Indicators of the Russian economy In 2020, the global gross domestic product per capita was estimated to be at 10.915 US dollars. In contrast, Russia’s GDP per capita was 10.295 US dollars, or $1,483.50 billion US dollars for the entire country.
Who is wealthier, the United States or Russia?
While the United States has the greatest economy in the world, with a GDP of $21 trillion, Russia’s nominal GDP is $1.48 trillion. 1 Russia lags behind considerably smaller countries like the United Kingdom, Italy, and France in terms of GDP.
Which country owes the most money?
Venezuela has the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the world as of December 2020, by a wide margin. Venezuela may have the world’s greatest oil reserves, but the state-owned oil corporation is thought to be poorly managed, and the country’s GDP has fallen in recent years.
Is Russia more prosperous than India?
India vs. Russia: A Comparison of Economic Indicators At a GDP of $2.7 trillion, India is the world’s seventh largest economy, while Russia ranks 11th with $1.7 trillion. India and Russia were rated 6th and 162nd in terms of GDP 5-year average growth and GDP per capita, respectively.
How big is Russia compared to the United States?
The United States has a land area of roughly 9,833,517 square kilometers, while Russia has a land area of approximately 17,098,242 square kilometers, making Russia 74 percent larger than the United States. Meanwhile, the United States has a population of 332.6 million people (190.9 million fewer people live in Russia).
What is the size of the Russian army?
Perhaps Putin and the Russians have reached a stalemate in Ukraine; both sides claim to have suffered losses, but there is almost no independent confirmation. However, the Russians are doing quite well in the south and southeast, as you may have noticed. What if Putin does not complete his task and the British Army is forced to confront Russian forces? With the exception of some air assault forces, the Russians have not deployed their finest trained and equipped formations into Ukraine. Elements of 11 Russian armies or equivalent formations have been deployed, according to various sources: First Guards Tank Army, Second, Eighth, and Twentieth Guards Combined Arms Armies; Fifth, Thirty-Sixth, Forty-First, and Fifty-Eighth Combined Arms Armies; XXII Corps and elements of the Airborne Forces not to mention the Black Sea Fleet and its marines. Two full combined arms divisions and two air assault divisions, as well as 12 combined arms and specialised brigades and three air assault brigades, appear to have been committed by these units. This brings the overall number of personnel to almost 150,000. When logistical forces, artillery and missile troops, and engineers are factored in, the widely reported figure of 190,000 appears to be a reasonable estimate.
During offensive operations, Russian troops, like their Soviet forefathers, use an echelon system or waves, if you prefer. When the first wave has finished, run out of steam, or suffered significant casualties, an echelon change occurs, with the second wave crossing through and taking up the fight. The first operational echelon is what we’re seeing in Ukraine right now. So, what and where is the second? This is most likely made up of the remnants of the armies indicated above, which are still in Russia and likely on shorter notice to move. The First and Twentieth Armies are the most important of them, holding many of Russia’s greatest soldiers and most modern weaponry. According to one source, the Ukrainians annihilated the First GTA, which is unlikely given that only a reconnaissance brigade and two regiments have been reported in Ukraine. The rest of the army is most likely in the Voronezh area. Twentieth is almost certainly east of Kharkov.
So, what are Russia’s possibilities for employing the next echelon, and then a second strategic echelon behind it? The first option is to finish or partially complete the conquest of Ukraine. The Donbass, the Sea of Azov, and the Black Sea beaches that connect Russia and Crimea will be incorporated as autonomous republics; what about the rest? Perhaps the goal is to separate Ukraine along the Dnieper River, which serves as a natural border. Ethnic cleansing will take place east of the river, which is already underway, reducing the need for a long and expensive counter-insurgency effort. That would leave a shattered Ukraine west of the river, devoid of industrial potential and ports. But, given Putin’s statements that Ukraine is Russian, the land west of the Dnieper could be invaded, ethnically cleansed, and kept down with a smaller force than would otherwise be required and without the call-up of huge numbers of reservists.
This may be accomplished by shifting the main effort from Kiev to the south, along with a ruse or diversion. Maskirovka is a well-known ideological instrument in both the Soviet Union and Russia. So, while we’re all focused on the situation surrounding Kiev and the famous 40-mile-long immobile convoy (perhaps there just to draw attention), airborne units working with the Black Sea navy encircle Odessa and then conquer the rest of Moldova east of the Dniester River. Despite the losses, the Russians have a large number of airborne and air assault formations, as well as the aircraft to transport them, soldiers who have only recently acted decisively in Kazakhstan. Once in possession of Moldova, a non-NATO country, the Russians will have completed a successful strategic encirclement of Kiev and will be well positioned to strike into western Ukraine from the south.
It’s also worth mentioning how the Russians employ information operations to spread propaganda. Manipulation of facts and truth is as much a weapon for them as tanks and planes – after all, they originated the term agitprop. Anyone who served in the former Yugoslavia will immediately recognize this. The concept of focusing not just military but also media attention on Kiev while pushing hard elsewhere is axiomatic in Russian, as well as Soviet, strategic planning. Remember that the Ukrainians, who attended the same school, will be doing the same thing.
This would be a Russian win, albeit at significant economic and political consequences. Putin’s second choice may come as a result of such a win, reversing the 30-year narrative of Nato marching eastwards towards Russia. This narrative has undoubtedly been viewed in Moscow as a series of insults and provocations by the West: the EU’s and Nato’s admission of the Baltic States, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland; the intervention in the Balkans on behalf of Muslims and against Russia’s historic clients, the Serbs; the EU’s cynical underwriting of Yanukovych’s ouster in 2014, despite its undertakings; Nato ships in the To counter this narrative, a Russian triumph in Ukraine and the annexation of Moldova a vestige of the Soviet empire separated from Mother Russia by chance of history would bring Russia closer to Western Europe. This would also act as a message to non-aligned countries not to consider joining the EU or NATO.
A third alternative is for Putin’s strongest formations to relocate: possibly to build another land corridor, this time with the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad? This move could be made instead of, or in addition to, any other possibilities. Of course, this necessitates a violation of Nato territory, as well as the unavoidable use of Article 5. Putin plainly does not fear Nato in the medium term, but in the long run, Russian military force combined with the crushing weight of western sanctions, as well as its economic and financial resources, will be too much for Russia to bear.
It is possible to dismiss the use of nuclear weapons. They are considerably too rigid, and huge reprisal is a distinct possibility. In nuclear terms, Russia is outgunned by at least three to one, and no Russian leader will risk the annihilation of the sacred narod. Chemical and biological weapons, on the other hand, should not be overlooked: they have already been employed in Syria and are undoubtedly part of the weapon load of both tactical and operational weapons systems.
Of course, Russia may be failing in Ukraine and unable to deploy additional forces. Putin would pay a severe price if he failed – Nikita Khrushchev did not survive the humiliation of the Cuban missile crisis for long. It would almost certainly prompt non-aligned countries to rush to join Nato, further isolating and isolating Russia. As a result, there is no positive outcome.