SNELL: So, Scott, the last time inflation was this high, Ronald Reagan was in the White House, Olivia Newton-John was everywhere on the radio, and the cool new computer was the Commodore 64, which was named after its 64 kilobytes of capacity. Oh, and a new soft drink was set to hit the market.
(Singing) Introducing Diet Coke, UNIDENTIFIED PERSON. You’ll drink it only for the sake of tasting it.
SNELL: Before Diet Coke, there was a period. And, while it feels like a long time ago, Scott, how close are we to having to go through it all again?
HORSLEY: Kelsey, you have to keep in mind that inflation was really decreasing in 1982. It had been significantly higher, nearly twice as high as it was in 1980, when annual inflation reached 14.6 percent…
HORSLEY:…Nearly twice as much as it is now. And inflation had been high for the greater part of a decade at the time. High inflation plagued Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter. And by the time Reagan took office, Americans had grown accustomed to price increases that seemed to go on forever.
REAGAN, RONALD: Now we’ve had two years of double-digit inflation in a row: 13.3% in 1979 and 12.4 percent last year. This happened only once before, during World War I.
HORSLEY: So, in comparison to the inflation rates of the 1970s and early 1980s, today’s inflation rate doesn’t appear to be all that severe.
SO IT WAS COMING DOWN. SNELL: How did policymakers keep inflation under control back then?
HORSLEY: Well, the Federal Reserve provided some fairly unpleasant medication. Paul Volcker, then-Federal Reserve Chairman, was determined to break the back of inflation, and he was willing to raise interest rates to absurdly high levels to do it. To give you an example, mortgage rates reached 18 percent in 1981. As you may expect, that did not go down well. On the backs of wooden planks, enraged homebuilders wrote protest notes to Volcker. The Fed chairman, on the other hand, stuck to his guns. Volcker was interviewed on “The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour.”
PAUL VOLCKER: This dam is going to burst at some point, and the mentality is going to shift.
HORSLEY: Now, some people may believe we’re in for a rerun when they hear the Fed is prepared to hike interest rates once more to keep inflation in check.
HORSLEY: The rate rises we’re talking about now, though, are nothing like Volcker’s severe actions. Keep in mind that interest rates were near zero throughout the pandemic. Even if the Fed raised rates seven times this year, to 2% or something, as some experts currently predict, credit would still be extremely inexpensive by historical standards. The Fed isn’t talking about taking away the punchbowl, just substituting some of the extremely sugary punch with something closer to Diet Coke. The cheap money party has been going on for a long time, and the Fed isn’t talking about stopping it.
SNELL: (laughter) OK, so there are certainly some significant distinctions between today’s inflation and the inflation experienced by the United States in 1982. Is there, however, anything we can learn from that era?
HORSLEY: One thing to remember is that inflation is still a terrible experience. Rising prices have a significant impact on people’s perceptions of the economy, and politicians ignore this at their peril. The growing cost of rent, energy, and groceries – you know, the stuff that most of us can’t live without – were some of the major drivers of inflation last month. Abdul Ture, who works at a store outside of Washington, says his money doesn’t stretch as far as it used to, so he has to shop in smaller, more frequent increments.
ABDUL TURE: Oh no, the costs have increased. Everything has gone to hell on the inside. I now just buy a couple of items that I can utilize for two or three days. I used to be able to buy for a week. But no longer.
HORSLEY: This has an impact on people’s attitudes. Price gains are expected to ease throughout the course of the year, but inflation has already shown to be larger and more persistent than many analysts anticipated.
SNELL: However, a great deal has changed in the last 40 years. Take, for example, my cell phone. It has 100,000 times the memory of the Commodore computer we discussed earlier. Is this to say that inflation isn’t as dangerous as it once was?
HORSLEY: For the most part, it appeared as if the inflation dragon had been slain for the last few decades. Workers, for example, were assumed to have less negotiating leverage in a global economy, limiting their ability to demand greater compensation. Because the economy is no longer as reliant on oil as it was in the 1970s, oil shocks do not have the same impact. However, additional types of supply shocks occurred throughout the pandemic. And when you combine shortages of computer chips, truck drivers, and other personnel with extremely high demand, you’ve got a recipe for price increases.
