Iran is ranked 123rd on the Prosperity Index overall. Iran has risen two places in the rankings chart since 2011.
PILLAR RANKINGS
Iran is the best in terms of health and living conditions, but the worst in terms of education.
Personal liberty. In comparison to a decade earlier, the most significant improvement was in Social Capital.
What is Iran’s military rank?
Iran is ranked 14th out of 142 nations assessed for the annual GFP assessment in 2022. It has a PwrIndx* score of 0.2104 (a 0.0000 score is regarded “perfect”).
What is Iran’s military might?
In terms of active troops, the Iranian Armed Forces are the largest in the Middle East. Iran’s military forces consist of roughly 610,000 active-duty people plus 350,000 reserve and trained personnel who can be activated as needed, for a total of about 960,000 military personnel. These figures exclude the Law Enforcement Force and the Basij.
The majority of Iran’s imported weapons are American systems purchased before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, with a few purchases from the Soviet Union in the 1990s during the IranIraq War. However, since then, the government has embarked on a comprehensive internal rearmament effort, and its inventory has become increasingly indigenous. According to Iranian officials, the vast majority of the country’s military gear is produced domestically, and by the 2000s, Iran had already established itself as an arms exporter. Iran has invested significant funds in an ambitious ballistic and cruise missile program for long-range strike capability, and has manufactured various types of arms and munitions, including tanks, armoured vehicles, and drones, as well as various naval assets and aerial defense systems, despite being unable to import weapon systems from abroad due to international and US sanctions, and suffering from an increasingly aging air force fleet.
Iran’s ballistic missile and space programs are a hot political matter in the international community, and the country has persistently refused to compromise on them. Iran’s missile program, according to Iranian officials, is not designed to deliver nuclear payloads and is solely used for surgical attacks, and hence is irrelevant to any nuclear talks with the P5+1.
The General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces is in charge of all branches of the armed forces. The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics is in charge of planning logistics and finance for the armed forces, but not of military operational command in the field. The Supreme Leader is the military’s commander-in-chief.
Is Iran a decent place to visit?
Iran is ranked 118th out of 153 countries in the 2020 study, just above the “unhappiest” quintile. The index’s scores are rated among the countries, both overall and by category.
Is Iran a wealthier country than Saudi Arabia?
According to Capgemini’s World Wealth Report, almost 72 percent of HNWIs have invested in cryptocurrencies.
According to Capgemini’s calculations, the rapid rise of millionaires has made Iran the 14th richest country in the world and the wealthiest in the Middle East. Iran is now wealthier than Saudi Arabia, which is ranked 17th with 210,000 millionaires.
Extreme wealth is nothing new in Iran. Because of their opulent lifestyles, children of the wealthy were dubbed “aghazadeh” or “noble-born” in the 1990s. Images of their automobiles and vacations are frequently shared on Instagram these days, with many of them being reposted by the channel Rich Kids of Tehran.
Children of the country’s kings are among them. A great-granddaughter of Iran’s supreme dictator, Ayatollah Khomeini, Atefeh Eshraghi, was once pictured in London clutching a $3,800 purse. Following allegations of nepotism, Kambiz Mehdizadeh, the son-in-law of Iran’s outgoing president, Hassan Rohani, resigned from a high government position in 2018.
However, there are evidence that Iran’s administration is reining in its aghazadeh. Instagram posts with a lot of flash have been less popular in the last year. Iran is even attempting to deport Sasha Sobhani, a popular Instagrammer who was jailed in Spain on money laundering accusations.
The fortunes of Iran’s millionaires, on the other hand, contrast sharply with the country’s impoverished and the wider economy. According to the Islamic Labour Council, more than 60% of Iran’s population lives in relative poverty due to rising living costs. There are no official government poverty statistics.
Following Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 and reimpose sanctions, prices of ordinary commodities skyrocketed. A year later, violent protests against growing living costs erupted across Iran’s major cities.
With inflation approaching 50%, such prices have grown even more. The Covid-19 pandemic, which struck Iran before much of Europe or America, has exacerbated unemployment and poverty in the country.
The news that Iran’s wealthy are becoming wealthier could cause problems for Ebrahim Raisi, Iran’s next president, who will take office in August after a resounding victory in June’s presidential elections.
