In 1873, Congress passed an act known as the “Crime of ’73,” which prohibited the minting of silver coins. Professor of government Elizabeth Sanders cites the demonetization of silver as one of a few key measures of the time that led many working people, particularly farmers, to conclude that the national state was perpetrating a “fraud against the people” on behalf of a wealthy elite. The amount of money in circulation fell when silver coins were delegitimized. Creditors, such as banks and merchants, benefited from a tighter money supply at the expense of debtors, particularly farmers who had to borrow annually from banks and merchants in order to cultivate cash crops that could only bring in money for debt repayment at harvest time. Farmers wanted the money supply to expand so that more money would be available for loan, crop prices would rise, and debts would be simpler to repay.
Those who advocated for expanding the money supply ranged from those who urged that the federal government produce paper money that was not backed by gold or silver to those who called for silver to be remonetized. In the 1890s, proponents of free silver started to believe that unlimited coinage of silver, a reform less drastic than others favored by agrarian revolutionaries, might bring disparate groups together into a national coalition to fight politicians who supported monied interests.
In 1891, the People’s Party, often known as the Populists, was established as a political party. “Its philosophy was anti-corporate, though not anti-capitalist,” Sanders notes. “Not to turn the clock back on industrial development, but to harness the new technological power for social good, to use the state to check exploitative excesses, to uphold the rights and opportunities of labor (farm and factory), and to maintain a healthy and creative business competition,” Sanders writes of the Populist platform during the 1892 election campaign.
Farmers have no interest in inflation.
Large sums of money must be borrowed by farmers. Farmers must borrow enormous quantities of money to make capital investments in land, farm machinery, and even seed in the spring.
The farmer may have to repay these loans over a period of time ranging from five years for machinery to twenty years for land loans.
The farmers’ ability to repay their debts is influenced by the value of their money.
Inflation reduces the value of money, making it simpler for farmers to repay their loans.
For instance, if there was 10% inflation over five years, it would cost 161.05 dollars to acquire something that would have cost 100 dollars five years ago. To put it another way, the 100 dollars borrowed five years ago is now only worth 59.04 dollars. This makes it easier for the farmer to repay the large sums of money he or she must borrow to run their farms.
Is inflation beneficial to farmers?
In conclusion, the previous discussion produces a mixed message about the impact of inflation on American farmers. Farm commodity prices can be pushed up by inflationary pressures in the economy, but higher commodity prices raise demand for farm inputs, including the cost of borrowed capital. Inflation tends to raise the value of farm assets like land, but it can hinder U.S. ag exports due to its impact on the value of the dollar, according to historical statistics. Many of the impacts are very dependent on the degree and duration of “excessive” inflation in the economy, as well as the final monetary policy change. Also, depending on whether you are a farmland investor, a permanent landowner, or a land renter, as well as your reliance on borrowed capital and/or overseas markets, the outcome may differ. While the impacts of inflation on agriculture appear to be debatable, it is apparent that inflation is terrible for consumers (more on that next month) and deflation is bad for the overall economy, including farmers.
How did farmers try to persuade the government to inflate the currency?
Farmers proposed expanding the money supply to include non-gold-backed dollars in order to cause inflation. Farmers’ first effort was to get Congress to produce greenback banknotes similar to those used during the Civil War.
Why did farmers despise deflation in the late 1800s?
Farmers in the United States have always expressed displeasure with their lot, but the decades following the Civil War were particularly notable in this regard. There was a lot of political instability during this time. Farmers’ precise worries were varied, but at their center was their perception of their political and economic situation deteriorating.
The efforts of farmers to band together for mutual benefit were a defining element of farm unrest. To protest their dwindling fortunes and boost their political and economic power, farmers created cooperatives, interest groups, and political parties. The Grange or Patrons of Husbandry was the first such organization, created in the 1860s to address farmers’ complaints about railroads and a desire for more cooperation in commercial affairs. In the 1870s, the agrarian-dominated Greenback Party emerged. Its primary purpose was to increase the amount of money in circulation, lowering the cost of borrowing for farmers. In the 1880s, the Farmers’ Alliance was founded. Its members engaged in cooperative marketing and pushed the government for business and banking regulations. In the 1890s, disgruntled farmers took their boldest step yet, founding the independent People’s or Populist Party to challenge the Republican and Democratic parties’ control.