SNELL: You should know that both Congress and the Federal Reserve injected trillions of dollars into the economy during the pandemic. It was an attempt to defuse the situation. So, how much of that contributed to the current level of inflation?
HORSLEY: That’s something economists will be debating for a long time. Those trillions of dollars did contribute to a fairly quick recovery. Unemployment has dropped from over 15% at the start of the pandemic to 4% presently. Could we have had a faster recovery without the huge inflationary consequences? Jason Furman, a former Obama administration economic adviser, believes that the $1.9 trillion stimulus package passed by Congress this spring went too far, even if it helped to speed up the recovery and put more people back to work.
FURMAN, JASON: I’d rather have high unemployment and low inflation than the other way around. I believe there were probably better options than either of those. I believe that if the stimulus package had been half as large, we would today have nearly the same amount of jobs and much lower inflation. Who knows, though.
HORSLEY: Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell was also questioned about whether the Fed went too far. He claims that historians will have to decide on the wisdom of the central bank’s policies in years to come. In retrospect, his cigar-chomping predecessor, Paul Volcker, looks a lot better. Look out if Powell shows up to his next press appearance with a cigar in his mouth.
OLIVIA NEWTON-JOHN: Let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’ I’d like to engage in some physical activity. Let’s get down to business. Allow me to hear your body language, body language.
When was the highest point in US inflation?
Between 1914 and 2022, the United States’ inflation rate averaged 3.25 percent, with a high of 23.70 percent in June 1920 and a low of -15.80 percent in June 1921.
Has the United States ever experienced hyperinflation?
The trend of inflation in the rest of the world has been quite diverse, as seen in Figure 2, which illustrates inflation rates over the last several decades. Inflation rates were relatively high in many industrialized countries, not only the United States, in the 1970s. In 1975, for example, Japan’s inflation rate was over 8%, while the United Kingdom’s inflation rate was around 25%. Inflation rates in the United States and Europe fell in the 1980s and have mainly been stable since then.
In the 1970s, countries with tightly controlled economies, such as the Soviet Union and China, had historically low measured inflation rates because price increases were prohibited by law, except in circumstances where the government regarded a price increase to be due to quality improvements. These countries, on the other hand, were plagued by constant shortages of products, as prohibiting price increases works as a price limit, resulting in a situation in which demand much outnumbers supply. Although the statistics for these economies should be viewed as slightly shakier, Russia and China suffered outbursts of inflation as they transitioned toward more market-oriented economies. For much of the 1980s and early 1990s, China’s inflation rate was around 10% per year, however it has since declined. In the early 1990s, Russia suffered hyperinflationa period of extremely high inflationover 2,500 percent a year, yet by 2006, Russia’s consumer price inflation had dropped to 10% per year, as seen in Figure 3. The only time the United States came close to hyperinflation was in the Confederate states during the Civil War, from 1860 to 1865.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, many Latin American countries experienced rampant hyperinflation, with annual inflation rates typically exceeding 100%. In 1990, for example, inflation in both Brazil and Argentina surpassed 2000 percent. In the 1990s, several African countries had exceptionally high inflation rates, sometimes bordering on hyperinflation. In 1995, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, experienced a 75 percent inflation rate.
In most countries, the problem of inflation appeared to have subsided in the early 2000s, at least when compared to the worst periods of prior decades. As we mentioned in an earlier Bring it Home feature, the world’s worst example of hyperinflation in recent years was in Zimbabwe, where the government was issuing bills with a face value of $100 trillion (in Zimbabwean dollars) at one pointthat is, the bills had $100,000,000,000,000 written on the front but were nearly worthless. In many nations, double-digit, triple-digit, and even quadruple-digit inflation are still fresh in people’s minds.
Why was 1920’s inflation so high?
“I have no reason to believe there was an over-investment boom in the 1920s,” says the author.
Professor Milton Friedman, in an ongoing exchange of letters with me, urged Austrian school supporters to present proof of an overinvestment boom in the 1920s. He reaffirmed what he and Anna Schwartz found in A Monetary History of the United States: the 1920s were the “high tide” of Federal Reserve policy, with virtually no inflation and moderate economic development. Even monetarists deny that the stock market of 1929 was overvalued! In a nutshell, “everything in the 1920s was fine.” According to Friedman, the problem was not inflation in the 1920s, but rather the “Great Contraction” of the money supply in the 1930s, which drove the economy into the worst slump in US history.