“Many Iranians are criticizing the regime and are increasingly expressing anger over the stark divide between rich and poor, as well as the economic inequality between the elite and ordinary people,” says Majid Rafizadeh, an Iranian-American political scientist and president of the International American Council.
Rafizadeh adds that the record low voter turnout in June’s elections reflects the public’s dissatisfaction with the government.
President-elect Raisi has backed talks in Vienna for a new nuclear deal with the United States. If the talks go well, sanctions may be lifted, allowing international investment to flow back into the country, boosting the economy as a whole.
But, as Rafizadeh points out, sanctions relief is unlikely to be a quick fix: “Iranian politicians usually attribute the country’s widespread poverty to foreign forces, such as US sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program and financial system.”
“However, extensive financial corruption, cronyism, and nepotism must be seen as major causes to the high levels of poverty.”
Is Iran wealthier than the United Kingdom?
make 2.2 times the amount of money As of 2017, Iran’s GDP per capita was $20,100, while the United Kingdom’s GDP per capita was $44,300.
Why is Iran’s economy shrinking?
The petroleum, agricultural, and service sectors, as well as a noticeable state presence in manufacturing and financial services, define Iran’s economy. Iran has the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and the fourth-largest proven crude oil reserves, and while its economy is rather diversified for an oil exporting country, its economic activity and government revenues are still reliant on oil earnings, making it volatile.
For their 20-year economic vision and five-year growth plan for 2016/17 to 2021/22, the Iranian authorities have embraced a comprehensive policy of market-based reforms. The strategy is built on three pillars: the creation of a robust economy, scientific and technological advancements, and the promotion of cultural excellence. Reform of state-owned firms, the financial and banking sectors, and the allocation and administration of oil income are among its top priorities. The plan predicts an annual economic growth rate of 8%.
Iran is dealing with the consequences of the COVID-19 problem. It remains the worst-affected country in the Middle East and North Africa region, with over 1.7 million illnesses and 61,000 deaths as of mid-March 2021. The number of new, confirmed cases remained steady when additional lockdown measures were implemented in late 2020, and the number of deaths decreased below 100 per day. A progressive easing of lockdown measures, on the other hand, raises the possibility of a fourth wave of COVID-19 cases. Frontline medical professionals began receiving vaccinations in February 2021, but full coverage of Iran’s 84 million inhabitants would take awhile.
For the Iranian calendar year 2020/21, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been estimated at US$628 billion, based on the official exchange rate and a population of around 84 million people. In 2020/21, Iran’s real GDP is expected to expand by 1.7 percent. COVID-19 caused less output loss in Iran than in other countries because the country’s economy had already shrunk by 12% in the previous two years. Both the oil and non-oil sectors recovered faster than predicted in Q3 and Q4-2020, with manufacturing driving the non-oil sector’s revival as exchange rate depreciation made domestic production more competitive.
The COVID-19 pandemic, on the other hand, has had a significant impact on jobs and income in a variety of labor-intensive industries, including high-contact services and the informal sector. Despite the fact that employment levels fell by almost 1 million YoY as a result of the pandemic, discouragement in the labor market, represented in decreased economic participation41.4 percent in Q4-2020dragged the unemployment rate down to 9.4 percent.
COVID-
Iran’s fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio has risen to its highest level in decades as a result of rising spending and falling oil earnings. From April to December 2020 (9M-2020/21) government revenues were just 55% of the budgeted budget for the entire year. Due to reduced oil export volumes and prices, only 14 percent of expected oil revenue realized. Meanwhile, the pandemic’s higher health and social support costs pushed total spending up by 28% year over year. As a result, the country’s fiscal deficit is expected to rise to over 6% of GDP in 2020/21, with public debt exceeding 50%.
Inflationary pressures grew in 2020/21 as the Iranian rial devalued due to a lack of foreign money and rising economic uncertainty. In February 2021, inflation spiked to nearly 48 percent year over year. Because of US sanctions on accessing foreign reserves, the currency has lost half of its value since April 2020. The rial has regained around 15% of its value as a result of hopes that sanctions will be lifted after the November US elections. The stock market was negatively impacted by exchange rate volatility and government funding operations.
Recent economic trends have added stress to low-income households and slowed the decrease of poverty. From 2017/18 to 2018/19, poverty climbed by one percentage point, reaching 14% before the epidemic. The loss of household income owing to the pandemic, combined with the rising cost of living due to inflation, is expected to push poverty up by 20 percentage points. In response, a variety of social safety measures have been implemented, but while they partially compensate for lost revenues, their real value will diminish as long as inflation remains high.
