-dealers that act as counterparties to the Fed’s open market operations, as well as lending programs for money market mutual funds and the commercial paper market, were among them. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which was launched in collaboration with the US Department of Treasury, was aimed to relieve credit conditions for families and enterprises by offering credit to US holders of high-quality asset-backed securities.
To avoid an increase in bank reserves that would drive the federal funds rate below its objective as banks attempted to lend out their excess reserves, the Federal Reserve initially funded the expansion of Federal Reserve credit by selling Treasury securities. The Federal Reserve, on the other hand, got the right to pay banks interest on their excess reserves in October 2008. This encouraged banks to keep their reserves rather than lending them out, reducing the need for the Federal Reserve to offset its increased lending with asset reductions.2
Effects on the Broader Economy
The housing industry was at the forefront of not only the financial crisis, but also the broader economic downturn. Residential construction jobs peaked in 2006, as did residential investment. The total economy peaked in December 2007, the start of the recession, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. The drop in general economic activity was slow at first, but it accelerated in the fall of 2008 when financial market stress reached a peak. The US GDP plummeted by 4.3 percent from peak to trough, making this the greatest recession since World War II. It was also the most time-consuming, spanning eighteen months. From less than 5% to 10%, the jobless rate has more than doubled.
The FOMC cut its federal funds rate objective from 4.5 percent at the end of 2007 to 2 percent at the start of September 2008 in response to worsening economic conditions. The FOMC hastened its interest rate decreases as the financial crisis and economic contraction worsened in the fall of 2008, bringing the rate to its effective floor a target range of 0 to 25 basis points by the end of the year. The Federal Reserve also launched the first of several large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs in November 2008, purchasing mortgage-backed assets and longer-term Treasury securities. These purchases were made with the goal of lowering long-term interest rates and improving financial conditions in general, hence boosting economic activity (Bernanke 2012).
Although the recession ended in June 2009, the economy remained poor. Economic growth was relatively mild in the first four years of the recovery, averaging around 2%, and unemployment, particularly long-term unemployment, remained at historically high levels. In the face of this sustained weakness, the Federal Reserve kept the federal funds rate goal at an unusually low level and looked for new measures to provide extra monetary accommodation. Additional LSAP programs, often known as quantitative easing, or QE, were among them. In its public pronouncements, the FOMC began conveying its goals for future policy settings more fully, including the situations in which very low interest rates were likely to be appropriate. For example, the committee stated in December 2012 that exceptionally low interest rates would likely remain appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remained above a threshold of 6.5 percent and inflation remained no more than a half percentage point above the committee’s longer-run goal of 2 percent. This “forward guidance” technique was meant to persuade the public that interest rates would remain low at least until specific economic conditions were met, exerting downward pressure on longer-term rates.
Effects on Financial Regulation
When the financial market upheaval calmed, the focus naturally shifted to financial sector changes, including supervision and regulation, in order to avoid such events in the future. To lessen the risk of financial difficulty, a number of solutions have been proposed or implemented. The amount of needed capital for traditional banks has increased significantly, with bigger increases for so-called “systemically essential” institutions (Bank for International Settlements 2011a;2011b). For the first time, liquidity criteria will legally limit the amount of maturity transformation that banks can perform (Bank for International Settlements 2013). As conditions worsen, regular stress testing will help both banks and regulators recognize risks and will require banks to spend earnings to create capital rather than pay dividends (Board of Governors 2011).
New provisions for the treatment of large financial institutions were included in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. The Financial Stability Oversight Council, for example, has the authority to classify unconventional credit intermediaries as “Systemically Important Financial Institutions” (SIFIs), putting them under Federal Reserve supervision. The act also established the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), which authorizes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to wind down specific institutions if their failure would pose a significant risk to the financial system. Another section of the legislation mandates that large financial institutions develop “living wills,” which are detailed plans outlining how the institution could be resolved under US bankruptcy law without endangering the financial system or requiring government assistance.
The financial crisis of 2008 and the accompanying recession, like the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Inflation of the 1970s, are important areas of research for economists and policymakers. While it may be years before the causes and ramifications of these events are fully known, the attempt to unravel them provides a valuable opportunity for the Federal Reserve and other agencies to acquire lessons that can be used to shape future policy.
What triggered the financial crisis of 2008?
Deregulation in the financial industry was the primary cause of the financial catastrophe. This allowed banks to engage in derivatives-based hedge fund trading. When derivatives’ values plummeted, banks stopped lending to one another. As a result, the financial crisis erupted, resulting in the Great Recession.