The Austrians, in contrast to Friedman and the Monetarists, contend that the Federal Reserve artificially cheapened credit and staged an unsustainable inflationary bubble throughout the 1920s. As a result, the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing economic disaster were unavoidable.
The fact that Irving Fisher, the most prominent Monetarist of the 1920s, utterly missed the crash, whereas Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek foresaw it but did not name a specific date, is an intriguing historical footnote. Since then, Monetarists have claimed that the 1929-33 financial crisis was unforeseeable and that there were little, if any, warning signs of danger in the 1920s. The Austrians, on the other hand, have attempted to substantiate Mises-claim Hayek’s that the government induced an inflationary boom that could not persist, particularly under an international gold standard.
Was the 1920s a period of overinvestment? Which statistics you look at will determine the answer. The “macro” data supports the Monetarist argument, whereas the “micro” evidence backs up the Austrian position.
The broad-based pricing indexes, which support the Monetarists, indicate little or no inflation in the 1920s. Between 1921 and 1929, average wholesale and consumer prices barely changed. The majority of commodities prices dropped. “Far from being an inflationary decade, the twenties were the polar opposite,” Friedman and Schwartz conclude.
Other evidence, on the other hand, backs up the Austrian opinion that the decade was appropriately termed the Roaring Twenties. Although the 1920s were not marked by “price” inflation, they were marked by “profit” inflation, as John Maynard Keynes put it. Following the Great Depression of the 1920s, national output (GNP) expanded at a rate of 5.2 percent per year, well above the national average (3.0 percent). Between 1921 and 1929, the Index of Manufacturing Production rose at a significantly faster rate, nearly doubling. Capital investment and corporate earnings both increased.
In the United States, as in the 1980s, there was “asset” inflation. In the mid-1920s, there was a nationwide real estate boom, including a speculative bubble in Florida that burst in 1927. Manhattan, the world’s financial capital, saw a surge as well.
On Wall Street, both in stocks and bonds, the asset bubble was most pronounced. The Dow Jones Industrial Average began its colossal bull market in late 1921, at a cyclical low of 66, and went on to reach a high of 300 by mid-1929, more than tripling in value. Industrials were up 321 percent, Railroads were up 129 percent, and Utilities were up an unbelievable 318 percent, according to the Standard & Poor’s Index of Common Stocks.
Surprisingly, the Monetarists reject the existence of any stock market orgy. “Had high employment and economic growth continued, stock market valuations could have been sustained,” Anna Schwartz believes. It’s as if they’re trying to clear Irving Fisher’s name for announcing a week before the 1929 crash that “stock prices have hit what appears to be a permanently high peak.” (The crash wiped away Fisher’s massive leveraged position in Remington Rand stock.)
The thesis of Schwartz is predicated on what appear to be respectable price-earnings ratios for most firms in 1929. (15.6 versus a norm of 13.6). P/E ratios, on the other hand, are a notoriously deceptive measure of speculative activity. While they do rise during a bull market, they grossly underestimate the level of speculation because both prices and incomes rise during a boom. When yearly national output averages 5.2 percent and the S&P Index of Common Stocks rises an average of 18.6 percent each year during the 1920s, something has to give. In fact, the economy increased by only 6.3 percent between 1927 and 1929, whereas common stocks surged by an astonishing 82.2 percent! “Trees don’t grow to the sky,” as the old Wall Street adage goes. A collision was unavoidable.
The Austrians contend that the Federal Reserve’s “cheap-credit” strategy was to blame for the twenties’ structural imbalances, whilst the Monetarists deny that there was any serious inflationary purpose. Between 1921 and 1929, the money stock (M2) increased by 46 percent, or less than 5% a year, which Monetarists do not consider excessive. On the other hand, Austrians point to the Fed’s purposeful efforts to cut interest rates, particularly between 1924 and 1927, resulting in an unjustified boom in assets and manufacturing. More crucially, the expansion of credit in the United States far outpaced the growth of gold reserves, which would mean doom for the gold exchange standard.
In conclusion, was there an inflationary imbalance sufficient to produce an economic crisis in the 1920s? The evidence is mixed, but the Austrians have a strong case. The “cheap credit” stimulus may not have been substantial in the eyes of the Monetarists, but given the fragile nature of the financial system under the international gold standard, modest modifications by the newly constituted central bank provoked a gigantic worldwide earthquake.