Farmers in every section of the country were agitated, but the northern prairie and Plains states experienced the most turmoil. Between 1870 and 1900, a series of droughts wreaked havoc on the region, and grain farmers in the Midwest faced increasing price competition from growers abroad. Farmers in the South revolted as well, but their demonstrations were stifled by prejudice. Most farm organizations excluded black farmers, and many white farmers were hesitant to join the anti-establishment campaign for fear of upsetting the social control structure that kept blacks inferior to whites (Goodwyn, 1978).
The Debate about the Causes of Farm Unrest
For a long time, there was a heated discussion regarding what caused farm discontent. Historians couldn’t reconcile farmers’ concerns with data concerning agricultural terms of trade, or the prices farmers were paid for their production, particularly in comparison to the costs of other products and services they bought, such as transportation, financing, and manufactured goods. However, there appears to be some agreement now. Before delving into the reasons behind this agreement, it’s worth taking a look at some of the farmer’s grievances. What was the source of the farmers’ dissatisfaction? What made them feel so frightened?
The Complaints of Farmers
Farmers’ grievances have been widely documented (Buck, 1913; Hicks, 1931) and are generally uncontroversial. Farmers’ falling wages and tumultuous business ties were the main topics of discussion. Farmers first stated that farm prices were declining and, as a result, their earnings were as well. Overproduction, they said, was to blame for the low pricing. Farmers also claimed that monopolistic railways and grain elevators charged them exorbitant charges for their services. The farmers’ answer to the monopoly dilemma was government regulation. Third, there was a perception of a credit and money shortage. Farmers believed that interest rates were excessively high due to monopoly lenders, and that the money supply was insufficient, resulting in deflation. Farmers repaid loans with dollars worth much more than those they had borrowed as prices fell, increasing the true burden of debt. Farmers sought interest rate ceilings, public boards to resolve foreclosure processes, and the United States Treasury to freely mint silver to expand the money supply. Finally, farmers decried the railways’, big business’s, and money lenders’ political clout. These interests wielded excessive sway over policymaking in state legislatures and the United States Congress. In brief, farmers believed a gang of greedy railroads, creditors, and industrialists were shortchanging their economic and political interests.
The Puzzle of Farm Unrest
Farmers’ objections have been subjected to rigorous statistical scrutiny by economic historians. Each assertion has been found to be contradictory with the existing facts about the terms of trade to some extent.
Take, for example, farmers’ complaints about price increases. During this time, farm prices were declining, as were the prices of most other items. However, this does not indicate that farm revenues were likewise declining. For starters, real prices (farm prices as a percentage of the overall price level) are a better indicator of the value that farmers received for their output. When looking at real prices in the post-Civil War period, there is a roughly horizontal trend (North, 1974). Furthermore, farmers were not necessarily worse off even if real agricultural prices were declining (Fogel and Rutner, 1972). The negative consequences of declining real prices on incomes could have been mitigated by increased farm production. Finally, while there is no direct evidence about farmer incomes, estimates show that farm incomes were not declining (Bowman, 1965). There were periods of suffering in some areasfor example, Iowa and Illinois in the 1870s and Kansas and Nebraska in the 1890sbut there was no general agricultural downturn. Data on wages, land rentals, and capital returns, on the other hand, imply that land in the West was opened to settlement far too slowly (Fogel and Rutner, 1972).
Consider the statements made by farmers regarding interest rates and mortgage debt. True, interest rates on the frontier were higher than in the Northeast, averaging two to three percentage points more. Frontier farmers, understandably, grumbled about having to pay so much for credit. Lenders, on the other hand, may have been justified in their interest rates. Drought susceptibility on the frontier and financial uncertainty among many settlers resulted in higher-than-average lending risks, for which creditors were paid (Bogue, 1955). Borrowers, for example, frequently defaulted, leaving land worth barely a portion of the amount as collateral. This story calls into question the exploitation theory. Furthermore, there was no evidence to support the monopoly concept when farmer statements were submitted to rigorous statistical testing (Eichengreen, 1984). Instead, high rates of interest appear to have been compensation for the inherent risks of lending to frontier farmers, as is typical of the frontier mortgage market. Finally, in terms of the cost of a dropping price level on debtors, deflation may not have been as severe as farmers claimed. The average mortgage was for a short period of time, less than five years, showing that lenders and borrowers could typically predict price increases (North, 1974).