In 2008, how much did the economy contract?
GDP declined by 6.9% during the global financial crisis, from its high in February 2008 to its lowest point in March 2009, a period of 13 months.
Is a recession in 2020 likely?
Domestic demand and supply, commerce, and finance are all expected to be significantly disrupted in advanced economies by 2020, resulting in a 7% drop in economic activity. This year, emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) are predicted to fall by 2.5 percent, the first time in at least sixty years. Per capita incomes are predicted to fall by 3.6 percent this year, plunging millions more people into poverty.
The damage is being felt most acutely in nations where the pandemic has been the most severe and where global trade, tourism, commodity exports, and external financing are heavily reliant. While the severity of the disruption will differ by location, all EMDEs have vulnerabilities that are exacerbated by external shocks. Furthermore, disruptions in education and primary healthcare are likely to have long-term consequences for human capital development.
Global growth is forecast to rebound to 4.2 percent in 2021, with advanced economies growing 3.9 percent and EMDEs growing 4.6 percent, according to the baseline forecast, which assumes that the pandemic recedes sufficiently to allow the lifting of domestic mitigation measures by mid-year in advanced economies and a bit later in EMDEs, that adverse global spillovers ease during the second half of the year, and that financial market dislocations are not long-lasting. However, the future is bleak, and negative risks abound, including the likelihood of a longer-lasting epidemic, financial turmoil, and a pullback from global commerce and supply chains. In a worst-case scenario, the world economy might fall by as much as 8% this year, followed by a sluggish recovery of just over 1% in 2021, with output in EMDEs contracting by about 5% this year.
The GDP of the United States is expected to fall by 6.1 percent this year, owing to the interruptions caused by pandemic-control measures. As a result of widespread epidemics, output in the Euro Area is predicted to fall 9.1 percent in 2020. The Japanese economy is expected to contract by 6.1 percent as a result of preventative measures that have hampered economic activity.
Key features of this historic economic shock are addressed in analytical sections in this edition of Global Economic Prospects:
- What will the depth of the COVID-19 recession be? A study of 183 economies from 1870 through 2021 provides a historical perspective on global recessions.
- Scenarios of potential growth outcomes: Near-term growth estimates are unusually uncertain; various scenarios are investigated.
- How does the pandemic’s impact be exacerbated by informality? The pandemic’s health and economic implications are anticipated to be severe in countries where informality is widespread.
- The situation in low-income countries: The pandemic is wreaking havoc on the poorest countries’ people and economies.
- Regional macroeconomic implications: Each region is vulnerable to the epidemic and the ensuing downturn in its own way.
- Impact on global value chains: Global value chain disruptions can magnify the pandemic’s shocks to trade, production, and financial markets.
- Deep recessions are likely to harm investment in the long run, destroy human capital through unemployment, and promote a retreat from global trade and supply links. (June 2nd edition)
- The Consequences of Low-Cost Oil: Low oil prices, resulting from a historic decline in demand, are unlikely to mitigate the pandemic’s consequences, but they may provide some support during the recovery. (June 2nd edition)
The pandemic emphasizes the urgent need for health and economic policy action, particularly global cooperation, to mitigate its effects, protect vulnerable populations, and build countries’ capacities to prevent and respond to future crises. Strengthening public health systems, addressing difficulties posed by informality and weak safety nets, and enacting reforms to promote robust and sustainable growth are vital for rising market and developing countries, which are particularly vulnerable.
If the pandemic’s effects persist, emerging market and developing economies with fiscal space and reasonable financing circumstances may seek extra stimulus. This should be supported by actions that help restore medium-term fiscal sustainability in a credible manner, such as strengthening fiscal frameworks, increasing domestic revenue mobilization and expenditure efficiency, and improving fiscal and debt transparency. Transparency of all government financial commitments, debt-like instruments, and investments is a critical step toward fostering a favorable investment climate, and it may be achieved this year.
East Asia and the Pacific: The region’s growth is expected to slow to 0.5 percent in 2020, the lowest pace since 1967, due to the pandemic’s interruptions. See the regional overview for further information.
Europe and Central Asia: The regional economy is expected to fall by 4.7 percent, with practically all nations experiencing recessions. See the regional overview for further information.
Latin America and the Caribbean: Pandemic-related shocks will produce a 7.2 percent drop in regional economic activity in 2020.
See the regional overview for further information.
Middle East and North Africa: As a result of the pandemic and oil market changes, economic activity in the Middle East and North Africa is expected to fall by 4.2 percent. See the regional overview for further information.