In 1982, what was the rate of inflation?
In 1982, the inflation rate was 6.16 percent. The inflation rate in 1982 was greater than the average annual inflation rate of 2.73 percent between 1982 and 2022. The change in the consumer price index is used to calculate inflation (CPI). In 1982, the CPI was 96.50.
Why was 2011’s inflation so high?
In September, the Consumer Price Index, the government’s main gauge of inflation at the retail level, increased by 3.9 percent over the previous year. Higher food and energy prices were once again the main culprits, with food prices up 4.7 percent year over year and energy prices up 19.3 percent.
Even core CPI, which excludes volatile food and energy costs, increased by 2%, putting it at the upper end of the range considered acceptable by the Federal Reserve.
However, there were indicators that the rate of increase was slowing. Prices increased by 0.3 percent month over month, down from 0.4 percent in August. In addition, the monthly core CPI rose by 0.1 percent, down from 0.2 percent the previous month and the smallest increase since March.
This year’s higher costs will result in a 3.6 percent increase in Social Security benefits in 2012, the first since 2009. Seniors did not receive any cost-of-living adjustments in 2010 and 2011 due to low or no inflation following the financial crisis.
What is creating 2021 inflation?
As fractured supply chains combined with increased consumer demand for secondhand vehicles and construction materials, 2021 saw the fastest annual price rise since the early 1980s.
What was the state of the US economy in 1921?
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the recession lasted 18 months, from January 1920 to July 1921. This recession lasted longer than most postWorld War I downturns, but it was shorter than those of 19101912 and 19131914. (24 and 23 months respectively). It lasted a far less time than the Great Depression (132 months). The drop in Gross National Product is also estimated differently. GNP decreased by 6.9%, according to the US Department of Commerce, 3.5 percent according to Nathan Balke and Robert J. Gordon, and 2.4 percent according to Christina Romer. Although there is no legal definition of economic depression, two informal guidelines include a 10% drop in GDP or a recession lasting more than three years, as well as an unemployment rate over 10%.
The 19201921 recession was marked by significant deflation, with the biggest one-year percentage drop in over 140 years of statistics.
According to the Department of Commerce, there will be 18 percent deflation, 13 percent deflation by Balke and Gordon, and 14.8 percent deflation by Romer.
Wholesale prices dropped by 36.8%, the greatest since the American Revolutionary War.
This is the worst year since the Great Depression (although adding all the years of the Great Depression together yields more cumulative deflation).
In absolute terms, the deflation of 192021 was extreme, and it was also extraordinarily extreme given the tiny drop in gross domestic product.
During the recession, unemployment soared.
According to Romer, unemployment increased from 5.2 percent to 8.7 percent, while Stanley Lebergott estimated that it increased from 5.2 percent to 11.7 percent.
Both agree that unemployment declined rapidly following the recession and had restored to a level consistent with full employment by 1923. During the Great Recession, industrial production plummeted dramatically. Automobile output fell by 60% and total industrial production fell by 30% from May 1920 to July 1921. Production quickly recovered after the recession ended. By October 1922, industrial production had recovered to pre-war levels. According to the AT&T Index of Industrial Productivity, the recession of 192021 had the most severe decline and most robust recovery of any recession between 1899 and the Great Depression, with a decline of 29.4 percent followed by a rise of 60.1 percent.
Victor Zarnowitz discovered that the recession of 192021 had the biggest reduction in business activity of any recession between 1873 and the Great Depression, using a variety of indices. (By this metric, Zarnowitz estimates the recession to be only marginally greater than the 18731879 recession, the 18821885, the 18931894, and the 19071908 recessions.)
Was there any inflation in the Roaring Twenties?
Despite the Housewives League’s complaints, records suggest that inflation was low from 1913 to 1915, albeit some cautions are certainly in order when looking at data from that time period. The rate of inflation, on the other hand, accelerated rapidly in 1916. The CPI change over a year increased from 3.3 percent in January to double digits in October. The period following World War I, 19171920, saw continuous inflation unlike any other in the country’s history. From December 1916 to June 1920, prices increased at an annualized pace of 18.5 percent, a total increase of more than 80 percent.