Finally, examine the railroads’ objections from farmers. These look to be the most viable options. Nonetheless, most historians rejected farmers’ complaints for a long time, arguing that the real cost to farmers of delivering their food to market must have been gradually declining due to railroad productivity advances. However, as Robert Higgs (1970) illustrates, increases in rail freight productivity did not always transfer into reduced rates for farmers and consequently greater farm gate prices. Between 1865 and 1900, real rates (railroad rates in relation to the prices farmers received for their output) were very varied. More importantly, rail fares did not fall in relation to farm prices for the entire period. The terms of commerce began to improve in favor of farmers only in the 1890s. Aldrich (1985) finds a falling trend in railroad rates before 1880, but no trend or a rising trend thereafter, using alternative data.
The Causes of Farm Unrest
The available evidence supports or even contradicts many of the farmer’s allegations, raising issues regarding the underlying reasons of farm unrest. What or who, if not the railroads’ monopoly power and creditors, was to blame for farmers’ woes?
Agrarian discontent, according to most economic historians, represented the increased dangers and uncertainties of agriculture following the Civil War. Risk or uncertainty can be viewed of as an economic force that lowers welfare. Farmers can now decrease their exposure to environmental and economic unpredictability by using advanced production technologies and agricultural futures markets at a low cost. Risk avoidance was substantially more expensive in the late 1800s. Farmers suffered as a result of the increased risk and uncertainty. Farmers on the border appear to have been particularly vulnerable to these uncertainties and risks.
What were the potential dangers? First, following the Civil War, agriculture had become increasingly commercialized (Mayhew, 1972). Farmers who had previously been self-sufficient were now reliant on creditors, merchants, and railroads for their livelihoods. These partnerships brought with them chances for financial gain, but they also brought with them commitments, challenges, and hazards that many farmers did not appreciate. Second, global grain markets were becoming increasingly integrated, resulting in increased competition and price volatility in markets previously dominated by US producers (North, 1974). Third, agriculture was now taking place in the United States’ semi-arid zone. Farmers in Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas faced unexpected and challenging growing circumstances. Droughts hit the Plains on a regular basis, but they were unpredictable, causing financial difficulty for many farmers. Their predicament was exacerbated by the increased price elasticity (responsiveness) of global agriculture supply (North, 1974). Drought-stricken farmers could no longer rely on higher domestic pricing for their crops due to reduced harvests.
A significant body of evidence now supports the theory that rising risks and uncertainties in U.S. agriculture contributed to discontent. First, between 1866 and 1909, there were significant relationships between various indices of economic risk and uncertainty and the geographic distribution of unrest in fourteen northern states (McGuire, 1981; 1982). The variability in agricultural prices, yields, and incomes across the northern states was directly linked to farm unrest. Second, states with high rates of agricultural foreclosures experienced the most turmoil (Stock, 1986). On the frontier, the average farmer would have had a neighbor whose farm had been repossessed by creditors, causing him to be concerned about his own financial stability in the future. Third, in the 1890s, populist agitation in Kansas coincided with unanticipated fluctuations in agricultural prices, resulting in lost earnings and lower incomes (DeCanio, 1980). Finally, as previously stated, high interest rates were not a sign of monopoly, but rather a means of compensating creditors for the higher risks associated with frontier lending (Eichengreen, 1984).
The Historical Significance of Farm Unrest
Farm unrest had far-reaching and long-lasting economic implications in the United States. Above all, it marked the beginning of substantial and long-term institutional transformation (Hughes, 1991; Libecap, 1992).
The transformation began in the 1870s. In response to farmer complaints, state legislatures in the Midwest adopted a slew of legislation governing railways, grain elevators, and warehouse prices and procedures. ‘The’ “The “Grange” regulations marked a watershed moment in government regulation of the private sector, reversing a long-standing trend. They also generated a succession of major court decisions supporting the government’s regulatory powers (Hughes, 1991). The United States Supreme Court dismissed a challenge to the legitimacy of the Granger statutes in Munn v. Illinois (1877), famously holding that the government had the legal power to control any commerce “It is in the public interest.”