Iran’s economic prospects are dependent on how the COVID-19 outbreak develops and how quickly the world economy recovers. Due to sluggish vaccination deployment and weak demand from regional trading partners, the country’s GDP is expected to recover gradually. Inflation is expected to fall, although it is still expected to remain above 20% on average in the medium term. Economic pressure on disadvantaged households will persist due to a lack of fiscal space and excessive inflation. Cash transfers that are better targeted can help lower mitigation costs.
The fiscal deficit is expected to remain large in the medium term if oil revenues do not improve. Modest economic recovery would imply slow increase in non-oil revenues as well. Increased reliance on bond issuance, particularly short-term bonds, would result in higher interest and amortization costs. More government debt issuance and asset sales could raise financial contagion risks in the stock market and put more strain on the undercapitalized banking sector.
What does Iran stand for?
“A guest is a gift from God,” as the proverb goes, and this phrase holds a special place in Iranian society. Iranians are willing to provide the best of what they have, whether it is to a foreigner or a fellow countryman. This centuries-old practice has grown in popularity in recent years as more tourists visit to quench their thirst for knowledge about this lesser-known region and, no doubt, to carry home a lasting impression of Iranian hospitality.
Is Iran capable of defeating Israel?
For the second time in recent memory, Israel wants the world to know that it is ready and prepared to strike Iran militarily if necessary.
Israel’s Defense Minister, Benny Gantz, has stated repeatedly in recent weeks that Israel is prepared to strike Iran militarily to stop it from progressing its nuclear program. “He told a briefing of foreign ambassadors and envoys, “I don’t rule out the possibility that Israel will have to take action in the future to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.” To add to the gloom, Israel Military Forces (IDF) Chief of General Staff Aviv Kochavi claimed that “progress in the Iranian nuclear program has pushed the IDF to accelerate its operational planning” for an attack on the country, and that a newly agreed “defense budget… is geared to handle this.” He claimed that a specialized team had been established to boost preparations for a strike on Iranian nuclear sites if Israel’s top leadership ordered one. Israeli Prime Minister Neftali Bennett, for one, has stated that his country is prepared to participate “If it ever feels the need to, it can “act alone” against Iran. After an attack on an Israeli-managed tanker off the coast of Oman, which Tel Aviv and its allies blamed on Iran, he made the remarks.
To be sure, Israel has conducted limited operations against Iran in the past, including as raids on Iranian allies in Syria and nuclear sabotage, and it may do so again in the future. But how certain should we be that Tel Aviv is actually ready and eager to strike Iran as a result of progress in the Iranian nuclear program, knowing full well that this will inevitably lead to war between the two countries and their allies? Given Israeli decision-makers’ political and military restrictions, a military clash is highly unlikely.
In his autobiography, My Country, My Life, none other than Israel’s former PM and Defense Minister Ehud Barak emphasized this rule in explicit terms. Barak sketched out the paradigm that has dictated and would most likely continue to shape Israeli policy toward Iran. “There were only two possibilities,” he explained, for Israel to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (read: “nuclear program,” because Barak blindly overlooks US intelligence judgments that Iran had ceased nuclear weapons aspirations in 2003). One option was to “It is time for the Americans to intervene.” There was only one alternative choice “not to obstruct Israel’s ability to do so.”
Barak, on the other hand, believes that “Hider” is exactly what successive US administrations have doneand will continue to do.
Even during George W. Bush’s military interventionism, Israel did not have a free hand to do anything it wanted. When Bush learned in 2008 that Israel was trying to buy heavy weapons from the US, he confronted Barak and then-prime minister Ehud Olmert, according to Barak’s memoirs. “I want to tell both of you right now, as president,” Bush said, “that any action you take to mount an attack against nuclear reactors will be fully opposed by us.”
“In order to avoid any confusion,” Bush added, “I reiterate.” We don’t expect you to do it. We’re not going to do it as long as I’m president, either. I wanted it to be as clear as possible.” It’s worth noting that, according to Barak, Bush gave this warning despite the fact that Israel at the time lacked the military capability to attack Iran.