South Asia: The region’s economy is expected to fall by 2.7 percent in 2020 as pandemic preparedness measures stifle consumption and services, and uncertainty about the virus’s trajectory chills private investment. See the regional overview for further information.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s economy is expected to decline by 2.8 percent in 2020, the steepest contraction on record. See the regional overview for further information.
Was there a recession in the UK in the 1990s?
The recession significantly affected job markets across the country, with unemployment climbing from 7.2 percent in October 1989 to 12.1 percent in November 1992; it would take ten years for unemployment to return to its previous level of 7.2 percent (it was reached in October 1999). For example, by December 1992, 16.7% of the active population in Montreal (Quebec) was unemployed, but the number of welfare families climbed from 88,000 to 102,000 between April 1990 and December 1992.
The early 1990s recession was notable for being significantly more negative for employment in Ontario than the early 1980s recession; Ontario’s percentage of total age 15-64 population employed began to decline early in 1989 and only began to grow again early in 1994, after a five-year decline of 8.2 percentage points.
In the early 1980s, on the other hand, Ontario’s employment percentage decline was less than Canada’s overall, with just a 4.4 percentage point contraction.
What led to the UK’s recession in 1990?
High interest rates, declining home values, and an overvalued currency rate were the primary causes of the UK recession of 1991. Membership in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (1990-1992) was a crucial element in maintaining higher-than-desirable interest rates.
The recession occurred following the late 1980s economic boom, which saw significant economic growth and growing prices.
The Lawson Boom Background to Recession
The government permitted the economy to develop at a considerably faster rate than its long-run trend rate during the 1980s. This was because they believed a “supply side miracle” had occurred. They claimed that the government’s supply-side policies allowed the economy to grow faster than before.
During the 1980s, the government kept interest rates low and reduced income taxes, particularly for the wealthy. This aided in the growth of consumer expenditure. In addition, the housing market exploded in the 1980s. The quick rise in home values resulted in a surge in consumer affluence and spending. Consumer confidence has risen dramatically.
Unfortunately, the notion that the economy had undergone a supply-side miracle turned out to be overly optimistic; the majority of economic growth was driven by consumer borrowing and spending. A significant current account deficit and rising prices reflected this.
Inflation and a high current account deficit resulted from growth above the long-run trend rate.
Exchange Rate Mechanism 1990-92
In 1990, the government entered the Exchange Rate Mechanism in order to combat rising inflation. It was hoped that by joining, inflation would be brought under control.
However, as the UK joined the ERM, the economy slowed, and it became increasingly difficult to hold the Pound at its target exchange rate versus the DM.
- Use its foreign exchange reserves to purchase sterling (the UK lost between 3.5 and 21 billion in the ERM).
- Interest rates should be raised. Despite the fact that the economy was in recession, interest rates were 10% in September 1992. In order to maintain the value of the pound, the government boosted rates to 12 percent and even momentarily 15 percent.
- Investors, on the other hand, rightly predicted that these interest rates would not last. Mortgage payments became prohibitively expensive due to high interest rates, and many homeowners suffered a drop in disposable income, resulting in less expenditure.
Despite these efforts to stabilize the currency, speculators outnumbered the government, and the UK was compelled to exit the ERM and devalue. The UK government finally abandoned the ERM after Black Wednesday on September 16, 1992, and the Pound plummeted by 20%, illustrating how much it was overvalued.
High Interest Rates Major Cause of Recession
- Borrowing costs and mortgage interest payments both increased as a result of this. This resulted in lower consumer disposable income, which resulted in less spending and a drop in aggregate demand.
- As a result of many people being unable to afford their mortgage payments, housing prices fell. House prices fell much lower, thus reducing household wealth and AD.
- Many consumers who took out loans in the 1980s now face exorbitant interest rates.
As a result of the recession, the Bank of England’s MPC was eventually given responsibility over interest rate setting. An autonomous Bank of England, it was hoped, would be better at avoiding boom and bust economic cycles.
House prices in 1991 recession
The housing market was booming in the late 1980s, especially in London and the South East. High interest rates and a drop in confidence, on the other hand, prompted a large drop in house values. House prices were decreasing by 10% in 1990 as foreclosure rates increased.
This resulted in a negative wealth effect and a drop in consumer expenditure, further deflationary effects.
Is a recession every seven years?
“Recessions follow expansions as nights follow days,” said Ruchir Sharma, Morgan Stanley Investment Management’s head of emerging markets and global macro. “Over the previous 50 years, we’ve had a worldwide recession once every seven to eight years.”