Farmers also went to the federal level to seek satisfaction for their problems. The United States Supreme Court ruled in Wabash, St. Louis, and Pacific Railway v. Illinois in 1886 that only the federal government had the authority to regulate interstate commerce. As a result, the states were unable to regulate many issues that farmers were concerned about. The Interstate Commerce Act, approved by Congress in 1887, gave the Interstate Commerce Commission regulatory authority over long-distance train shipping. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 followed, prohibiting monopolies as well as certain conspiracies, combinations, and barriers of trade. Cow farmers in the Midwest pushed for the passage of an antitrust statute, claiming that the famed Chicago meat packers collaborated to artificially keep cattle prices low (Libecap, 1992). Both statutes signaled the beginning of the federal government’s increasing engagement in private economic activities (Hughes, 1991; Ulen, 1987).
Although not all agrarian proposals were implemented, even those that fell on deaf ears in Congress and state legislatures had long-term consequences (Hicks, 1931). During the Progressive Era, for example, several Alliance and Populist proposals such as the progressive income tax and direct election of U.S. Senators became law.
Historians dispute about the late-nineteenth-century farm movements’ legacy. Some see their contributions to the creation of American institutions as favorable (Hicks, 1931), while others do not (Hughes, 1991). Despite this, few would deny their influence. Indeed, most of the institutional transformation in the United States over the last century can be traced back to political and legal reforms launched by farmers in the late 1800s (Hughes, 1991).
The Sources of Cooperation in the Farm Protest Movement
Farmers in the nineteenth century were exceptionally successful at banding together to gain economic and political influence. Nonetheless, historians have generally ignored one component of agricultural unrest: the sources of cooperation in promoting agrarian interests. Free-riding, according to Olson (1965), should have plagued large lobbying or interest groups like the Grange and the Farmers’ Alliance: the incentives for individuals not to contribute to the collective production of public goodsthose goods for which it is impossible or very expensive to exclude others from enjoying. A logical and self-interested farmer would not join a lobbying group if he could reap the advantages of its efforts without paying any of the expenses.
Most farm interest groups, based on their political clout, were able to put a stop to free-riding. Between 1885 and 1890, Stewart (2006) investigates how the Dakota Farmers’ Alliance accomplished this. First, the Dakota Farmers’ Alliance supplied valued goods and services to its members that were not available to outsiders, incentivizing membership. These goods and services included improved trading terms achieved through cooperative marketing and the exchange of agricultural productivity-enhancing information. Second, the Dakota Farmers’ Alliance’s structure as a federation of township chapters allowed the organization to monitor and discipline free-riders. Alliance members were able to persuade people to join the group within townships. This technique appears to have worked among German and Norwegian immigrants, who were far more likely than others to join the Dakota Farmers’ Alliance, and whose likelihood of joining increased as their nationality group’s share of the township population increased. This is in line with long-standing cooperative social norms in Germany and Norway, as well as economic theory on the use of social norms to elicit collaboration in collective action.
References
Mark Aldrich, Mark Aldrich, Mark Aldrich, Mark Aldrich “Railroad Rates and the Populist Uprising,” says the author. 83552 in Agricultural History 41 (1985).
Money at Interest: The Farm Mortgage on the Middle Border, by Allan G. Bogue. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1955.
“An Economic Analysis of Midwestern Farm Values and Farm Land Income, 1860-1900,” by John Bowman. Yale Economic Essays, vol. 5, no. 5, 1965, pp. 317-352.
The Granger Movement: A Study of Agricultural Organization and Its Political, Economic, and Social Manifestations, 1870-1880, by Solon J. Buck. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1913.
“Economic Losses from Forecasting Error in Agriculture,” by Stephen J. DeCanio. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 234-57, 1980.
“Mortgage Interest Rates in the Populist Era,” by Barry Eichengreen. 995-1015 in American Economic Review, vol. 74, no. 1, 1984.
Robert W. Fogel and Jack L. Rutner. “A Report of Some Provisional Findings on the Efficiency Effects of Federal Land Policy, 1850-1900.” Wayne O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue, and Robert W. Fogel edited The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1972.
Lawrence Goodwyn is a writer.
The Populist Moment: A Brief History of America’s Agrarian Revolt Oxford University Press, New York, 1978.
The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party, by John D. Hicks. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1931.
“Railroad Rates and the Populist Uprising,” by Robert Higgs. 29197 in Agricultural History 44 (1970).
The Government Habit Redux: Economic Controls from Colonial Times to the Present, by Jonathan T. Hughes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1991.
“The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust,” by Gary D. Libecap.