This adamant opposition to a strike on Iran, according to Barak, has a cost “Since the Bush administration supported Israel’s 2007 bombing of Syria’s nascent nuclear program just a year before, it has had a “dramatic” influence on him and Olmert. Washington’s approval, or lack thereof, was plainly important in both circumstances.
The similar dynamic governed US-Israel relations during Obama’s presidency, according to Barak’s memoirs. He recalls how then-US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta handled the situation “At a time when the Obama administration was focused on exerting international diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran, he made no secret of his opposition to a military strike. Panetta is the head of the Panetta Group “Barak wrote, “urged me to ‘think twice, three times’ before proceeding down that road,” and assumed Tel Aviv would keep Washington informed of its intentions. “When will we know if you decide to attack Iranian facilities?” he allegedly asked Barak.
According to Barak’s narrative, Israel was persuaded to abandon a planned strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in the summer of 2012 “because it would jeopardize our relations with the United States.” After the nuclear deal was signed in 2015, Washington’s demands continued to constrain Tel Aviv. Even back then, Barak recalls, the Israelis couldn’t just go to war with Iran without the Obama administration’s approval: “We needed to come to an agreement with the Americans about what kind of military action we, or they, might have to take if the Iranians moved forward with their nuclear weapons program again.”
Because of these political realities, Israel is unlikely to launch an open attack on Iran. The military limits that Israel faces, on the other hand, are equally critical.
To be sure, even without its ready-to-deploy nuclear weapons, Israel is more than capable of striking Iran’s armed forces with rapid and destructive strikes, both on land and at sea. Iran’s air defenses and depleted air force can be irreversibly damaged by its fleet of American fighter jets and bombers. Even Iran’s increasingly powerful, precise, and far-reaching missile and drone systems do not significantly alter the power balance in the skies. In short, the IDF’s dominance over Iran’s armed forces in terms of military weaponry is undeniable, not to mention unearthly.
However, if an all-out conflict entices the IDF ground forces onto the battlefield, this vast dominance will be rendered significantly less significant. Why? Israel’s top military officials have been acutely aware since the IDF’s humiliating defeat in the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah that the country’s land forces are ill-prepared for a full-scale war with a fighting force even modestly capable of packing a punch.
The 33-day conflict with Hezbollah proved that Israel’s ground forces were hopelessly ill-prepared to conduct a genuine war with a formidable foe, as evidenced by Israel’s own damning investigation into the 2006 war, as well as findings from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the US Army.
Since then, there have been some indications of the IDF taking corrective action to fix its faults. Nonetheless, there is no reason to suppose that its ground troops have improved significantly since the 2006 battle. Unsurprisingly, Gadi Eizenkot found “the ground forces in fairly horrible form” and “an army that had gotten fat in… all the wrong areas in the decade after the Second Lebanon War” when he took over as Chief of General Staff of the IDF a few months after Protective Edge (the 2014 Gaza War). When the outgoing ombudsman of the Israeli Defense Ministry, Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick, cautioned lawmakers in a letter in late 2018, the situation appeared to be similar “The country’s ground forces were unprepared for a future war, according to a “contentious” meeting.
Knowing full well that an overt military operation inside Iranian territory will most likely lock Israel and Iran into an irreversible spiral of escalation, pitting ill-prepared IDF ground troops against Iranian forces and regional allies such as Hezbollah, Israel’s highest military and political echelons are unlikely to order such an assault, knowing full well that such an assault will most likely lock Israel and Iran into an irreversible spiral of escalation.
But, if Washington’s red light and Tel Aviv’s own military calculus make a brazen breach of Iranian sovereignty by the IDF implausible, what accounts for Israeli statesmen’s public, sometimes gaudy, saber-rattling? Threats like this are partially designed for home consumption. Talk of bombing Iran could be an attempt to avoid seeming weak in front of political opponents in a highly militarized societal setting that has increasingly moved toward the far right in recent decades.
It might also be interpreted as a negotiating stance to enhance Israel’s position with the Biden administration on problems that are much closer to home than Iran’s nuclear program. By keeping the threat of striking Iran alivea source of great concern in Western capitals due to the potential for catastrophic consequencesIsraeli leaders can offer to forego their non-existent plans to go to war with Iran in exchange for other benefits, such as Biden dropping his opposition to illegal settlement expansion in the occupied territories (a secondary issue for the US) and more military and financial aid.