Economic Inquiry, vol. 30, no. 2, 1992, pp. 242-62.
Anne Mayhew, Anne Mayhew, Anne Mayhew, Anne Mayhew “A Reappraisal of the Causes of the American Farm Protest Movement, 1870-1900.” 464-475 in Journal of Economic History, vol. 32, no. 2, 1972.
“Economic Causes of Late Nineteenth-Century Agrarian Unrest: New Evidence,” by Robert A. McGuire.
83552 in Journal of Economic History, vol. 41, no. 1, 1981.
“Economic Causes of Late Nineteenth-Century Agrarian Unrest: Reply,” Journal of Economic History 42 (1981): 697-99. McGuire, Robert A. “Economic Causes of Late Nineteenth-Century Agrarian Unrest: Reply,” Journal of Economic History 42 (1981): 697-99.
Growth and Welfare in the American Past: A New Economic History, Douglass North. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1974.
Mancur Olson, Mancur Olson, Mancur Olson, Mancur Olson Public Goods and Group Theory: The Logic of Collective Action Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965.
“Free-riding, Collective Action, and Farm Interest Group Membership,” by James I. Stewart. Working Paper, Reed College, 2006. Stewart, J., http://www.reed.edu/stewartj
“Real Estate Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Midwestern Agrarian Unrest, 1865-1920,” by James H. Stock.
89-105 in Journal of Economic History, vol. 44, 1983.
“The Market for Regulation: The ICC from 1887 to 1920,” by Thomas C. Ulen. American Economic Review, vol. 70, no. 10 (1980), pp. 306-10.
Why did farmers prefer low-cost money?
Farmers desired cheap money because it would increase the value of their crops. Cheap money suggests inflation, which means that there is more money in circulation, lowering the value of each dollar. Farmers’ goods and services will cost more as a result of this, which means more money for them.
What is the rate of inflation in agriculture?
It’s a lot of fun giving seminars and speeches to some of agriculture’s top lifelong learners. Many people are naturally curious about my economic viewpoints. Discussions about the rate of inflation are one topic that generally raises eyebrows. Many people ask if we can trust government data when I provide current inflation rates. “My inflation rate appears to be considerably greater,” people frequently claim.
Inflation data from the government is reported in terms of core and headline inflation. The price levels of a basket of products, excluding food and energy, are used to calculate core inflation. Because these two variables are deemed volatile, they are not included in core inflation, which is a gauge used to calculate cost-of-living adjustments, as well as increases in Social Security and pensions. Food and energy are included in headline inflation, which is a measure of overall inflation. The current rate of core inflation is 1.7 percent, down from 1.9 percent at the start of 2013. Inflation is now at 1.5 percent, down from 1.6 percent at the start of 2013. Before raising interest rates, the Federal Reserve wants these rates to stay below 2.0 percent and 2.5 percent for core and headline inflation, respectively.
To assuage agriculturalists’ fears, the rate of inflation for agriculture has been projected to be between 5% and 10% in recent years. This sector is experiencing inflation because to rising input, equipment, and farmland costs.
The velocity of money, or the number of times dollars change hands or are spent in the economy, influences the rate of inflation. Despite the Federal Reserve’s efforts to print more money, inflation is low in the general economy because velocity is low, as institutions, businesses, and individuals keep large amounts of cash on hand. In contrast, in the agricultural economy, recent affluent times have resulted in increased investment and expenditure in agricultural and rural areas, resulting in a considerably higher money velocity in agriculture and rural areas.
The greatest data we have is from the government, but it’s always a good idea to double-check. Producer inflation is substantially greater than the stated rate, which could mean negative margins are on the way, especially if commodity prices continue to fall.
What exactly is inflation?
Inflation is defined as the rate at which prices rise over time. Inflation is usually defined as a wide measure of price increases or increases in the cost of living in a country.
What was the reaction of farmers to industrialization?
There were numerous changes in America between the commencement of the Second Industrial Revolution and the end of the imperialism movement. The Gilded Age saw a shift in American ideals in this environment. During the Gilded Age, from 1865 to 1900, farmers and industrial workers responded to industrialization by founding organizations that allowed their views to be heard and influencing political parties to help pass national legislation. During the Gilded Age, from 1865 to 1900, farmers and industrial workers responded to industrialisation by founding organizations that allowed their opinions to be heard within the commercial world.